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MALE OCCUPATIONAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN SCOTLAND SINCE THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 
Geoff Payne, B.A. (Econ), M.A. 
ABSTRACT 
'Social' or 'class' mobility is in practice normally 
occupational mobility. The occupational dimension, however, has to 
date received relatively little attention. The thesis explores how 
occupations and occupational mobility have been treated in three bodies 
of work: social mobility studies, sociological theories drawing on 
Marx, and sociological theories of industrial or post-industrial society. 
This discussion provides a wider context by means of which to under-
stand occupational mobility, while also suggesting new areas 1n which 
mobility analysis can throw light on current debates. 
Scotland is then taken as a case study. A brief econom1c 
history and a more detailed account of occupational transition since 
the First World War lay the groundwork for an investigation of 
mobility per se. Earlier accounts of mobility - pa'rticulary that of 
Glass - are shown to be inadequate. 
Detailed examination of mobility rates us1ng data from 
the 1975 Scottish Hobility Study involves four main considerations. 
First, the main patterns are identified, revealing higher rates of 
· intergenerational movement and more 'long-range' mobility than previously 
expected. The upper middle class in particular displays high levels 
of inflow and outflow. Second, changing trends in early career mobility 
over the past 40 years are presented: the trends indicate considerable 
variation between industrial sectors, and the more recent levelling-off 
of upward mobility is shown to result largely from the growing dominance 
of certain service industries in the creation of non-manual employment.· 
The third area of investigation is the relationship between 
education and mobility. The generally low level of qualified manpower 
and the rapid growth of non-manual employment are used to explain the 
poor association between academic achievement and first occupation 
until the 1960s. This relates to the final question of career mobility, 
which is shown to follow the broad pattern of first job mobility. 
An exploration of ideas about deskilling and labour markets in terms 
of mobility rates illustrates how an occupational emphasis establishes 
wider links to sociological theory than one limited to 'social'mobility 
The thesis includes two appendices, one dealing with the occupational 
class schema used in the study, and the other describing the methodology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social Mobility and Occupational Mobility 
'Social' or 'class mobility' is normally thought of as 
movement between social cla?ses, whereas it is operationalised in 
occupational terms and what is actually measured is moy~ment between broad 
groupings of occupations. It is therefore often forgotten that social mobility 
is in fact occupational mobility, and so it is a produ_ct of employment processeE 
which have taken place in specific historfcal and economic circumstances. 
The sociological literature contains few attempts at an occupational 
explanation of social mobility or accounts of how changes in mobility 
and the class structure have been altered by major social and economic 
events like two World Wars or the Great Depression. 
Perhaps because the present research set out to investigate 
variations ~n mobility at a time when nationalism was an active political 
force, mobility ~n Scotland was seen as necessarily bound up with those 
features of Scottish society which made it distinctive. From the start, 
therefore, mobility was treated in a more concrete sense than in other 
studies which had taken an interest in mobility only to the extent that 
it shed light on theories of stratification. An emphasis on the histor-
ical, econom~c and social context of mobility runs throughout this study. 
This perspective is outlined in the opening chapter which, 
starting from a consideration of earlier key contributions, attempts to 
show that mobility research has become increasingly restricted to a 
limited number of concerns. Sorokin's original multi-dimensional and 
all-encompassing vision has been replaced with more specific technical 
concerns about comparative analysis of how 'open' societies have become, 
or how national, educational and class recruitment systems op-
erate. There is therefore a need to re-establish links between mobility 
analysis and other themes. Conceiving of mobility in occupational terms 
makes it easier to see what such links would be like (for example, with 
labour market theory, occupation~l ansition, or theories of post-
. {}' 
. . _i;_--'7 
""'-:V') .~4 
industrial society). 
That is not to say that mobility is not about stratification: 
indeed, quite the reverse. But before one can deal with the abstractions 
2 
of mobility and class analysis, it is necessary to establish the occupation-
al base on which a number of theoretical class models have (often un-
wittingly) been built. The present study concentrates more on this. 
basic task, as a necessary first step, rather than on theorizing the 
current state of social class in Scotland. 
Central to the anayl_sisJof oteupati~nal mobility· is the 
question of the evolution of occupational stnuctures. Put at its most 
simple, in modern society an increasing proportion of jobs are white collar. 
This creates new opportunities for both upward mobility and the 'inherit-
ance' of non-manual employment by the children of non-manual workers. 
Mobility rates are therefore seen as directly related to the way in which 
demand for labour in a society.changes over time. 
The precise nature of such changes is not unproblematic, and 
therefore new information drawn for economic histories and a reworking 
of census reports will be presented to document the Scottish experience. 
This .evidence is specific to Scotland but at the same time illustrat-
ive of modern society. Chapter 4 deals with the distinctive social 
characteristics that make Scotland sociologically interesting as a site, 
together with a brief history_ of economic and industrial development. 
This is seen as providing the concrete grounding which is normall1 
lacking in mobility studies. It is also a contribution to the general 
understanding of Scottish society, a society which has in the past, 
received little directsociological analysis. The following chapter 
goes on to look at male employment s~nce the first World War in some 
detail. Industrial development is shown to produce a particular mixture 
of types of employment, in part typical of other modern societies and in 
part a result of the unique history of Scotland. 
3 
However, these chapters are not purely descriptive, because 
the material presented has been selected in the light of the discussion 
that preceeds them, and. is addressed to a number of theoretical issues. 
While it is a significant step to explain mobility in terms of occupation-
al transition, it is also necessary to ask what brings about this increase 
in the proportion of white collar jobs? Two alternative eKPlanations 
are offered: on the one hand, a marxist view sees the conditions of 
production under monopoly capitalism as the root cause, while on the 
other, the theory of industrial society attributes occupational transit-
ion to new technologies and the logic of industrialism. The former view 
also tends to play down the wider significance of this structural change, 
whereas the latter view places the new middle classes at the centre of 
the stage. 
Much of marxist writing on mobility and occupational change 
is concentrated around two problems, the nature of the 'new middle classes', 
and the deskilling of the labour process. Despite recent claims to the 
contrary, Marx wrote very little on the new middle class or mobility, and 
did not see its importance. This is not surprising, because he also 
failed to account adequately for the occupational strata that lie between 
the bourgeoisie and manual labourers. Recent debates (for example the 
writings of Poulantzas, Hunt and Wright) are reluctant testimony to the 
fact that while Marx recognised the existence of the 'dritte personen' 
he afforded them little attention. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
identify within the organisation of monopoly capitalism factors that 
generate new occupational roles: the banking system.and competitive 
exploitation of science for profit maximisation are two examples. The 
discussion of the theory of capitalist societY in chapter 2 tries to 
assemble an explanation of why new occupations are created, and also 
-draws attention to what the incumbents of such occupations do in the 
production process. The latter involves an analysis of occupational 
functions, which lies at the heart of arguments over boundaries 
between the capitalist class and the new middle classes on the one hand, 
and the new middle classes and the class of manual labourers on tth~ 
other. 
The second theme in marxist accounts of the labour process 1s 
the degradation of skills and the proletarianisation of marginal 
labour. Although such views have recently come under attack, a further 
test of such models 1s to examine flows of recruitment between occupa-
tional classes with similar skill levels. Deskilling and proletarian-
isation are important for accounts of mobility because they propose 
that genuine opportunities for mobility are increasingly restricted. 
In contrast, the theory of industrial society (which is 
reviewed in chapter 3) explicitly identifies the upgrading of skill 
levels and increases in social mobility as core elements of advanced 
industrialisation. Because specialist abstract knowledge is central 
to the technology on which modern or post-industrial societies depend, 
new occupational roles are needed to acquire, apply, and coordinate 
that knowledge. The new middle classes that result are seen to be 
sufficiently numerous and influential to warrant a revision of tradition-
al class theory. While some writers suggest that class conflict is re-
placed by a new social order, others regard class conflict as substantia-
lly modified by the existence of the new classes. It is the latter view 
that the present author finds more plausible, and the professional/ 
managerial class is singled out as requiring particular attention in the 
empirical analysis. Not least, the relationship between occupational 
achievement and educational qualifications is identified as an important 
factor in recruitme~t to this class. Following Giddens and Parkin, 
credentialism and mobility are seen as central to an understanding 
of this class, although perhaps such an '~nderstanding' has yet to be 
achieved. 
Three ma1n themes from the theory of industrial society are 
4 
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regarded as particularly relevant to mobility research. The first is 
the idea of sectoral shift of employment from primary production and 
manufacture into service industries. This creates new kinds of occupa-
tions and reduces the level of employment in older types of occupation. 
Sectoral shift fuels occupational transition and therefore analysis by 
industrial sector is one of the major tools to be used in the investi-
gation of mobility rates. Writers on modernization and convergence have 
also claimed that mobility rates increase in response to occupational 
transition._ Data from the 1975 Scottish Mobility Study are used to explore 
this idea for the period since World War I. Finally, the idea of labour 
markets and their segmentation is used to explicate certain assumptions 
about mobility processes, and 1n turn, mobility rates are proposed as a 
possible means of identifying labour market boundaries. 
Each of the two basic theoretical perspectives provides a 
necessary framework in which to explain the occupational transition 
effect. Their significance for the present study is that they offer a 
series of conceptual reference points, so that mobility can be attached 
to other sociological work in addition to its conventional siting in 
stratification theory. In as far as the study attempts new theoretical 
insights, it is in establishing such connections. Thus the mobility 
analysis draws on ideas from the sociology of the labour process and 
in turn provides new ways of examining models of employment which have 
not previously been expressed in mobility terms. The main thrust of 
this approach is to demonstrate the potential of such connections: quite 
deliberately, the study discusses a range of connections rather than 
concentrating in detail on any one, although naturally some ideas like 
sectoral shift of industries and the operation of labour markets rece1ve 
more attention than others. The overall position is one which borr·ows 
eclectically from both main streams of sociological analysis. 
One result of the theoretical and sociographical accounts 1n 
Chapter 1 to 5 is a critique of some of Glass's findings in Social 
6 
Mobility in Britain. It is argued that this key work, which has been 
the basis for so much theorizing of the British class structure and 
provided for over twenty years the cornerstone of knowledge about mobility, 
is not so much out of date as inaccurate in its statements on rates of 
mobility .. Both occupational transition and class differentials in 
fertility are used in Chapter 6 to show that Glass seems to have under-
estimated the amount of mobility, both in Scotland and in England and 
Wales. 
This leaves a substantial gap in our knowledge, which is only 
partially filled ~y the recent Nuf£ield Survey of England and Wales. The 
present study does not attempt a direct comparison, because the present 
author finds their results unsatisfactory for a number of technical and 
conceptual reasons. Not least of these doubts is the model and operat-
ionalisation of social class used, on which the reported levels of mobil-
ity completely depend. Further details of this are to be found 1n 
Appendix I, which also explains the class schema used in the Scottish 
study. 
· The empirical evidence for the research is drawn from official 
sources and from the 1975 national survey of Scotland by the Scottish 
Mobility Study (on which the author worked: see Appendix 2). This 
provided information on a random sample of over 4500 men aged 20 to 64, 
resident in Scotland, and it is their careers which are analysed 1n 
Chapters 7 to 10. Each chapter deals with one conventional focus of 
interest: intergenerational mobility; trends in mobility, education and 
occupational achievement; and intra-generational mobility. However, 
although the new data are intrinsically interesting and therefore report-
ed in some detail, their presentation and analysis draws on the theoret-
ical issues identified in earlier sections. 
Thus Chapter 7 presents new evidence on mobility rates, and 
shows how upwaru ~ability is associated with occupational classes that 
have expanded in the last fifty years. The identification of considerable 
I 
long range mobility, and general high levels of social fluidity 1s 
used as a test of var1ous models of mobility and the class structure 
(e.g. the buffer-zone thesis). While in general the conclusions are 
at variance with the ~odels, a comparison of elite mobility and mass 
mobility shows that social fluidity does not extend beyond the upper 
middle class to the elites. At the same time, the picture of fluidity 
has to be balanced against the continued relative inequalities in 
access to non-manual occupations, which restricts the life chances of 
manual workers' sons. The degree of movement in the several parts of the 
class system varies: the working class 'rump' appears to be becoming 
more consolidated, whereas the upper reaches of the middle classes show 
little in the way of common backgrounds as a potential source of class 
solidarity. An appendix to Chapter 7 explains why the upper middle class 
of professionals and managers needs to be investigated separately from 
other groups whic~Goldthorpe regards as the Service class. 
7 
Social fluidity - or rigidity for that matter - is constantly 
changing, and the next stage of'the analysis deals with trends in mobility 
rates. By using moving averages, the impact ·of the Second World War and 
new patterns energing in the 1960's are demonstrated. The several occup-
ational classes comprising non-manual employment are examined for growth 
in size and mobility: the two do not necessarily coincide, and the 
classes themselves show no uniform profile. The finding that upward 
mobility is certainly not increasing and may even be decreasing s1nce 
1960 is probably the study's m•:ost striking result. The pattern 1s 
attributed to a combination of sectoral shift between industries and the 
expans1on of non-manual occupations within industries, culminating in 
those new non-manual occupations of the 1960's being heavily concentrated 
in the 'newer service' industries -which have traditionally been p~or 
upward mobility routes. 
Although the emphasis 1n this discussion is on the demand 
side of mobility, that is the employment structures, it is also recognised 
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that the rules of recruitment have to be taken into account. Perhaps 
the most important of the rules is the need for educational qualifications: 
the growth of credentialism. Chapter 9 looks at educational achievement 
and subsequent career~ concentrating on the upper middle class because 
it is normally argued that their occupations require sophisticated, 
knowledge-based skills. While it can be·shown that access to such jobs is 
very loosely related to qualification levels, the data do not display 
strong evidence of a 'tightening bond'. Credentialism seems to operate 
only among the men who most recently came through the education system 
and into work, which may reflect the generally low levels of education 
in Britain compared with the rapid expansion of occupational demand. 
There is no evidence of Little and Westergaard's· ·counter-balance' 
effect, so that overall, the significance of education as an explanatory 
variable for an adult population seems to be less than commonly assumed. 
One important exception to this is thstthe upper middle class and the elite 
are again shown to be sharply different. Whereas the elite make extensive 
use of private education, the upper middle class are much more typical of 
the rest of society. 
Chapter 10 concludes the presentation of new data by looking at 
career (or intragenerational) mobility. While there are certain limits 
to these data, imposed by the relative youth of the youngest cohort, 
the analysis suggests that the early mobility trends discussed in 
Chapter 8 are confirmed in late careers. Direct and indirect mobility 
routes are used by men from both main classes of origin. The 
industry sector effect is again operative (as it was in education), as 
is the cohort effect, so that a close examination is necessary to dis-
entangle the several processes at work. The second part of the chapter 
looks at career. mobility in terms of two specific, 'non-mobility', 
debates. First, doubt is cast on Braverman's deskilling thesis because 
there are no flows of intra-manual mobility as there should be if skilled 
work has become more like unskilled work. Second, while industrial sectors 
and cohorts make useful approximations to segments of the lab~ur market, 
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male unskilled work is shown-to be poorly segmented from other occupat-
ional classes. The treatment of cleskilling and labour market segmenta-
tion is intend2d to exemplify how mobility analysis need not be restricted 
to stratification theory narrowly conceived, but can be used to explore 
other fields of sociology once its occupational basis is recognised. 
The concluding chapter draws together many of these points 
showing how the -initial concern with historical change. and economic 
settings re~ults in a new mobility perspective. At the same time, it 
returns to some of the main contemporary questions in the stratification 
debate, ~n particular to the case of the professional/managerial class. 
The study is then an essay in occupational issues as well as a contribu-
tion to theorizing class in modern society. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PERSPECTIVESON SOCIAL MOBILITY. 
The extent of movement in social position by individuals of 
diverse social origins (l) has been of interest to sociologists for over 
fifty years, and a major sub-field for nearly thirty. Three contributions 
to the development of social mobility research stand out as turning points 
in this period. Sorokin'sSocial Mobility, published in 1927, marks its 
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beginnings; Glass's Social Mobility in Britain (1954)is the key contribution 
to the'modern'phase of analysis, while Blau and Duncan's The American 
Occupational Structure (1967) represents the later phase of highly 
sophisticated modelling of mobility processes. 
Of course, it is possible totrace the origins of interest in social 
mobility to earlier sources. Most of sociology's Founding Fathers had something 
to say about stratification and changes in group membership. For example, one 
recent report on current social mobility has gone to some lengths to show 
that Marx was aware of the phenomenon (2>,. a judgement that is further 
discussed below in Chapter 2. But the early writers were far more 
concerned with stratification, institutions, and the division of labour 
than with mobility per se. As Blau and Duncan have observed, 
'many.of the great social thinkers of the last century 
..• developed theories of stratification or 
differentiation ..• But neither (Marx or Dukheim) nor 
any of the many other broad theories of social class 
and differentiation had much influence on the 
systematic research on social mobility that has been 
carried out in the last two decades. Indeed, most 
empirical studies of occupational mobility never refer 
to these theories. Thus even investigators known to be 
conversant with and sympathetic to Marx's theory do not make 
reference to it in their mobility research '(Blau and Duncan 
1967' 2-3). 
By the same token, one would search Glass's work in vain for reference to 
19th century authors as sources of inspiration. Instead, the reader is told 
that Sorokin's book 'is still the only comprehensive study' (1954, 5), and 
(1) To use David Glass's definition of social mobility: Glass (1954,5). 
(2) See the opening chapter of Goldthorpe (1980). 
Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain 
(1980) throughout. 
(For convenience, Social 
is referenced as Goldthorpe 
that only Ginsberg (1929) and Carodog Jones (1934) are listed as 'pioneer 
studies' (1954, 79 and also ppA 4 and 13). 
This is not to suggest, however, that social mobility sprang 
into sudden, fully-fledged being in 1927, completely without ancestry. 
Early writings in the field have drawn on even earlier contributions. For 
example, Rogoff - one of the very few sources which Glass do~ogive -
mentions the work of Chessa (1912) on recruitment to the Italian professions 
(Rogoff, 1951, 434), while Sorokin includes Pareto and his disciples 
Kolabinska (1912) on French elites and Sensini · (1913) on Italy as sources 
that provided him with suggestive ideas (Sorokin 1928, 60). But these 
earlier studies tended to concentrate on recruitment to a single stratum, or 
to be based on a community study, rather than a national sample covering 
the whole of society, and it was ·not until Sorokin's major theoretical 
statement that the boundaries of the field were laid down. 
At the same time, it must be admitted that a great deal of 
social mobility research has as a result operated in something of a 
theoretical vacuum. Despite attempting to illuminate processes of 
stratification, very little use has been made of classical statements, 
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so that the published accounts seem heavily empirical and yet conceptually 
primitive. It may be fruitless to embark on an extensive historical search 
for social mobility's intellectual pedigree- and indeed that is something 
~hich is not part of the present project - but it is important to recognise 
that many social mobility investigators have compartmentalised their research 
quite separately from their knowledge of sociological theory. Significantly 
(if we take this country) it is the commentators who have attempted to link 
Glass's work to ideas about stratification, rather than Glass himself or his 
main collaborators. Parkin, Westergaard, Giddens, Miliband - and exceptionally 
Bottomore - are cases in point. The synthesis has not been particularly 
successful, as we indicate below in Chapter 6. 
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This study does 1n a small way attempt to draw out some of these 
neglected connections, but it is conceived as very much a 'main line' 
study. That is to say, it deals with a national sample, it looks at 
patterns of intergenerational transfer between occupational groups, and 
it is ultimately concerned with the .nature of stratification 
in modern Britain. It is not primarily concerned with the consequences 
for individuals of being socially mobile, such as psychological stress or 
changes in kinship attachment, as is Richardson (1977). Nor does it make 
any pretence to express what actors understand by being mobile, to know 
what the subjective meanings of'what the observer calls mobility are for 
those observed. These are very important questions, but at this stage the 
first priorityis to know more about the canvas on which these more complex 
issues are displayed. Despite appearances, in fact very little is known about 
basic patterns of social mobility in Britain: as Chapter 9 argues at some 
length, what we did think we knew 1s probably mistaken. Furthermore, the 
explanations of those basic patterns that we draw largely from the 1949 
L.S.E. study are highly questionable. In particular, an excessive - one might 
almost say obsessive - concern with education and equality of access have 
distracted us from the more relevant dimension of occupational mobility and 
the concomitants of work, careers and changes in employment opportunities. 
In order to' appreciate both this view of mobility and the differences which 
mark off the present study from its predecessors, the first step is to 
outline the major contributions to the field of social mobility in the 
last half century. (3) 
(3) With such a productive and international field as social mobility 
a comprehensive review would not rise above an annotated 
bibliography, and indeed the period to 1960 is largely covered by Miller 
(1960) and Mack et al (1957). Bibby (1976) and Kaelble (1981) also 
contain surveys. Instead, a number of the more influential studies are 
discussed with the intention of identifying certain common themes, and, 
through critique, of justifying \vhy the present study has developed in 
its particular fashion. 
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Sorokin's Social Hobility. 
Sorokin provides a link between the 'pre-history' and 'history' 
of social mobility. His work has the character of 19th century writing, 
ranging from Rome and Athens through medieval England to the contemporary 
American business elite and back, in an attempt to develop a sociology of 
industrial society on a grand scale. But it is also the first systematic 
and comprehensive account of mobility, and despite the limitations of the data 
available to him at the time, his work is remarkably close to later research finding 
Starting from the notion of a multi-dimensional'social space', 
he proposes 
'to reduce the plurality of the dimensions into two 
principal classes, provided that each is to be subdivided 
into several sub-classes. These two principal classes may be 
styled the vertical and the horizontal dimension,dimensions 
of the social universe' (Sorokin, 1927, 7). 
The vertical dimension is sub-divided into economic (i.e. wealth), 
political,and occupational components; specific 'channels' are identified 
- the army, marriage, professional associations, political alliances, 
and wealth; and different types of society are compared in terms of their 
flows of vertical mobility, both in 'velocity' and 'volume', through these 
channels (see particularly pp. 133-180). Sorokin also discusses the role of 
the family, education, and the employing organization as mechanisms of 
selection, or 'sieves' which permit the upward passage of some and deny it 
to others. At times he seems to adopt an optimistic quasi-functionalist view 
that the best people get into the best jobs: 
'many societies have existed for a long time and this very 
fact means that their mechanism of social testing, selection, 
and distributing their members has not been wholly bad and has 
performed its function in a more or less satisfactory way' 
(ibid, 182: see also pp 190 and 202). 
In other parts of his writing, he recognises that children are dissimilar 
from their parents, and therefore it is a necessary condition of an 
efficient society to have 
'an equality in the starting point of children and an 
equality of chance .•• The second fundamental condition 
is the adequacy of the testing institutions and 
methods' (ibid, 530). 
More specifically, Sorokin proposes several features of mobility 
in modern society (435-9 and 455-6): 
1. there is a high level of dispersion of offspring to 
different occupational groups from those of their fathers. 
2. all occupational groups consist of members with he~ogeneous 
origins. 
3. the difference between occupational groups as separate 
entities is 'blurred'. 
4. there is, nonetheless, still a high level of occupational 
inheritance. 
5. similar occupational groups (ie those adjacent in the 
occupational hierachy) are more likely to exchange member·s. 
6. mobility is therefore more likely to be 'short-range' 
than across the whole of the hierachy. 
7. the 'middle' of the hierachy is likely to be more stable 
than the extremes. 
With the possible exception of the last, all of these propositions have since 
received considerable attention from researchers, and been shown to be 
generally correct. 
Similarly, Sorokin's work on the consequences of mobility in one 
dimension for behaviour in another has also inspired later sociologists, 
although here the emphasis has shifted. Sorokin writes about psychological 
dislocation, mental illness, suicide and moral disintegration (in a 
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Durkheimian sense) among the mobile as consequences of isolation from intimate 
friendships.and close kinship ties which require many years to establish 
(pp508-527). Although .a few writers have speculated along these lines 
(e~g. Lipset and Bendix, 1959, 285; Stacey, 1967) a more fruitful line of 
enquiry has been to examine the extent to which mobility does reduce kinship 
interaction or community involvement: later sociologists have generally been less 
alarmist. (4) 
(4) For example see Litwak, 1960a, 1960b; Adams, 1968; Bell, 1968; 
Richardson, 1977; Goldthorpe, 1980. 
• 
At this distance, the sense of anxiety about mobility in modern 
society is one of the¢dngs that strikes the contemporary reader. In 
talking about horizontal mobility, Sorokin likens modern society to 
'a mad "merry-go-round" in which men, objects and values 
incessantly move with a·mad rapidity, shift, turn round, 
clash, struggle, appear, disappear, diffuse, without a 
moment of rest and stability. Compared with immobile 
societies in all these respects they offer a contrast to them 
no less striking than that of boiling water or a waterfall 
to a quiet pond or lake'(Sorokin, 1927, 394). 
This somewhat over-dramatic style may have been a contributory factor to the 
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'distortion' of Sorokin's conception of social mobility by later sociologists. 
As was noted above, his mobility was a multi-dimensional one, including not only 
several sub-divisions of vertical space, but sub-divisions of horizontal space 
as well. Modern mobility research has concentrated almost exclusively on 
mobility as vertical occupational movements, although as we shall see later 
in this chapter, this has been treated as if it were social mobility in a more 
general sense. The present study attempts to rectify this, not by exploring 
other vertical sub-divisions, but by explicitly confronting the occupational 
dimension. 
It also draws on another neglected feature in Sorokin's work, 
namely the role of historical events (pp 142 and 466). Contained in his 
panoramic review of human history is a very simple and sensible point: 
societies are disrupted by wars, revolutions, famines and other natural 
disasters. These real events remove the incumbents of occupational strata 
(as in the Russian Revolution), kill off competitors (as in the Great War), 
or speed up circulation (as in perio~of economic boom). The process of 
mobility is bedded in a concrete time and place, and yet modern analysis 
have almost nothing to say about world wars, the depression, or even 
technological change. ·Their world is a rarified place of statistical 
relationships with little reference to the twentieth century and its complex 
changes. Had Sorokin had better data· available to him, he might ·have been 
able to demonstrate his point to greater effect. 
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Even nearly twenty years later, when with the L.S.E. study of-Britain 
in i9~9 this kind of evidence did become available, subsequent writers failed 
to take up the question of historical settings~ The 1949 study was historical 
in the sense that it was concerned with the effects of the 1944 Education 
Act, but it went little beyond that. There areno index entries for 'war' 
or 'unemployment', and only four to the Depression- all in Jean Floud's 
chapter on the educational experiences of adults. In this, and in many other 
respects, Social Mobility in Britain typifies the next generation of mobility 
studies. 
'Social Mobility in Britain' 
Of the three major contributions which have been identified 
at the start of this chapter, the work of David Glass and the L.S.E. team is the 
most important. It not only provided a conceptual and technical orientation 
for later research but also produced empirical evidence about mobility that was 
taken up by other sociologists for the next twenty years. The fact that it was a 
study of Britain of course makes it all the more relevant for the present 
project. 
The major publication arising from their work, Social Mobility in 
Britain (Glass; 1954) is- a collection of cognate chapters ranging over 
education, marriage, and mobility, technical problems of statistical analysis, 
and reports of work on voluntary associations, the professions, and subjective 
class ratings carried out separately from the main national· sample. Of these, 
it is the sections dealing with social mobility per se which are most 
relevant, together with the introductory explanations of why the researchers 
tackled their tasks in a particular way. Glassgivespriority of place in 
his opening remarks to two themes, an interest in 'the formation and structure 
of the 'middle classes'', and in the consequences of the passing of the 
1944 Education Act 'which , so far as social stratification is concerned, ~s 
probably the most important measure of the last half~century' (1954, 3;4). 
Glass's interest in the middle classes, by which he seems to 
mean mainly the professions and the higher civil service (e.g. see pp 4-5), 
led him to look at the wider picture as a first step: 
'Self-recruitment in the professions and the higher 
Civil Service would have little meaning unless compared 
with self-recruitment in other occupational groups. 
Indeed, it was clear that the study of particular groups 
needed, as background, a general investigation of social 
status and social mobility in Britain' (ibid, 4-5). 
It would not be unfair to say that the British working class features in 
the L.S.E. research more as a by-product than as a ma~n focus of the 
analysis. 
Because of this orientation, there is paradoxically not a 
great deal of the section dealing with the main investigation in Social 
Mobility in Britain which is about class differences (except in relation to 
educational access). Although extensive data are presented in the var~ous 
mobility tables, there is little commentary on, or use of, them to discuss 
class boundaries, class consciousness and integration, or the rigidity of 
the class structure as a whole. These were issues taken up later by writers 
who saw the potential of Glass's evidence for class analysis. What little 
original.discussion there was dealt mainly with the upper occupational 
strata, rather than the lower. 
In the same way, the team's interest in educational reform was 
to see what effect it might have upon the existing middie classes and 'its 
role in the formation of new elites' (ibid, 4). The 1944 Act would 
reduce the effect of family background on the type of secondary education 
received, so that 'social mobility will increase, and probably increase 
greatly' (ibid, 24). 
This would be a desirable result for two reasons. First it would 
increase economic and social efficiency, 
'since with a fluid social structure there is more likelihood 
that positions requiring high ability will in fact be held by 
individuals who possess high ability ... secondly, from the 
point of view of the individual •.. there may, as a 
consequence, be less feeling of personal frustration and a 
greater possibility of social harmony' (_ibid, 24-25)_. 
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Not surprisingly, later writers (for example Kreckel, 1973 and 
Goldthorpe, 1980, 21-23) have commented adversely on this rather narrow 
conception of what is problematic about social mobility. There is no 
concern with equality of condition, only equality of access. The harsh 
realities (according to Glass's own data) of a relatively closed class 
system, the privileges of the middle class and the deprivations of the 
working class, feature little in the commentary. The orientation is 
liberal social democrat or 'Fabian'; the product is 'rather bloodless, 
rather statistical', to use Strauss'·s phrase about social mobility in 
general (Strauss, 1971,2). 
Goldtho~pe has recently argued a slightly more generous 
tine tnat Glass was also concerned with equality of condition in that he 
opposed private education and wished to avoid meritocratic selection 
leading to a new, more legitimate but still powerful elite. This_may be true as a 
judgement of Glass as a man, but whereas Goldt-horpe himself produces 
several quotations from Glass which show the latter as a Fabian meritocrat, 
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he produces only a single one to substantiate his assertion that Glass 
was also a socialist seeking major social change - and that quotation, read 
in context, is extremely ambiguous, for the'other paths to social prestige' 
need not refer to any humanistic or socialistic values, but are discussed 
in the same conflict-reducing frameworkthat was noted above (see Goldthorpe, 
1980, 23, and Glass, 1954, 26-27). 
While one sympathises with Glass 1n the sense that he was 
writing soon after the 1944 Act in a period when Labour Party hopes were 
still high, and that his general investigation of social mobility was 
an important step forward for its time, this should not blind us to the 
limitations of his position. In the light of the Scottish data, for 
example, Glass's concern with education as a reforming factor is to say the 
least, questionable (see.below Chapter 9 ), and.the emphasis on the middle 
class (something the present study, it must be said, also largely shares) 
means that other issues received less attention. In particular, as this 
chapter goes onto argue, the occupational structure itself was so 
neglected as to distort not only the L.S.E. study, but also to influence 
later writers (among them, members of the I.S.A. social stratification 
and social mobility group which first met in 1951) so that the occupational 
dimension of mobility remained virtually unexplored for the next twenty 
years. 
Most important of all, the present author is extremely sceptical 
about the core firdings on mobility rates in the L.S.E. study. This is such 
a fundamental question to raise, as well as being based on a technical 
argument, that it deserves a chapter to itself. Glass's results are 
therefore not discussed at this point, but below in Chapter 6. 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that Glass's work has 
been absolutely central to the mobility field. In this country it 
effectively put an end to further mobility research for a generation, because 
after 1954 w.e 'knew' about mobility and could use what was known as the basis 
for writing on stratification. Sociologists like Parkin and Westergaard 
(and others, see below Chapter 6) felt no need to get involved in new 
data-collection exercises, when patterns of mobility had been so clearly 
demonstrated. The influence of Glass was, then, in terms of his results 
as far as his own country was concerned,whereas internationally it was 
the techniques and the novelty of the research itself which helped to 
inspire comparable national studies throughout most of Europe, America, and 
eventually in Japan, Australia, and much of the Third World. It was one of 
the key inspirations of the third main contribution to the development of 
social mobility, that of Blau and Duncan. 
'The American Occupational Structure' 
Blau and Duncan:s work was by no means the first on social 
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mobility in America, (5) but like the L.S.E. study in its time, it was more 
comprehensive, technically more sophisticated, and conceptually more 
developed than previous efforts. Using a sample of 20,700 respondents 
representing about 45 million men 20 to 64 years old in the civilian, 
no~~titutional population, they analysed not only occupational mobility 
but also the relationship between mobility and migration, ethnicity, kinship,. 
and fertility patterns. In particular they attempted to demonstrate how 
family background factors (parental education and employment) operated 
on and through the respondent's own schooling, and first job, to produce 
the respondent's current socio-economic status. This involved the use of 
path analysis, a technique which dominated American mobility research for 
the next decade. In essence, path analysis uses multiple regression 
techniques to parcel out effects between variables in a simple model that 
is chronologically structured. Once the model is established, it can be 
used to make causal statements about how changes in the level of one variable 
bring about changes in the dependent variable. Again, the Blau & Duncan model can 
be elaborated from its original quintet of variables by adding more variables, 
which improves its effectiveness.(~ 
Despite its initial attractiveness, path analysis has not been 
much adopted by what we might call the 'European sociological tradition'. 
In part, this is due to a number of important technical features of 
path analysis: for example, there are limitations on the comparison between 
one su£vey and another; the variables are assumed to be normally 
(5) See for instance Sjoberg (1951); Rogoff (1951); Hollingshead (1952); 
Chinoy (1955); Lenski (1958); and Lipset and Bendix (1964). 
(6) See Blau and Duncan, 1967, 163-177. Simple explanations of the 
technique can also be foundinSilvey 1975, 113 and more technical 
accounts can be found in Blalock, 1970. The work of Sewell and others 
at the Madison Centre for Demography and Ecology at the University of 
Wisconsin, for example~ is typical of the complex elaboration that has 
been undertaken to model the American status achievement process. 
<llitributed; the excluded variables (which by definition, there must be 
in a simple model) reduce the explanatory power of the model and must be 
treated as caus.ally irrelevant, and so on. An excellent critique of path 
analysis in mobility research is to be found in Crowder (1974). However, 
the lack of popularity of path analysis is also due to its association with 
the conceptual framework in which Blau & Duncan operated. 
They regard social mobility primarily as a process of status 
attainment, which in industrial society is dominated by universalistic 
values. Ascriptive factors like family background must play an 
increasingly small part in deciding occupational fates, because achievement 
factors such as educational qualifications and work performance are 
necessarily more important when it comes to filling posts that require 
technical skill, where the efficient discharge of work tasks is essential to 
the working of a technological society. What Blau and Duncan call the 
'universalistic system' (1967,430) prod~es technological progress, high 
standards of living, greater equality of opportunity, reduced kinship ties, 
higher rates of migration~ differential fertility, 'stable democracy', and 
high rates of occupational mobility (430-31). 
It 1s possible to object to this view 1n two ways. First, one 
could make point by point objections, such as the continued existence of 
ethnic and sexual discrimination, i.e. discrimination on ascriptive 
characteristics, wlich is not explained by such a model. Second, one can object 
that the whole orientation of the approach is misplaced: the role of 
property and power are completely omitted from consideration, and the fate 
of identifiable classes or str~a is lost under the associated assumption 
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that under universalism, 'the occupational structure is more or less 
continuously graded in regard to status rather than being a set of discrete 
status classes' (ibid, 124). In other words, one can approach stratification 
not as the outcome of a value system, but rather as the social product of a 
particular set of class relations arising from the dominant mode of production 
under modern capitalism. In one view, the value system is the paramount 
consideration, ~n the other, it is the relations of production. Although the 
present study adopts the latter v~ew, it is worth noting that Blau and Duncan 
still manage to compare thepositions of working and middle classes, and that 
their framework does not exclude family background or differential access 
to education as relevant objects of study. Consequently there is a great 
deal in their work that is of interest, not least their comments on 
occupational change, which have perhaps not received the attention in 
European Sociology which they merit. 
Other Themes in Mobility Research 
The purpose of high-lighting Sorokin, Glass, and Blau and Duncan, 
was first to identify important turning points and sources .of influence 
in the history of the subject; second to demonstrate some of the major 
themes in social mobility research; and third to introduce three perspectives 
on mobility which at least in part have direct relevance for the present 
study .. (f course, selecting any three contributions from what has already 
been acknowledged to be:an extensive body of research can provide only a 
partial picture of that field, and in order to help the reader further ~ locate 
the present work within that wider literature, it is necessary briefly to 
mention some of the other major developments. 
We have already commented on the effect that Glass's work, via 
the I.S.A., had on stimulating national studies. Given the centrality 
of the structural questions to which he addressed himself, other sociologists 
~n different countries naturally wished to examine their own societies to 
see if patterns of mobility were similar tothoseGlass had reported for 
England and Wales. This in turn provided the basis for comparison 
between societies, most notably those of Lipset and Bendix (1959) and Miller 
(1960). The variety of occupational categorization schemes used made this 
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a difficult task and one of doubtful value: Miller's discussion of 
elites, for example, defines an elite as consisting variously of anything 
from 0. 9% to over 15 % of the population, while Lipset and 
Bendix's conclusion that 'the overall pattern of social mobility appears 
to be much the same in the industrial societies of various Western 
Countries' (1964, 13) is based only on movements across the manual/ 
non-manual line. (7) 
These international comparisons reflect an interest in the 
openness of class boundaries in different societies, most notably 
possible differences between America and the European societies, which 
has origins in early ideological statements about the American way of 
life, and in sociology, in the work of Sombart (1906) and Sorokin (1927). 
This in turn is related to the problem of social and political order, which 
is a much more important feature of, say, Lipset and Bendix's work, than 
Glass or Bla.u and Duncan. 
One of the first concerns which Lipset and Bendix discussed in 
Social Mobility in Industrial Society is the problem facing any ruling 
class: to exclude potential incomers from the lower ranks, or to admit 
them? Which is the more threatening to the continuance of their power? 
The issue in the complex area of mobility and class structure becomes 
access to the elite, rather than the position of the middle classes, or 
the working class, while the notion of mobility as inherently desirable is 
questioned. Moving away from a stable social group sets up pressures 
on the individual and may weaken the stability of the system as a whole. 
As Goldthorpe has recently observed in a discussion of interest and 
ideology in mobility research, 
'the theme recurs that an unremitting emphasis on 
universalistic values may lead ultimately to socially 
disruptive rather than to socially integrative effects' 
Goldthorpe 1980, 19). 
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'(7) To be fair, Lipset and Bendix do make some allowance for the farm/non-farm 
distinction, but this is still a very crude measure compared with the 
greater specificity of the original 15 studies (see footnote 4 page 13 of 
Lipset and Bendix, 1964). 
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Successive generations of American sociologists have drawn on this 
tradition. The size and regional variation of .the United States has proved 
a fertile site, while the greater technical sophistication of American 
methodology has both prompted more interest in what is a heavily statistical 
field, and also stimulated new techniques of analysis. Following Blau and 
Duncan, new forms of the basic path model were proposed (for example, see 
Sewell 1969,) and more recently Hauser et al (1975) have introduced 
log-linear modelling techniques to disaggregate st"ructural effects. There 
have been two kinds of reaction against these developments. The first criticism :is that 
the theoretical orientation attaches too great an importance to mobility as 
against other aspects of the class structure, and tends to be supportive 
of a false notion of America as an open society (e.g. Osipov, 1969, Bertaux 
1971, Kreckel, 1977). The second criticism is that the technical elaboration of the 
analysis has distorted the kinds of questions being tackled and that many of 
the statistical techniques are inappropriate for the uses to which they have 
been put (Crowder, 1974; Noble, 1981). 
Although- social mobility research in Europe has also become more 
technically sophisticated, it has not done so to the extent of the Americanwork. 
1nterest in the last few years has turned to alternative perspectives: 
Muller (1977) for example has argued that real .historical events (like 
the rise of the Nazis in Germany, and the Second World War) must feature in 
an explanation of mobility, while an interest in the complexity of individual 
mobility records has led some studies to examine complete occupational 
histories (as in the Irish Mobility Study). Despite these divergent approaches, 
there is a strong undercurrent of interest in class (see Girod 1979), which 
marks off almost all the European work from that in the United States. (S) 
(8) A frequent comment among European sociologists at the I.S.A. Social 
Stratification and Social Mobility Seminars is that 'the first day 
is given over to the Americans, so that the real work can begin for 
the rest of us on the second; day'. 
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Mobility and Class 
This is clearly exemplified by the centrality of class in publications 
resulting from the Nuffield Study of Social Mobility in England and Wales. 
Heath's opening sentence in Social Mobility-poses the question, 'how are men 
to be recruited to positions of power and privilege?', while he takes as the 
first 'landmark' in the development of answers to this question to be 'Karl Marx 
and class formation' (Heath, 1981, 11 and 13). Similarly Goldthorpe's main 
report on the Nuffield Study is entitled Social Mobility and Class Structure 
in Modern Britain, starts with a chapter dealing largely with Marx on class, 
and uses the term 'class mobility' in five of its eight other chapter headings 
(Goldthorpe, 1980; see also p 287). 
It may seem surprising that reference to these products of the Nuffield 
Study has not been made before. However, there are several good reasons for 
this. First , although presenting some interesting results from the society 
most similar to Scotland (ie, England and Wales - not Britain despite 
Goldthorpe's use of that term) together with some changes in perspective, the 
Nuffield Study can be seen more as a step in a continued direction, rather 
than a major change of direction. Heath's clear and precise survey of the 
field is explicitly designed to be a survey of the state of art, accessible 
to the layman (although his later work on female mobility, and on occupational 
structures is more innovatory (eg, Britten andHeath, 1983; Heath and Ridge, 
1983)). Goldthorpe and Halsey introduce new technical sophistication developed 
elsewhere, such as in Hauser's work, to the British social mobility scene, 
and present more up-to-~ate data on mobility to replace dependence on 
Glass's 1949 data. It follows that their contribution is of interest, and 
parts of it are discussed in more detail below - the second of the reasons for 
not dealing with them here. But because of the type of contributions that 
the Nuffield Study has made, ie, the continuance of an established tradition, 
the main reports do not merit identification with Sorokin, Glass, and Blau 
and Duncan, as key points of reference. 
. 26 
The other reason lies in the relationship between the Aberdeen and 
Oxford studies. This is dealt with in greater detail below, and elsewhere 
(Moore and Payne, 1978). At this point it will suffice to note the emphasis 
on a sociography of Scotland in the Aberdeen work, rather than a concentration 
on a comparative study with England and Wales. Although some commentators 
have since taken the view that this seems a peculiar choice of focus (for 
example both Hope and Goldthorpe in personal communications, and Kendrick, 
et al 1982a, 12), an interest in Scottish conditions together with an interest 
in mobility theory per se, is equally valid. The comparative dimension -
which leads one into more direct dialogue with Goldthorpe's work - has since 
been tackled by two of the author's recent research collaborators (see Ulas, 
1983, and Chapman et al 1984). 
While comparative sociology is not a major focus in this research, 
an interest in comparative stratification has been one of the central motives 
in mobi~ity research in general, and provides an essential link for much of 
past research between national studies of mobility and a concern with 
stratification. In this context, mobility is a measure of rigidity of the 
stratified order over time: high rates of mobility suggest a system in which, 
despite whatever inequalities may exist at any one time, more people (or 
rather their families) have access to the more desirable statuses in the long 
term. Conversely, low levels of mobility indicate a highly stratified, caste-
like, order in which inequalities apply to successive generations. American 
sociologists in the 1950s and early 1960s, such as Bendix and Lipset, were 
particularly keen to compare societies for their degrees of openness or 
closure in this way. More recently Goldthorpe's collaboration with several 
European sociologist (eg, Erikson et al, 1979, 1981) demonstrates a renewal 
of interest in this approach. 
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A second connection between class and mobility comes in the 
use of mobility rates to identify the boundaries of classes. Those 
statuses which readily exchange members can be thought of as having 
more in common than those between which exchange is limited. An 
examination of the 'natural breaks' in the mobility flows reveals the 
basic class structure, while changes over time Ln such breaks indicate 
changes in the shape of society, and the relative success or failure of 
groups in narrowing or maintaining the gaps between the classes. Recent 
examples of this approach can be found in the work of Parkin, Westergaard and 
Resler, and the marxist debate over the class position of 'the new middle classes'. 
A third use of mobility in.stratification theory is as an 
explanation of class consciousness (or more precisely, lack of it). If 
there is considerable movement between classes, then the present members of 
any class are more likely to have been born and socialised in some other 
class. That is to say, they will bring with them values and exper~ences 
appropriate to a different way of life, which will prevent them from 
belonging as completely and unquestioningly to their new class as those ~ho 
have been born into, and lived all their lives in, that class. Indeed, 
their imported values may infect the host population leading to a mongrel'isation 
of class values. In this way (following Sorokin) there is less chance of 
a distinctive class consciousness emerging, or for in-comers to acquire it 
should orie begin to develop. In turn, there is less prospect of collective 
class action. Albeit expressed in less overtly marxist terms, Giddens and 
writers on the new managerial class like Galbraith and Crosland have adopted 
this argument. 
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A final example ot. the close conjunction between stratification 
and social mobility is political stability. Two perspectives can be 
differentiated here: on the one hand, mobility is seen as a safety valve 
used to bleed off working class pressure for change, by allowing the most 
able to pass into the ranks of the middle class, so leaving the working 
class without effective leadership. In this view, mobility appears as 
a mechanism of control, which serves to perpetuate the capitalist order. (9) 
The alternative view stresses the pacification effect on the unsuccessful 
(or immobile) of believing either that the able really do succeed, or that 
their own lack of success does. not preclude their children from being mobile. 
Here the emphasis is more on legitimation, rather than control, but in both 
mobility is used to explain the continued survival of an inequitable and 
otherwise insupportable system (e.g. the writings of Michels and Sombart). 
Without the driving force of sociology's central interest 1.n 
stratification and social order,mobility would not have assumed its current 
importance within the sociological lexicon. However, the very strength of the 
connection between mobility and stratification has, paradoxically, narrowed 
our awareness of mobility and the way it relates to other problems. 
Specifically, we have not looked hard enough at the occupational dimension 
of 'occupational mobility'. 
This point is exemplified by the differences between the Nuffield 
study of England and Wales, and the present work. The former was exlicitly 
designed to be an up-date of the 1949 investigation, albeit usfng somewhat more 
advanced statistical tools ( 10). As a result, it tended in its style to be 
something of a throwback to an earlier era of mobility research, and it must 
be said that it did owe far more to Blau and Duncan, and Glass, than it did 
to the latest trends beginning to show on the continent. 
(9) 
(10) 
'The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the most prominent men 
of the ruled class the more solid and dangerous is its rule' (Marx, 
1959, 706) 
See the original application for a research grant to SSRC, 1969. 
The criticism must also apply to the present study, because in 
its early stages it was influenced by the Nuffield project. However, 
after the first few months, a very considerable estrangeQent occurred(ll), 
and the Scottish Study developed on rather different lines. In the first 
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place, on a pragmatic level, the Scottish Study's national survey provided an 
opportunity to correct the near-absence of empirical 'sociographic'researchnorth 
of the border (see the comments of Anderson, 1974; Kent, 1980; and Parsler, 1980). 
The rise of nationalism and the devolution debates have now made it common-· 
place knowledge that Scotland has different legal, religious and educational 
systems, largely separate media, an identifiable cultural tradition, a 
different pattern of economic, demographic and geographical problems. But ~n 
1973 this was not so widely accepted, nor was the dearth of Scottish 
sociology generally seen as problematic. 
Secondly, and at a more conceptual level, the research adopted 
an approach to mobility which saw it as grounded firmly in the local economic, 
·social and historical conditions of Scotland. Since mobility operationally 
constitutes a comparison of two occupational statuses (the father's and the 
son's) an explanation of mobility involved an explanation of how individuals 
come to be given jobs. This in turn raises Auestions about the industrial 
and occupational structure, about labour markets, about job choice and 
qualifications, about labour migration: that is, about the various processes 
by which workers enter a system of employment which has an objective reality 
pre- and pos~ existing the individual, and which constrains his or her 
freedom of action. 
(11) A more detailed account of the 'estrangement' is to be found in Moore 
and Payne, 1978, and in the methodological appendix below. 
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This approach was not atfirst seen as anything different from 
the main British paradigm stemming from Glass: rather it was seen as a simple 
extension of it. The study retained an ultimate orientation to the theories 
of class structures, but with the intention of identifying mobility as the 
outcome of (mainly economic) processes that are historically and geographically 
unique. In this way, the study was seen as a contribution to the general . 
field of mobility(bothas a new ethnographic study for comparative purposes, 
and also in proposing a small variation of the original paradigm by stressing 
real events) as well as being a major step forward in the general e~pirical 
sociography of Scotland. 
However, the comparatively simple idea ·of looking at local conditions, 
and in particular of taking the idea of occupational mobility seriously, 
is in fact a major departure from earlier work like the Nuffield Study. 
It represents a marked shift in emphasis away from conventional class theory 
towards other aspects of sociology, notably the sociology· of work and the 
labour requirements of modern societies. In that sense, although th1s study 
does relate to more recent work, it looks back more to Sorokin than to much 
of the other writing discussed. 
Conventional Empirical Treatments of Occupations, Hobility and Class 
When modern sociologists have talked about social mobility, 
they have normally concentrated on inter-generational (and to a lesser 
extent, intra-generational) occupational mobility among men. In practical 
terms, this has generally meant comparing a son's job with that of his father. 
The son's job may be his first job, or his job after ten years of work, or 
three years ago, or more commonly, his job at the time of interview. 
These are the four "job points" examined in both the Oxford Study of 
England and Wales in 1972, and the Aberdeen Study of 1975. Some more 
recent European studies have concentrated on parts of a career (M~ller 
1977), while others, including the Irish Mobility Study, have collected 
whole life employment histories. 
The father's job has been taken as his present or last job 
(Glass 1954) or his job at some stage in the adolescence of the son, 
usually dependant on the school leaving age of a particular country during 
a particular period. In Britain, the age of fourteen has been chosen in 
recent studies. The movement of a son between the two social statuses 
defined by his own adult membership of one occupational group, and his 
previous indirect membership, by virtue of his juvenile family position, 
of his father's occupational group, is occupational mobility. Intra-
generational mobility refers to movements during one man's lifetime 
between any two job points that he has occupied. (lZ) 
In most writing about mobility, the terms 'social mobility' 
and 'occupational mobility' are used synonymously, a practice which will 
be followed here in the interests of variety and familiarity. However, 
it is important to recognise at the very outset that strictly speaking 
mobility is measured in an occupational dimension. The mainstream 
European tradition has used occupation in a direct way, with similar jobs 
grouped together in broad categories or 1 classes' (again, there is a 
conventional and imprecise use of the word class for any occupational 
grouping). The Americans have prefered to measure mobility between socio-
economic statuses, based indirectly on job, and expressing some weighting 
. . . d . k" (!3). for 1ncome, educat1on an prest1ge ran 1ng. · 
However, it is no coinicidence that writings about 'social' and 
'occupational' mobility between 'classes' have used these imprecise 
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(12) It has lately become fashionable (eg, see Letters to the Edi"tor, The Times, 
14th, 22nd, and 25t~ January 1980) to dismiss mobility research as useless 
~ecause ~o much of 1t.deals only with men. Although the omission of women 
1s a ser1ous defec~, 1t ~oes not totally invalidate knowledge gained about 
males. A fuller d1scuss1on of this problem can be found in Payne et 1 
1983a, and some data on female mobility in Scotland in Payne et al a ' 
1980. Because the present account deals with male social mobility' 
the use of masculine forms ('he' 'his') throunhout · ' 
• o 1s a correct useage. 
(13) 
An extensive discussion of the occupational categories adopted 1n 
the present study can be found in Appendix 1. 
terms interchangeably.. Certainly in Europe, few sociologists 
have been interested in mobility per se, or even as an aspect of 
occupational processes. Far more important has been a· concern with social 
stratification, in which occupation is taken as a convenient indicator 
of class membership, and occupational movement stands for movement between 
classes or statuses. 
Of course, it must be said that the equation of occupation and 
social class is a well-established one in British Sociology. In the 
·first place, 'social class' is itself a complex social phenomenon. 
Unless class is defined in some very precise way one immediately becomes 
en~eshed in the interface with other dimensions of stratification such as 
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status and political power; even if class is-·taken in ·its narrowest sense, that 
pitfall is never far away. Reid compares the conceptual and practical side of 
the problem: 
~social class is a multidimensional concept, 
involving not only the identification of what 
are partly invisible categories in society but 
also an understanding of the effects of these 
on the people involved ... In British research 
••• almost the sole criterion of social class 
which has been used 1s occupation'(Reid 1977, 15). 
Reid is saying that on the one hand it is not possible to 
contain the notion of class in a simple economic or market straightjacket, and 
on the other, that there 1s a legitimate tradition of us1ng occupations 
as a pragmatic device 1n the empirical exploration of class. The latter 
1s generally accepted 1n Britain by sociologists with widely different 
persuasions. Runciman has observed that 
~occupations are at once the most obvious and 
the most effective predictor of differential 
location within the structure of social inequality' 
(Runciman, 1966,. 55) , 
while on the heavily empirical flank, Monk, a former employee of the SSRC 
Survey Research Unit,. notes that 
'Occupation has remained the backbone of social 
grading because no better methods have been 
found' (Honk, 1970, 10). 
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Occupation has been generally chosen because it provides a simple, 
universal and relatively unambiguous identity _(or rather it did until 
sociologists woke up to the fact that females, too, need a class identity, 
but that many of them do not have occupations that carry the same meaning as for 
men). Occupation carries with it connotations of income, and therefore 
possible patterns of consumption; levels of skill and educational entry 
requirements, and therefore life styles; seGof opinions, values and 
attitudes and therefore political behaviours; collectivities of work-based 
friendships, and therefore group identity; social prestige and therefore 
influence outside of the work setting; even patterns of ferti~ity and 
mortality are associated with occupational groupings. Since all of these 
factors are part of the stratified order, and are all in various degrees 
correlated with occupation, it has been taken as the single and simplest 
indicator of position within a social hierarchy. 
This is to say two things about occupations in prev1ous and 1n 
the present work. First, occupation represents other aspects of 
stratification because it fs highly correlated with them. Bu.t second, 
occupation is inherently connected to other aspects of stratification, so that 
the analytical distinction between occupation and these other features is a 
heuristic device. In particular, in stressing the centralit"y of occupations 
for purposes of examining hierarchies, the cluster ofconnected features 
remains important, however unstated, despite what might at first sight be a 
treatment of occupation conceived of narrowly as a set of work tasks. It 
makes little sense to regard occupational mobility as if it were only an 
exchange of work tasks: when this study stresses the occupational dimension 
it does not do so just out of an interest in occupations per se, but out 
of a joint interest in work and stratification. 
Conceptualising Occupations and Classes 
The previous discussion treated occupation (and to a lesser extent, 
class) as relatively unproblematic, but it is necessary to be somewhat more 
precise before entering into further .discussion. Bechhofer's survey shows 
that occupation, the more straightforward of the two concepts, has been used 
to convey a variety of ideas, ranging from work task in a narrow sense to 
a broader mixture of income, authority and social prestige. Two main components 
have most commonly been emphasised: 
'the precise job description, with the focus 
on the work content; and the position in the 
industrial hierarchy, with the focus on the 
internal stratification of industry' (Bechhofer 1969,99) • 
. Both of these are important, not least in discussing how occupations can be 
used to represent classes. 
A contrary view can be found in recent marxist writing, in which 
the technical division of labour and the social division of labour are kept 
separate. Here occupation per se is less important, and while the technical 
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division of labour is relevant for discussions of how surplus value is extracted, 
it is the relationship between classes that retains theoretical primacy. 
Thus Abercrombie and Urry argue that 
'although occupational designations are very often 
used as a convenient shorthand for class position, 
they are not.theoretically equivalent. Occupation 
typically refers primarily to sets of job tasks, 
that is, it refers to positions within the technical 
division of labour ••• the concept of class refers 
primarily to the social relations at work, or positions 
within the social division of labour ••• Occupational 
designations may"actually obscure class position because 
technical features do not entail social features' 
(Abercombie and Urry, 1983, 109). 
At one level, this is a valid observation: the employed professional and the 
self-employed professional carry out many of the same technical functions 
but occupy different class positions. On the other hand, a sharp 
distinction between 'job tas~' and social relationships makes it 
difficult to specify the job ·tasks of certain people, such as a foreman or 
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manager whose work task is to occupy an authority relationship over others. 
While technical task may be a starting point for identifying occupational 
categories, as in census and other classifications of occupations (Bechhofer 
1969, 98) the role within the enterprise must be treated as an integral part of 
occupational identity if a full picture is to·be gained. 
This position has been built into the classification scheme used in 
the main empirical work presented below. Unlike the scheme used by Goldthorpe 
(1980) and Halsey et al (1980), the .classification developed for the Scottish study 
makes explicit and rigorous use of the 'employment status' (manager, foreman, 
employee, etc)( 14) which was part of the original grading exercise in the pre~ 
liminaries for devising the Hope-Goldthorpe.scale (see Appendix 1 below for more 
details). Thus each 'occupational class' so defined reflects a similarity of 
task and authority, and possibly also of status as perceived by the respondents 
who graded them, among its component occupations. This is not to say that occupatio: 
will be treated as identical .to class, but that the distinction between the two 
in some respects has been reduced. 
Inde~d, the 'occupational class' as used in this study is very 
reminiscent of Lockwood's statement of 'class situation'. People in a common 
occupational class share similar levels of skills in order to carry out the technica 
tasks of their jobs. Their skill level defines to a large degree their market 
situation, ie, their source of income and its size, their job security and 
mobility chances. Their common employment position expresses comparable sets of 
social relationship at work, derived from similar positions in the division of 
labour; that is to say, a common work situation. And the ranking of the 
occupations, whatever the origin intentions of Hope and Goldthorpe, probably 
reflect common positions in the status hierarchy, or a shared status situation( 15 ). 
(14) 
(15) 
It should be noted however that Goldthorpe regards himself as working precisely 
within Lockwood's framework: see Goldthorpe 1982, 169-170; Hope and Goldthorpe, 
1974 on the origin construction of the scale; and footnot~ no. ~ i~ the draft 
of Goldthorpe and Llewellyn (1977) (in the published vers1on th1s 1s reduced 
to a simple reference to the Blackcoated Worker). 
The similarity of position to that of Lockwood clearly locates the present 
study outside of the marxist tradition. 
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One other o~ the key dimensions used in identifying occupations 
with classes, property, is given a relatively low priority in the occupational 
class scheme, for two reasons. First, the number of people in certain 
proprietorial positions in the mobility study sample was very small; this 
applied particularly to '_large proprietors'. They were merged with the top 
category of managers. Second, ·very small-scale businessmen (sel~-enployed non-
professional workers)are treated as part of the same group as foremen and 
I . 
supervisors. This reflects their actual grading scores and recognises that 
to become a foreman, or 'set up on ~ne's own' is a common if not always 
realistic occupational goal for many manual workers. However, the idea of large 
property (as against petty property) differentiating a capitalist class from 
the ordinary men in the sample is retained as an important element, even if 
it is no~ manifest in the ~ain occupational class scheme (see Chapter 7 below). 
The concept of skill as 'property', and the ownership and control debate, 
are discussed in the course of the next two chapters. The occupational classes 
are therefore perhaps more 'occupational' than 'classes', in that they do 
not take into account property or result directly· through theorizing from 
modes of production. 
This does not mean that mobility is conceived as existing simply 
in a concrete dimension of individuals on the move. Both occupations and 
classes can be thought of as positions or as people. In mobility research this 
is central, because people are seen as leaving one position and moving to 
another. The position, and the composite structure of all positions, is separate 
from the person moving. This accords with everyday life: a job is created, 
advertised, and filled. The new incumbent works in the job for a while and 
then leaves for another job. The post is then re-filled by someone else. 
Employment is dependent on the pre-existance of a position. 
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It is therefore possible to talk about occupations at both levels. 
In a mobility study one talks about, say, the patterns of recruitment to the 
professions and empirically represents the professionsas places by examining 
those people in the sample who reported that they worked as professionals. 
In principle at least one could add to this some measure of employment vacancies an 
unemployed professionals, in order to have a fuller account of opportunity. 
This would deal more directly, albeit still empirically, with positions, while 
the simpler approach deals with individuals. 
The distinction is sometimes hard to sustain, but it can play an 
important part, as in the work of Stewart et al (1980) on clerks and clerical emplo: 
ment. They argue that the position of clerical workeriSfilled almost exclusively 
by young men on their way up to managerial positions and old men who are former 
manual workers. It is not a position containing persons who have worked or 
intend to work for long periods as clerki. Thus although at any one time 
clerks may have similar work tasks and hierarchical positions, it makes little 
sense to talk of them occupying a common position because their origins and 
destinations are so diverse. While their point that persons carry with them 
'social baggage' from, or ready for, another occupational or class position 
is a strong one, their rejection of clerical work as a useful category is 
dependent on its unique mobility characteristics. Other occupational categories 
are more useful, if only because their incumbents remain in them for longer 
periods. 
We ,may contrast this view of persons and places with that of 
Poulantzas, who argues that even if 
'the bourgeoisie would take all the places of 
workers and vice versa, nothing fundamental 
about capitalism would be changed since the 
places of bourgeoisie and proletariat would 
still be there' (Poulantzas, 1975, 33), 
While recognising Poulantzas' wish to attach importance to capitalist relations, 
he is not correct in claiming that people ('social agents' in his 
form) are irrelevant to class analysis. If people are mobile, their 
'social baggage' is not lost in transit, even if much of it is no 
longer used on arrival. A bourgeois who was formerly a member of 
the proletariat is not the same as someone who has lived all his 
life in the bourgoisie. It is this fact that makes analysis of 
class such a difficult empirical problem, and which acts in real 
life to reduce and confuse class differences. 
It is not to be supposed that the present author's insistence 
on mobility between occupational classes is a misguided attempt 
to evade such problems. On the contrary, by separating out occupation 
and class (despite the similarities identified above in our account 
of 'occupational classes') we gain not so much precision and order 
as a means of making new connections and further elaborations. 
Our occupational classes for this purpose may be regarded as simply 
a representation of that central fact in man's existance in industial 
societies, work in paid employment. 
Occupational Mobility 
In looking at work and mobility we may begin by asking 
mundane questions about work processes in life cycles: how do men obtain 
employment, or lose it; what are the requirements for promotion, 
why do men change jobs, and so on. These kinds of questions mean 
that we take the metaphor of occupational mobility seriously, 
and narrow down our focus from the grand horizon of 
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stratification theory to the more commonplace world of work. This does 
not imply that we are concerned solely with work tasks, or that we are 
abandoning our earlier statement that occupation cannot be isolated from 
other aspects of stratification. Rather, we are recognising that our 
view of stratification, if based on occupation, is conditioned by the 
processes which themselves condition'occupations. The other side of this 
proposed concentration on occupation operates in the reverse direction; 
we can expand our interest by asking wider, historical questions, such as 
how do social changes generate new patterns of occupations,.patterns which in 
turn account for observed mobility? In other words, we need to consider 
theories of the evolution of advanced industrial society - or the emergence 
of modern capitalism - which either directly or indirectly deal with 
occupational processes. 
Both of these elaborations of the more conventional approach 
to mobility are basically very simple ideas. If mobility is measured by 
means of occupations, then the commonsense explanation of mobility lies 
39 
in whatever determines the supply.of and access to, those occupations. Starting in a 
concrete way, we can examine the society of our choice much as an economic 6r 
social historian would. It is possible to describe changes in the size of the 
labour force, its gender, its industrial composition, and its work skills: 
the census will provide a decennial framework for this. Other official 
sources (such as emigration and unemployment figures), memoires, and 
company histories may describe how certain older industries declined, 
while elsewhere other industries based on new technologies developed, so 
contracting some occupations, and expanding others. Again, major events 
like the Great Depression and two World Wars must have made some kind of 
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difference to the employment histories of men of working age during them. 
It may also be ;ossible to analyse the regional or segmented labour markets which 
make up the national picture. Men are not universal units of labour in 
a society-wide market: rather, they are restricted by social ties and 
the friction of space to selling their labour in only one localised 
segment of the total market at any one time. 
Presented in this fashion, the proposed analysis sounds almost 
pedestrian in its obviousness. But the reader will look in vain for 
such a treatment in the literature on social mobility in Britain, and will 
need to search with great diligence to find even partial programmatic Stptements 
among European writers (see, for example, Bertaux, 1969 and M~ler, 1971 )(16) 
It i~ true that the mai~ thrust of research into the relationship between 
education and mobility seeks to locate mobility in a framework of legisla-
tion, institutional practice, and educational reform (Little and Westergaard, 
1965; Halsey et al, 1980). However, such analyses have concentrated on 
class differentials in access, and there is an inadequate recognition of 
occupational change and the full range of historical factors involved. 
) 
And yet the basis for a sociographic approach can be found in the work 
Sorokin ana Glass, who both talk about historical and demographic changes. 
Indeed, the latter initiated one of the key technical debat~s 
1n measuring mobility, the attempt to eliminate 'the effect of the marginals'. 
(16) When the present ~uthor outlined this 'sociographic' approach at 
the SSRC International Mobility Seminar in 1975, it clearly surprised 
the other participants. Goldthorpe's contribution to that seminar 
(later to be published as Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 1977) was sub-
sequently revised to take in a new section on changes in the occupational 
structure, exactly as proposed (Payne et al, 1975). However, this 
remains the only (and a very partial) British attempt to connect 
mobility to its historical context. 
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It 'Was early seen that .in a mobility table, the s1.ze of the origin 
categories, relative to the destination categories, imposed arithmetic 
limits on the amount and kind of mobility that could take place. 
Numerous indices 'Were proposed tocontrol for this effect, so that the 
rema1n1ng 'true' mobility could be estimated for comparison 'With other 
societies or previous eras. It has been conventional to distinguish in 
this 'Way bet'Ween 'forced' (or 'structural') mobility 'Which is due to the 
differences bet'Ween fathers' and sons' occupational distributions, and 
'pure' mobility. 
To take a simple illustration, Fig. 1 sho'Ws a mobility table 
1n 'Which there are more sons in non-manual work than there were fathers. 
Fig. 1.1 A hypothetical two by two mobility table (percentages) 
·son's Occupation 
Non-manual Manual Totals 
-· 
35 ~ Non-manual 30 5 l1l 0 
~ 
·r-1 1-< ...., 
(!) co 
.co. 
...., ;j 
co u 
~ u 20 45 0 Manual 65 
Totals 50 50 100 
Because non-manual opportunities have expanded bet'Ween the 
t'Wo generations, there is a greater chance both for the sons of non-
manual men to obtain non-manual jobs, and for the sons of manual men 
to be up'Wardly mobile. With 15 percent more of the sons in non-manual 
employment, these ne'W non-manuals have to be recruited from either the 
sons of non-manual fathers (where already 30 out of 35 are getting 
non-manual jobs) or from the sons 'With manual origins. Had the sons' 
occupation distribution been 60/40, rather than 50/SO, then there would 
have been an absolute shortage of sons from non-manual origins to fill 
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all of the available posts, and a further 5%, with manual or1g1ns, 
would have to be forcibly drafted in to fill the vacancies. An altern-
ative way ~f putting this is to say that with half of the destinations being 
non-manual, there must be some upward mobility, but with only half of 
the destinations being non-manual, there cannot be upward mobility for 
every cre of the 657. of men born into manual families. Glass's indices 
of association and disassociation were an early attempt to eliminate the 
way marginal totals constrain patterns of mobility: many others were 
proposed in the next twenty years (Bibby, 1975) .. The (usually implicit) 
assumption was that structural mobility was a distortion of the picture, 
which hindered comparison between societies. 'Pure' mobility was due 
to institutional practices (like education) and so reflected the extent 
of 'democracy', or openness of societal arrangements, in a given culture. 
Paradoxically, then, the existence of a structural effect was 
well known, but no-one sought to analyse it in its own right ( 17 ) It was 
. not until 1975, with Hauser's two ~papers, that much attention. was 
given to the idea that·te central issue in mobility rates might be the occup-
ational structure itself, rather than the social processes of access which 
had normally been assumed to account for mobility up to that point 
(Hauser et al, 1975a,b). In using a log-linear modelling technique 
based on Goodman's work, Hauser found that changes in American mobility 
(17) One explanation for this may be that the academic specialists who 
were concerned with the statistics of mobility became organisationally 
differentiated from those generalist or historical sociologists who knew 
more about events of social change. Even if there was communication 
between the two, the task of connecting sample data to extraneous 
historical patterns is not an easy one, as we shall see below. Another 
explanation is that Glass's writings (which were tremendously influential~ 
tended on the whole to point away from the historical, and subsequent writers 
followed his lead. 
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rates (d~fined as odds-ratios, 1.e. comparisons of relative chances of 
mobility) could be adequately reconstructed from a very limited set of 
parameters which did ·not include a term for temporal change in the internal 
processes of mobility itself. In other words, Hauser treats 'pure' 
mobility as a constant, while allowing the occupational distributions 
to vary over time; this generates an estimate for mobility which is 
sufficiently close to observed mobility that treating pure mobility as 
a variable makes no significant improvement in goodness of fit (as 
2 
measured by a x·-type test). Parallel findings have been since reported 
for several other countries, except Sweden (Erikson, 1977), and variations 
in technique have alsoyielded similar results (eg, Hope 1980). It may be 
that the odds-ratio is not the best measure of mobility,"but Hauser's 
work provided both a statistical technique and an important new impetus 
to mobility research. Changes in occupa~ional structures became ~problem. 
Earlier it was suggested that taking the metaphor of occupational 
mobility seriously leads logically either to a more spe.cific and empirical 
consideration of occupational processes and structures, or to a relocation 
of mobility within mainstream sociology. Rather than asking what does 
mobility tell us about stratification, the new question asks what does 
a study of mobility tell us about the evolution and character of the 
particular type of society which has existed in this country during this century? 
Of course, this still rema1ns partly a matter of stratification. If 'the 
particular type of society' is defined as advanced capitalism, then class 
is going to remain one of the central issues. Even writers who have 
adopted one of the rival definitions of contemporary society (as 'advanced 
industrial' or 'post-industrial' society) do not ignore the form which 
stratification takes, even if their conclusions are quite different from 
I· 
those of the marxists. However, the emphasis and ordering of problems 
will not be the same, if only because there must be a more explicit 
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reference to ideas about the nature of a society which is based on an advanced 
technology, and specifically about occupational change. 
Occupations and Occupational Mobility. 
To what extent can changes in the occupatioml structure be said 
to explain patterns of mobility? By definition, an expansion or a contraction 
of an occupational group changes the overall flow of recruitment to (and 
from) that group. Such a change manifests itself as an arithmetic 
relationship in a mobility table; in both real and analytical terms, the 
change in the recruitment is caused by the change in the occupational 
structure. It does not however explain the details of the new recruitment. 
The new recruits to an expanded occupation may come more from other groups 
in the upper part of the hierarch~ or from the same groups or from lower 
groups - or the new posts may be shared out in exactly the same proportions 
as before. 
Although this last possibility seems unlikely at first sight, 
it is not completely implausible. If one assumes for the moment that the 
mechanisms of selection(in Sorokin's sense) do not change, then the allocation 
of:people to the new posts within an expanding occupation will favour( and dis-
criminate against) exactly the same kinds of people.as before. Until the point is 
reached where all of these potentially eligible people have been allocated, and there are 
still 'vacancies', the incomers will just be 'more of the same'. After all,past 
recruits have come from diverse backgrounds, so that it is unlikely that the 
criteria for selection are so precise as to restrict entry to a very small 
sub-set of the population which can be exhausted before the expansion has 
been filled up. 
We can qualify this statement to ta~e account of what is generally 
known about occupational change, i.e. that it is the DQn=illS!D1lg.l occupations 
that are growing in both absolute and relative terms. This growth is of 
two kinds, the expansion in size of existing occupations, and the-creation 
of completely new occupations. In new occupations there are at first no 
formal rules of entry, no union or professional association to limit access. 
New recruits are people from other very similar occupations who drift 
across into a new specialism. The new occupation attracts members much 
like its closest ancestors even if its formal qualifications are not 
established. This in turn tends to make its later history of· selection 
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like those other occupations, at least in terms of the origins of its recruits. 
Being in the upper part of the occupational hierachy means that increased 
recruitment on the previous pattern has two effects. It offers more non-
manual careers to the sons of non-manual fathers, so increasing immobility 
and cutting downward mobility. At the same time it offers more non-manual 
careers to the sons of manual fathers, so reducing immobility and increasing 
upward mobility. The joint effect is to reduce downward mobility, and to 
produce some kind of balanced effect on immobility and upward mobility, depending 
on the precise recruitment pattern reproduced. Because the original pattern 
of recruitment is one that selects from diverse origins, there is no 
automatic outcome beyond this. It would be just as wrong to assume that 
non-manual sons will benefit most, so increasing immobility, as to assume 
that manual sons will benefit most, so increasing upward mobility. 
Again we have built into this model the further assumption that 
recruitment is from diverse origins, which it is (see below, Ch. 7). 
However, there is an additional broad patterning to the relationship between 
origins and destinations, namely _that manual jobs are predominantly filled 
by sons ot manual workers and - to a slighty lesser extent - that non-manual jobs 
recruit disproportionately from sons of non-manual fathers. It is the former type 
of occupation that has, on the whole,been contracting during most of this 
century, and the latter which has been expanding. Since these 
dominatethe types of occupational change, this strongly affects 
any mea~ures of change. For instance, the probability of being 
born middle class has increased, and so have the chances 
of a middle class son getting a middle class job: the ratio .of the two 
probabilities (as in the odds - ratio) reflects both changes. 
Detailed-discussion of these changes is given below in Chapter 4, but as a 
rough guide, the overall trend in Scotland since 1921 has been an expansion of non-manual 
male employment from being about 28% of the labour force to about 39% in 1971( 18). 
Spread ove·r fifty years the change is not very great: if sons follow fathers 
into work some twenty years later, their opportunity structure is on average 
only around four per cent more non-manual than their fathers'. Of course some 
specific occupations were·greatly affected and others less so, and there 
has been no single historical trend, which further complicates the picture. 
These arguments are predicated on the explicit premise that the 
mechanisms of selection do not change, but this is an assumption that has 
more heuristic value than empirical reality. In the first place, the spread 
of universal post-primary education means that more people have the 
qualifications to take non-manual jobs, and as Little and Westergaard 
among ot"hers have argued, the middle classes have done better out of this 
education boom than the working classes. As education is certainly a 
selection mechanism for many expanding occupations, the sons of the middle 
class have improved their competitive position for entry v1s a v1s the sons 
of the working class. In the second place, the relative expansion of one sector· 
draws off recruits who might otherwise have competed for places at a lower 
level. This leaves the mechanisms of selection in the second - or in the 
generalised case, all other - occupational group(s) working on different 
'human materials'. We would therefore expect the reproduction of the original 
patterns of recruitment to be somewhat distorted, because all occupational 
groups are changing at the same time. 
(18) Based on Census data and definitions. 
For these several reasons, it is not possible to 'explain' 
mobility, in the sense of making precise predictive statements, on the 
basis of occupational change. It remains an empiLical question to 
investigate what the consequences for mobility patterns may be. Equally_, 
the operation of the selective mechanisms, for example education, remains 
part of the explanatory model, because we wish to know not jus.t how many 
men from a particular origin have been recruited, but why these men rather 
than others from the same origins have been recruited. Thus the traditional 
interest in English mobility analysis, access to education, is not lost: 
rather it is balanced by the introduction of occupation on the demand side 
of the demand/supply function. 
The change in 'occupational demand' :is not the only element which 
a concern with occupation introduces. The distribution of occupations between 
regions and industrial sectors, the rate of technological change in each, and 
the shape of local labour markets help to identify the constraints on an 
individual's 'choice'of occupation. The mechanisms of knowing about 
vacancies, deciding whether a post is attractive, and the way fathers are 
able to intervene directly in the hiring process provide links between the 
structural framework and the life chances of the individual actor. To the 
extent that these are patterned by changes in 'occupational demand' -which 
is an empirical question - they represent elaborations of the basic 
relationship (not all of which can be dealt with here). 
The point has already been made that this ~s a shift in emphasis 
as compared, say, with Glass's focus on education as the key mechanism. It 
is also a shift in the way in which stratification is linked to social mobility. 
Most mobility research has concentrated on the argument that when mobility 
occurs, it does something to the stratification system. What the present 
study attempts to do is to extend the normal chain of connections, which 
may be represented as in Fig 1.2. 
47 
48 
Fig 1.2 Conventional relationship between occupation and mobility 
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Compared with earlier studies·, we wish to emphasise the first of these connections. 
In fact, the present account goes beyond this, although only a partial and 
indicative way, to suggest other links in the chain, as in Fig 1.3; 
Fig 1.3 Modified relationship between occupation and mobility 
r---
v 
economic 
' 
occupational H change in ' changes in I / 
change change mobility stratification 
....... 
I 
!.....,-------------------- ---- - ..1 
First, occupations do not change autonomously. Occupations depend on the 
' use of labour in the production of goods and servives by organisations. 
These organisations are controlled by social actors, who depioy capital, 
new technology, and other factors of production in pursuit of their goals. 
This economic process creates or destroys occupational opportunity. 
Second, changes in occupations do not just affect stratification 
through m6bility. Improvement in the market position of an occupational 
group improves its financial standing, while deskilling of its task degrades 
it. This direct effect is represented by the upper dotted line in Fig 1.3 
not because it is unimportant, but because the present study is less concerned 
with that kind of relationship, important though it is. 
The lower dotted line in Fig 1.3 connecting changes in stratification 
to economic change is a reminder that few relationships work purely in one 
direction. An example of this connection is the argument that the new middle 
class created by occupational change will adopt a set of political and 
social priorities stressing communal rather than profit maximising goals. 
Expressed in contemporary terms, this would be support for public 
expenditure rather than cuts or privatisation of state operations. 
The use of the dotted line in Fig 1.3 as before indicates a legitimate 
and interesting line of connection, but one which does not take a central 
place in the present work. Other such lines could be added, for example 
connecting economic change directly to changes in stratification to 
take account of changes in property and modes of production. 
However, it will be recognised that two basic sociological 
positions are implied in the apparently simple figure above. First, 
the style of explanation is one that invokes large scale and general 
changes to explain a more specific phenomenon. It is a structural, 
macro-sociological, argument which makes little allowance for man as 
a creative social actor who reconstructs social reality through his 
subjective meanings. 
In the second place, the main emphasis is on the link between 
occupation and stratification. That is not to say that stratification 
is totally a product of occupation, but rather that this study is about 
occupations rather than say, property, or status, or the relations between 
classes. Necessarily the aspect of stratification which receives atten~ion 
here is the economic one, so that 'classes' are empirically defined 
as aggregates of occupations, and class positions are chiefly concept-
ualised in terms of market work situations. Other views of class, 
stressing 'struggle' or the dynamic created by the opposition of class 
interests, therefore receive little attention. 
Despite this, Fig 1.3 as it stands is not tied to a single 
theoretical framework. With minor changes of wording the figure would 
be compatible with several competing positions. The basic structure 
of the connections would be almost as acceptable to such varied writers 
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as Bell, Dahrendorf or Wright. The next s_tep must therefore be to 
--locate the core process of connections in a wider framework of ideas. 
Broadly speaking, marxist writers have argued that an 
explanation of class must be sought in the mode of production, and 
therefore concentrated their efforts on that feature. Johnson, for 
example, has criticised the Weberian tradition for taking the market 
in which property and labour are sold as given, and thereby 
for failing to see that the value of skills depends on the needs of 
the mode of production (Johnson 1977). Crompton and Gubbay (1977) 
identify the extraction of surplus value as the key process, which turns 
the market into a system of exploitation. In this view, both marxist 
and non-marxist accounts can be heavily economic in emphasis, but the 
former claims to have identified a more fundamental level of explanation. 
Non-marxists, such as Parkin (1979), tend to find the connections between 
the mode of production and the complexity of modern society hard to 
substantiate. They therefore draw on a wider range of economic forces 
(technology, knowledge skills, income) to account for a social world 
which increasingly is seen as departing from a two-class model of society. 
In order to structure these different theoretical positions, 
it is necessary to make a somewhat arbitrary division between 'theories 
of capitalist society' and 'theories of industrial society'. Broadly 
speaking, the former draw on Marx, and attach varying degrees of 
primacy to the search for profit and control of the market exchange 
system, and to the historical process of class struggle. The latter 
stress the growing application of inanimate power to production, and the 
consequent new forms of social relationship associated with large-scale 
organisations and the factory system. 
Thi~ dichotomy helps to impose an order on complicated ideas, 
and each school receives separate treatment below. However, although 
the division is artificial, it is not accidental or even strictly 
conventional. The principle involved is one of causal explanation: 
given that mobility is seen largely as a product of occupational change, 
how are we to explain occupational change itself? The two schools adopt 
differeni views. 
It is for this reason that we have chosen to contrast 
'capitalist' with 'industrial' theories, rather than the more common 
Marxist versus Weberian distinction (Abercrombie and Urry 1983; 
Scott, 1979) even though the two dichotomies have many similarities. 
The latter distinction owes more to the debate about class, in which 
mobility as occupational change is a relevant but subsidiary part, whereas 
the differentiation used here brings out the occupational dimension 
more directly. It will be necessary to extract elements from that debate 
and even at times to re-locate individual contributions in an unusual 
context, but the main focus of the present work makes this desirable. 
Any discussion of two schools of course disguises the 
internal complexity of debate that each contains. It follows that the 
temptation to proceed by means of comparisons between their different 
treatments of central issues, like technology or the growth of the middle 
classes, must be resisted because it is likely to result in too fragmented 
a picture. A prior - if only partial - consideration of each theory 
in its own terms and with its own internal disagreements is needed in 
order that those features which are directly related to mobility can 
be identified, in order to inform our analysis. This is seen as a step in 
the direction of re-establishing connections between mobility and several 
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of the major themes of sociological theory, as a counter-balance to mobility's 
present isolation as a sub-problem of social stratification. 
CHAPTER TWO 
OCCUPATIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY 1 ·The Theory of Capitalist Society 
The theory of capitalist society not only has its origins in 
Marx's work, but much of its contemporary debate (for example about the 
new middle classes) is tied to the detail of his writing and frequently 
refers back to Marx for legitimation. This chapter therefore begins by 
examining how Marx accounts for the core characteristics of modern 
society, particularly those relating to labour, and then goes on to 
discuss certain aspects of subsequent development of marxist ideas. 
Necessarily, the version of these theories presented will be truncated 
and selective, because the prime focus of the present study is 
occupational change and mobility, rather than class struggle or the 
complex abstract models of modes of production which are central to 
marxism. 
The discussion, which includes a review of basic ideas as well 
as some specialised and recent literature, is intended to serve three 
functions. First, it provides a theoretical framework in which 
mobility can be situated and from which mobility takes its meaning. 
Second, the discussion attempts to show which sub-themes within the 
general theory have a particular relevance for mobility as re-
conceptualised in the first chapter. Finally, some of these sub-themes 
suggest themselves as amenable to empirical treatment in the present 
study, and so form the basis of the analysis carried out in later 
chapters. 
The initial step in this is to characterise the main 
elements of the theory of capitalist society, drawing attention to its 
conception of work and class relations, and concentrating on Marx's 
ideas about changes in the middle strata. This is followed by a 
discusion of two specific sub-themes, to which marxist and nee-marxist 
sociologists have made important contributions; the nature of the new 
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middle classes, and the debate over technology and the degradation of 
labour. These sub-themes again receive a less extensive treatment than 
if we were interested in them for their own sake. 
Historical Changes in Labour 
We may begin by acknowledging the essentially historical 
style of the theory of capitalist society. As a result of its 
proponents' concern to show the uniqueness of modern modes of 
production, considerable attention has been paid to earlier social 
forms. From this it is possible to. draw an important if somewhat 
general observation about the variety of ways in which labour has been 
organised in production. Mobility research assumes the 'freedom' of 
the individual to change jobs, and perhaps more crucially, not to 
follow in his father's footsteps, but this is dependent on the 
existance of contemporary forms of labour. 
For example, under feudalism, the labour force typically 
consisted of serfs, free neither to determine their masters, their own 
movements, their own work tasks, nor the form in which their rents were 
paid to the lord. In a low technology, simple -economy, this applied to 
the vast majority. Even outside of the agricultural system, in the new 
towns whose growth contributed to the decline of feudalism, labour was 
not free. (Anderson 1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Hill, 1969). There, the 
medieval guild system of production differed from that of feudal 
servility, because master, journeyman, and apprentice typically lived 
and worked together as a domestic unit. Nevertheless, the master 
retained strong paternalistic control, and the distinctions between the 
grades of labour were very marked. In particular, progress from 
journeyman to master was restricted by the guild's regulation of trade, 
and the frustration of the journeymen (over what we might re-interpret 
as blocked mobility) was ultimately one of the pressures that helped to 
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undermine the system. The rigidity of the guild system did not just 
limit sideways and upward movement of labour; as urban growth 
continued, the guilds were unable to meet expanded demand for their 
products. 
The mode of production that replaced the guild system was 
based on the merchant capitalist 'putting out' his work; providing the 
raw materials for families of out-workers who used their own tools in 
their own homes to manufacture goods which were then returned to the 
merchant for sale. The master/ journeyman/apprentice paternalism was 
thus replaced by a simpler cash relationship, but one in which the out-
workers retained some control over production. Recent writers have 
seen this as a central issue in the introduction of the factory system. 
While factory production does allow the introduction of large scale, 
inanimate sources of power (such as the water·mill or steam engine) its 
attraction lies in overcoming what, from the merchant's point of view, 
were three defects of home-based work, namely 
'the lack of control by the merchant-capitalist over his 
workers; the economic losses through waste and fraud; and the 
uncertain nature of the labour force. The independant, 
voluntary status of the worker was slowly eroded in an 
attempt to increase the efficiency of exploitation, first, by 
allowing the worker to get into debt and, second, by taking 
away the worker's ownership of his tools. These two factors 
opened the way for the emergence of a class of alienable 
wage-labourers dependent on the capitalist class for both a 
living and a livelihood.' (Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, 50). 
In this view, the industrial revolution, with its new 
technology and organisation, has no meaning except as the 'successful' 
outcome of the efforts of the capitalist class to establish its 
domination of society, to shape the social order (by controlling state 
machinery and other ideological apparatus) to suit its ends, and to 
develop new forms of capital accumulation. Under industrial capitalism, 
those who have no means of production must sell their labour as best 
they can on a market which is determined by the capitalists' purchase 
of labour for the production of their chosen products. Beyond that 
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basic contract, there is nothing: worker/capitalist relationships are 
impersonaL To put it another way, workers are in principle free to 
change jobs and to obtain the best job they can, within a market where 
jobs are being created and destroyed by the capitalists through their 
control over the technology of production, and also over decisions 
whether production itself shall continue or cease. Feudal, guild, and 
out-work labour are replaced by a system in which social mobility, at 
least within a single broad class, and subject to market constraints, 
is possible(l). 
The underlying impersonality of the relationship between 
capital and labour is also further determined by the form of the 
business enterp-rise in modern capitalism. The rise of the joint stock 
company separated the capitalist from the enterprise itself; his 
ownership remained but his control was exercised indirectly (and some 
would argue, less effectively (eg Burnham, 1945)) through the persons 
of managers and the legal entitlements of 'money capital', that is 
shares and bonds etc. By means of one company controlling another, in 
increasing chains, the distance between the capitalist and the actual 
productive activity was extended. At the same time, a banking 
apparatus was required to handle the expanding workings of a joint-
stock system, which helped to change the function of-the banks from 
small borrowing and lending concerns into major forces which themselves 
exerted control over production. 
--·- --------- ------ -------------------------
(1) Although this account has been presented in ideal typical terms, 
in order to point up the particular character of labour under 
capitalism, it also reflects the heavy historical emphasis of this 
school of social analysis. 
5.) 
'The central theme of the theory of capitalist society is 
the dominance of finance capital. Lenin and Bukharin both 
point to the fact that monopolized capital in banking and 
manufacturing fuses into 'finance capital' ie, capital which 
is not restricted to one particular sphere of activity ' 
(Scott, 1979, 24). (2) 
This process hastens the 'inevitable outcome of the nature 
of capitalism' (Aaronvitch, 1955, 14), that is the growth of monopoly 
capitalism, in which production is dominated by fewer and fewer, larger 
and larger enterprises. The banking and managerial apparatus needed 
for monopolistic corporations consists of new technological forms, 
manifested in occupations requiring new skills. Indeed, some jobs 
involve day-to-day control of the corporation and its other employees. 
But that does not introduce any fundamental change in the basic 
relations of production. 
'After all, the real power over production remains with the 
owners and not with those who in their name are directing 
technological progress, etc. The engineers and clerical 
employees of a monopolistic company cannot throw its owners· 
out nor force them to surrender a portion of the profits in 
favour of the workers. The owners, on the other hand, can 
hire and fire engineers and clerical workers and dictate 
their will just as they could a hundred years ago.' 
(Kuusinen et al, 1959,292). 
Nor, as Mills has pointed out, can the manager automatically 
pass on his advantageous position to his children. They in turn must 
struggle for their own advance as he did before them (Mills, 1963). 
Real power remains in the hands of 'a few hundred or at most a few 
thousand men of wealth' (Perle, 1957, 13). 
(2) Scott is of course looking at the theory of capitalist society in 
terms of his interest in corporations, rather than in terms of our 
present interest in mobility. 
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However, the separation of ownership from direct control, 
together with the growth in the scale of organisations, the 
introduction of complex new technologies, and the need for an apparatus 
of ideological legitimation all require a different kind of wage 
labourer. This new middle class ranges from the top managers of major 
corporations, whose services are progressively rewarded with gifts of 
shares until they are effectively absorbed into the capitalist class, 
to some kinds of clerical workers (for example, machine operators in 
Californian banks) whose pay, conditions, and skills have been eroded 
to the point that their work is indistinguishable from manual labour 
(Braverman, 1974). 'The middle class' is a misleading title: it is 
only one class in the sense that it lies between the capitalist class 
and the class of manual labourers, and that, in the theory of 
capitalist society, it owes its being to the forces of capital 
accumulation inherent in monopoly capitalism. But the diversity of its 
composition is such that it would be more accurate to talk about the 
middle classes. This not only reflects the internal differentation of 
status that the incumbents themselves acknowledge, but also goes some 
way towards recognising that different occupational groups owe their 
existence to different aspects of the capitalist process. These points 
will be elaborated later in the chapter. 
It is the emergence and massive growth of the new middle 
classes which provides the major opportunity for social mobility in 
capitalist society, although it is the more fundamental relationship 
between labour and capital which 'frees' the worker to be a mobile 
agent in the market place. 
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Marx and Mobility 
It might be expected from this conceptual basis that marxist 
sociologists would have investigated social mobility extensively. Some 
writers on class in Britain, for instance Westergaard, have used the 
findings of earlier studies in a limited way, but that apart, there has 
been little empir~cal, and not much more theoretical, work on mobility 
from the standpoint of the theory of capitalist society(two exceptions 
are Smith (1981) and Robinson and Kelley (1979)). On the contrary, one 
of the more important recent accounts of social mobility in England and 
Wales (Goldthorpe, 1980) starts with a lengthy defence against those on 
the left who see this kind of work as ideological support for the 
capitalist system. 
Goldthorpe acknowledges that evidence of mobility patterns 
can be used ideologically, and the opening chapter of Social Mobility 
and Class Structure in Modern Britain devotes considerable effort to 
the identification of 'interests' in writing on social mobility: that 
is to say, to relating various styles of social mobility analysis to 
the positions that key figures have taken on the subject of the class 
structure of capitalist societies in particular, and capitalism in 
general. While this can be justified as a means of clarifying sub-
schools within mobility analysis, its explicit rationale (pp 2-3) is as 
a direct response to the marxist critique that a concern with social 
mobility is inherently bourgeois. Furthermore, its treatment of the 
selected key figues is uneven: the attention devoted to Marx is 
unjustified except in terms of a perceived need to placate a 
potentially hostile audience on the Left. (3) 
(3) An alternative explanation lies in a tendency for British 
sociology to be over-concerned with its intellectual roots (see 
Payne et al, 1981) 
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Thus we find the first nine pages concentrating on a 
demonstration of the fact that Karl Marx did in fact deal with social 
mobility. Fourteen direct references or quotations are introduced 
between pages 4 and 9, with the sources ranging from the Manifesto, 
through the Eighteenth Brumaire, and Theories of Surplus Value, to 
Capital. (4), Goldthorpe uses this evidence to challenge the'more 
accepted view propagated by Van Heek: 
'Nineteenth century liberalism was blind to the problem (of 
mobility): Marxism attached little importance to it.' (Van 
Heek1956, 131). 
But as Goldthorpe himself has to admit, 
'while Marxism no less than liberalism thus foreclosed on the 
question of mobility, the further point that we would wish to 
bring out here is that, so far as Marx's own writings are 
concerned,the significance of mobility is in fact a good deal 
greater than has usually been supposed. It is true 
that Marx discussed mobility directly only, as it 
were, in the context of other problems, and then at 
no ·great length.' (Goldthorpe, 1980, 4, - first emphasis 
original, second added). 
This presents us with the dubious argument that Marx may have 
written almost nothing about the subject, but that it had great 'covert 
significance' in his work (Goldthorpe, 1980, 4). We must therefore 
decide whether Marx saw the true significance of mobility and yet 
capriciously chose not to write much about it, or whether he in fact 
only partially saw it as a problem, mistook its true importance for 
future developments, and so paid it scant attention. (See also 
Crompton and Gubbay's sceptical comment (1974,47)). 
(4) Although there are only two direct references to it, Goldthorpe 
appears to be dravring heavily on Harris (1939), whose work 
Goldthorpe calls the outstanding critical contribution to the 
study of intermediate strata in.~1arx's work. (Goldthorpe, 1980, 32) 
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If we are to believe Goldthorpe, Marx did appreciate the 
importance of mobility, despite writing almost nothing about it in the 
whole of his prolific output. Two consequences follow from this 
position. First, Goldthorpe has established that mobility can be 
analysed from any ideological standpoint, not just from that of the 
apologist for capitalism. Second, he has established a hallowed, 
symbolic pedigree for the study of social mobility: if Marx himself 
sanctified it, we may all safely follow in his footsteps. Goldthorpe 
goes on to discuss several post-marxist writers who, he is able to 
demonstrate, use mobility as a means of elaborating aspects of Marx's 
work. Thus Bernstein deals with the fate of the lesser classses, or 
strata, caught between the two major forces of the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat; Sombart grows pessimistic about the fate of socialism in 
an affluent and mobile society like America - a kind of society not 
fully anticipated by Marx; and Michels deals with the way mobility 
aspirations and achievements weaken the position of the working_ class. 
Significantly, Goldthorpe's accounts show only that these writers were 
in dialogue with Marx, not that they were in dialogue specifically with 
the fourteen quoted references where Marx spoke directly on social 
mobility. 
This same caveat must be entered in the case of four more 
recognisable contributors to social mobility; Sorokin, Lipset, Glass 
and Duncan. While Goldthorpe skillfully disentangles the differences 
in interest and emphasis that distinguish these four sociologists, he 
is unable to show how they responded to Marx's view of social mobility. 
Indeed, it is apparent that their ideas are part of a non-marxist 
critique of capitalism, but in no way can be said to be a direct 
response to Marx on mobility. These writers belong, as we shall see, 
to the theorists of industrial society. 
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If, on the other hand, one rejects the Goldthorpe position 
that social mobility had some kind of 'covert significance' for Marx, 
where does this leave a marxist view of mobility? It was suggested 
above that there is within the theory of capitalist society ample 
grounds for an explanation of mobility. Nevertheless, it is not a 
subject which has received much attention. In fact, social mobility as 
it occurs in modern capitalism seems to be a source of great 
embarrassment to marxists. Its existence weakens class boundaries, 
dilutes class consciousness, and helps to explain the failure of Marx's 
prediction of proletarian revolution. Why have marxists (apart from 
defectors like Sombart) not studied mobility? 
First, as indicated in the previous chapter, some writers 
like Poulantzas lay so much stress on abstract structures of production 
that in comparison mobility of persons has no significance at all. 
Second, empirical analysis (except for historical analysis, where there 
is not much to be said about mobility) has not been a strong point of 
European, and particularly British, marxism. Goldthorpe is right that 
mobility can be studied by sociologists of any ideological hue, but he 
fails to recognise that marxist sociologists have shown themselves 
almost without exception to be able historians or theorists, but most 
unwilling to carry out systematic contemporary field work(S),. No 
amount of invocation of the Master's works will change this: it will 
remain far easier to label mobility analysis as bourgeois and so define 
it out of relevance. 
(5) This critique is developed in Payne et al, (1981), pp 70-84 
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However, this dearth of empirical sociological research is 
less important than the main point that social mobility in its modern 
sense fits uneasily with Marx's own conception of capitalism. Although 
he allowed for several minor strata between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat - such as state functionaries, small traders or industrial 
managers - and in numerous places acknowledges the existence of the 
middle classes (6 ), the main concentration of his argument was on the 
significance of the two major classes and the dominance of the one over 
the other (T). If, unlike Goldthorpe, we choose to concentrate on this 
other element in Marx's work, then it becomes apparent that social 
mobility is an unresolved problem, particularly in his early writing(8). 
(6) For example Marx and Engels (1962, 41); Marx, (1969, 300); Marx 
(1959a, 293-), although passing references to multiple classes or 
strata are numerous in his work: see Evans (1975, 80-81). 
(7) Obviously, there is a danger of over-simplification if one 
concentrates too narrowly on the 'two class' aspect of Marx's 
work. However, an emphasis on domination and the two major clases 
is not incompatible with recognising the importance of the minor 
classes - see for example Wesolowski (1979, Part 1). Harris's 
discussion (1939, 328-332) of the middle class in Marx shows how 
over-simplification can be avoided by appeal to the overall 
balance of Marx's writings. The polemicist of the Manifesto is 
not to be taken as representing the scientist of the 18th Brumaire 
or Capital (Harris 333-4). 
(8) Although see McLellan (1973, 13-25) for a discussion of "periods" 
in Marx's writing. 
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In the first place, if one emphasises this dimension of 
Marx's work, and leaves to one side for the moment the new middle 
classes, the two classes are by definition separate and mutually 
antagonistic. It is possible for there to be limited downward social 
mobility, as a capitalist fails and is reduced to the ranks of the 
proletariat by the loss of his capital. It is harder to see how Marx's 
theory allows for the accumulation of capital to permit individual 
mobility in the reverse direction. In the longer term, the proletarian 
revolution will result in a kind of social mobility (although Marx did 
not think of it in such terms) when the ruling class is deposed and a 
classless equalitarian society is established. Until that day, all 
other movements between occupations are unimportant, and not to be 
described as social mobility, because by definition, almost all of them 
take place within a single occupational category, the working class. 
It is slightly unusual to present Marx's conception of class 
in terms of occupational categories in this way. In non-marxist 
discussions of how occupational categories are constructed, two main 
criteria; work task and associated rewards, stand out (see Appendix 1). 
In Marx's writing, members of the proletariat share the same 
relationships to the means of production: they sell their labour. 
Although the details of what labour they sell differ, it is not the 
difference that matters to Marx, it is the similarity of the conditions 
under which they sell, and the rewards that are thereby obtained. Thus 
'work task', narrowly defined, is not a major part of Marx's 
conception; it is the exchange of labour for wages that matters. 
Differences in work tasks - or the technical division of labour - are 
reduced to a level of relative insignificance so that only the common 
act of 'work' remains. Thus all subtler occupational differences 
cannot count for social mobility unless some kind of false consciousnes 
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intervenes. In the same way, the rewards, both mate~ial and non-
-
material, which·accrue to different occupations, are treated as being 
undifferentiated except at the level of division between the two main 
classes. 
This reading of Marx is the one adopted by one of the very 
few recent attempts to tackle mobility from a 'marxian perspective' 
(Smith 1981 ). Smith defines mobility as that between 'wage and salary 
workers' and what he calls the capitalist class (although he is 
somewhat inconsistent in his discussion of the petty bourgeoisie, the 
self-employed, managers, and proprietors). He is able to show using 
local data on Memphis that the capitalist class is shrinking and that 
movements between the two classes are declining. The shrinkage he 
attributes to the monopolisation of capital (he excludes managers), and 
the decline in mobility to the consequent structure of class 
opportunity. Robinson and Kelley (1979) also treat mobility as a 
measure of how ownership and control over the means of production is 
inherited, again taking the idea of two antagonistic classes as the 
main message from Marx (see also Hindess 1981, and Johnson and Rattansi 1981). 
Mobility has then received little attention because what most 
sociologists regard as movement is for the marxist contained within a 
single working class. Its relevance for marxism is to demonstrate the 
separation of the capitalist class from the working class and to show 
that that separation is increasing because 'real' mobility is small and 
decreasing. Mobility could in principle also be used as an explanation 
for the generation of false consciousness, but that latter notion has 
not been at the centre of recent debate. Because most mobility 
research does not focus on either the capitalist class or false. 
consciousness, mobility analysts of whatever political colour can be 
castigated as bourgeois idealogues who spend their time and effort in 
the study of a non-problem, so diverting the attention of others away 
from 'the real issues'. 
If there is any room for some kind of mobility analysis in 
Marx's conception, it is one which draws on his discussion of the 
internal sub-divisions of the major classes and the ways these evolve. 
In other words, we can identify social mobility of a structural kind, 
in which entire classes or strata are elevated or depressed, or 
incorporated as adjuncts to another class. Significantly, the bulk of 
Goldthorpe's reference to social mobility in Marx's writing deals with 
just this ( 9} 
Although Marx in no way offers a systematic treatment of the 
subject, his limited comments do point to one of the major themes of 
the present analysis, changes in the occupational structure. It is on 
the wholesale creation and destruction of strata that he remarks (10). 
Interestingly, these strata are far more differentiated and smaller 
than the two major classes. They are identified in terms of 
occupational groups with specialist work task functions, as much as in 
terms of their place in the class struggle, and certainly much more so 
(9) 'Significant' in the sense that according to the present argument, 
it could not be otherwise, but also significant in that attempting 
to rehabilitate social mobility into marxist sociology, Goldthorpe 
concentrates on structural mobility rather than other less 
palatable forms which represent a potentially greater challenge. 
There is a certain irony in this, because Goldthorpe's own 
mobility analysis often displays less interest in structural 
mobility than in exchange mobility. 
(10) Mackenzie has argued that Marx pays little attention to the new 
middle classes because he sees them as historically transitional 
and therefore not important as they will disappear (1982, 64). 
In contrast, Abercrombie and Urry concentrate on the creation of 
new strata, emphasising Marx's prediction of growth made in 
Capital. They do however note that 'just what the political 
significance of a non-labour class constituting one-third or 
perhaps one-half of the population' is left unstated by Marx 
(1983, 50). See also Mackenzie (1976) and Hodges (1961). 
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than in discussions of the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Their 
'mobility' is a collective-one, encompassing a whole category, rather 
than a mobility of individuals: the collectivity is brought into 
existence by new technological and capitalist forces, or displaced by 
the rigours of capitalist development. Paradoxically, this is one of 
the points to which many critics have objected, namely that Marx made 
insufficient allowance for the extent of middle class growth, and so 
misread the future lines of the class struggle (eg, Sorokin, 1927; 
Berle and Means,1932; Burnham, 1941). 
In contrast, mobility analysis has traditionally concentrated 
on individual mobility, and attempted to control for the effects of 
changing occupational structures (although see Parry and Parry 1977, 
112). It has thus not taken on board, until recently, the potentially 
powerful insight that an expanded middle class offers mobility 
opportunities, because the new recruits are very likely to come from 
some other backgrounds at least in the first generation. This was 
something which Marx did not fully perceive <11 ). 
To be f~ir to Marx, there are points in his work where he 
does seem to be aware of this phenomenon. In his discussion of 
recruitment to the expanded commercial office in Capital, Vol III, 
although emphasising that its ultimate effect is supportive of capital 
and damaging to wage-levels, he writes: 
'The generalisation of public education makes it possible to 
recruit this line of labourers (office workers) from a class 
that had formerly no access to such education and that were 
accustomed to a lower scale-of living' (Marx, 1959b, 354). 
(11) Nor did the present writer light upon the idea as a result of 
reading the literature on capitalist society. At best one can 
say that while the general structure of these ideas has the 
potential for explaining social mobility, there is little direct 
treatment of the subject, and what there is has not been the 
direct inspiration of later mobility research. 
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Harris (in whose work the above quotation was located·by the author) 
demonstrates convincingly that Marx expected and accounted for a very 
considerable rise in the 'dritte personen': office staff (l 2); 
commercial agents, such as buyers, sellers, and travellers; those 
involved in the calculation of prices, book-keeping, managing funds, 
carrying on correspondence; officials, parsons, professors, 
magistrates; soldiers, sailors, clerical employees, policemen, 
mistresses, clowns, and jugglers; artists, musicians, lawyers, 
physicians, professors, schoolmasters, inventors, commercial labourers, 
managers, salesmen, cashiers, and merchants. Why then is this new 
middle class ('new' in the sense that in much of Marx's writing, it was 
the capitalist class that was the old middle class between the 
landowners and the working class) not identified as a powerful 
historical force? 
Harris explains this in two main ways. First, in 
understanding capitalism, it is to the dominant modes of production and 
class relations that the analyst must turn. Thus for example, the 
small-scale farmer or the worker on his own account are little more 
than an irrelevance: the fate of the petty bourgeoisie at the hands of 
the capitalist class will eventually tidy up such inconsistencies. 
Second, the newer middle class is also marginal, because its service 
'does not incorporate ·itself in commodities and therefore, 
does not give rise to a surplus-product. It is unproductive 
labour which is performed outside the process of capitalist 
production' (Harris, 1939, 341 ) . 
(12) The slightly repetitive list is drawn from various sources in 
Marx's writing; see Harris (1939, 349, 352-3) for original 
references. 
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Unproductive labour is the type of labour which does not create new 
value in the form of a surplus product. It is not a matter of whether 
there is a physical product or not, but rather whether it contributes 
to an increased profit for the capitalist. It is the giving of more 
labour time than is received back in wages that defines labour as 
productive. All other kinds of activity create use-value, but not 
profit. Harris here seems to underestimate (in keeping with Marx?) the 
extent to which the new middle class is employed for profit, and 
therefore is productive. 
This is a central 'point' in Marx's conception of modern 
capitalism. He regards most of the new middle class as marginal, 
because their labour has only use-value: one part of it represents a 
response to the capitalist class's drift towards a lavish lifestyle 
with a system of retainers to service their needs; a second part of it 
(the 'functionaries in trade and marketing', Harris, 343) is helping 
only the circulation of commodities, which is not the essential element 
in capitalist production; and a third part is employed by the state, 
which makes no profit, and is again merely an enabling mechanism for 
capitalist production. At the same time the survival of the petty 
bourgeoisie has been achieved by technological change which allows new 
markets to open up as temporary refuges before large scale capital 
takes over each new activity. There is then no systematic sociology of 
the new middle class (and therefore of mobility) in Marx's own writing 
because the middle classes are devalued. 
Recent Ac~ounts of the New Middle Class 
The vacuum left by Marx has since been largely filled by 
marxist writers in the last decade. Despite many protestations on 
their part that Marx did in fact take account of the middle class, the 
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sheer volume of contributions to this debate is evidence that he did 
not provide a clear statement on the subject {l)) The debate has 
centred around the problem of identifying which, if any, of the classic 
classes is the true home of the new middle classes. To take several 
examples, Poulantzas, addressing the question of political strategy in 
France, has argued that they are a fraction of the petty bourgeotsie. 
Carchedi, on the other hand, proposes that they perform some functions 
of both labour and capital, while Nicolaus sees them a~ a consumption 
class separate from but contributing to productive labour. Ehrenreich 
and Ehrenreich take the view that the class of professionals and 
managers have to be seen as a separate class in its right, distinct 
from previous classes. 
If the present study were adopting a specifically marxist 
framework, it would be necessary to deal with this body of work in some 
detail, so that mobility into the new middle classes could be defined 
as upward, downward or sideways movements. As we are not tied to such 
a framework, the need for such an analysis does not arise, but it is 
nonetheless useful to consider briefly three features of these 
exchanges. First, what·occupations are being talked about? Second, 
what criteria are used to distinguish between classes? And third, what 
explanations are used to explain the growth or decline of these classes 
(this being the most interesting element)? 
(13) See for example Nicolaus, 1967; Poulantzas,- 1973; Braverman, 
1974; Carchedi, 1975, 1977; Wright, 1976, 1978; Crompton and 
Gubbay, 1977; Hunt, 1977; Walker, 1979; Edwards, 1980; Mackenzie, 
1982; Abercrombie and Urry, 1983. What is striking about all of 
these contributors is that as soon as they discuss in concrete 
form any class other than the property-owning class, they use 
occupation to identify membership. Thus, even though their prime 
concern would seem to lead them in one direction, in practice 
they are tied to occupations and occupational structures. 
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Part of the disagreement between the leading protagonists can 
be traced to the level of discourse adopted. Because this has been 
mainly theoretical in nature, empirical reference points are sometimes 
hard to establish. Whereas Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979) 
concentrate on professionals and managers, as distinct from other 
occupations, Poulantzas allocates senior managers to the capitalist 
class, and then combines the remaining administrators and professionals 
with.hairdressers, foremen, entertainers and other wage-earning 
groupings. His initial statement on the nature of the new petty 
bourgeoisie immediately moves into a discussion of the theory of 
surplus value and class polarization (Poulantzas, 1975, 204-230). 
Similarly Crompton and Gubbay find it possible to discuss the middle 
ground of occupations in terms of 'structural ambiguity' without 
specifying which occupations they have in mind: their development later 
emphasises the proletarianization of technicians and clerks, rather 
than managers or professionals, which colours their account (1977, 171; 
197-202). Wright's categorisation of the middle class in terms of 
ambiguous or contradictory structural locations pays less attention to 
technicians and clerks, although he does cover a wide range of 
occupations under his four groupings of upper managers, lower 
supervisors, small business men, and 'semi-autonomous wage earners'. 
This latter category is however not very satisfactory as it combines 
technicians, certain teachers, filling station owners, and other 
professionals because they are self-employed. (1976, 20-35; 1978, 63-
88). Clerks are not part of the new middle class because they are non-
autonomous, non-supervisory employees, a view shared by Baran (1957, 
32-3). 
The 'class identification' or 'boundary' problem (Hunt, 
1977, 10; Mackenzie, 1982, 63) thus takes three forms. First, it 
consists of arguments about the 'top' and 'bottom' of the new middle 
classes: are senior managers in the working or capitalist class? 
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Second, it consists of (often implicit) emphasis on one or other sub-
division, so that commentators often argue past one another. And 
third, it consists of confusion over the sub-divisions of the remaining 
occupations, often due to lack of concrete examples in the exposition. 
However, this confusion is also due to the particular aspects 
in marxism to which a contributor connects his own argument, ie, to the 
criteria employed to distinguish between classes and to identify their 
essential character. As this is not central to the main themes of the 
present study, ·we shall simply indicate several of the approaches 
adopted. A number of writers share more than one such approach. As 
against most non-marxist accounts, which pay more attention to the 
empirical identification of each class, the theorists of capitalist 
society are concerned with how classes interact, and the part they play 
in the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. Wright (for 
example 1978, 64ff), Carchedi (1977, Ch 1), Crompton and Gubbay (1977, 
Ch 9) and Bravermann (1974, Ch 2) all stress the importance of control 
and authority. On the one hand, control and authority are relations 
between classes, and on the other they constitute functions by means of 
which capitalist reproduction is possible.· The latter two writers are 
more concerned with the control aspects and draw pessimistic 
conclusions about proletarianisation. Like Wright and Carchedi, 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich are also concerned with reproduction, but 
they pay more attention to the cultural and ideological function. The 
professional and managerial class through the division of labour has 
appropriated mental labour from the proletariat, creating mutual 
antagonism, and while similarly having different class interest from 
the bourgeoisie, this class is now indispensible to capitalism because 
of its major function in 'the reproduction of capitalist culture and 
capitalist class relations' (1979,12). 
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A more political criterion is advocated by Hunt et al (1977). 
In criticising economistic versions of marxism, they draw on Marx's 
view of the importance of political and ideological factors, and see 
one central question as being what role the new middle class will play 
in the class struggle. The middle class's historical role in the 
proletarian revolution helps to define its character and form. 
Finally, Poulantzas (together with others such as Crompton 
and Gubbay) uses Marx's theory of surplus values to identify the 'true' 
place of the new middle class. A clear insistence on a distinction 
between productive and non-productive labour is used to mark off 
certain occupations as neither bourgeois or proletarian. This attaches 
the idea of occupation and class very closely to elements of economic 
th . k" . M h" h . h t t · t· (l 4 ) 1n 1ng 1n arx, w 1c 1s somew a res r1c 1ve • 
Having sketched in some of the variation in conceptions of 
the new middle classes, we can now deal with explanations given for the 
growth of these classes in capitalist society. In general most writers 
have spent less time on this point, relying on either a commonsense 
view that the new middle classes exist and therefore are to be 
analysed, or on brief reference to some of Marx's own ideas. This can 
have slightly bizarre effects: despite his rhetoric that classes are 
(14) One problem with this approach is that it forces contemporary 
economic activities, such as the greatly exFanded public and 
commercial sectors, into a 19th Century manufacturing mould. It 
is not clear, for example, why Carchedi's definition of the 
collective labourer deals only with productive labour, or why 
Poulantzas restricts productive labour to the production of 
material goods: while these decisions may be consistent with 
earlier economic theory, they take little account of the volume 
of contemporary economic activity that is excluded, and thereby 
build in a complication for conceptualising class. Equally, it 
is not clear why the realisation of surplus value, either at the 
level of the individual enterprise or at the social level is 
diminished by the extension of circulation through the commercial 
chain, since at each level the value of the product is enhanced 
by distribution and retail agents. Nor is it an adequate answer 
to criticism of the productive/non-productive distinction that 
'objections to it on the grounds that it is unrealistic, 
irrational or inconsistent are pro~erly directed against 
capitalism itself' (Kay, 1979, 133). 
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created and take their being from the class struggle, Poulantzas offers 
very little concrete historical evidence to show how the new petty 
bourgeoisie have evolved out of struggle. His core explanation is that 
the logic of capitalist competition generates needs for new technical 
methods of production: the new technology is dependent on those who 
have high levels of scientific knowledge and others who control the 
more complex processes of production that become necessary. Poulantzas 
therefore illustrates three of the main themes in explaining the rise 
of the new middle class. At a basic level, he identifies the pursuit 
of surplus value as the driving force, while knowledge and control 
become the two functional foci of the new class. 
To these can be added Johnson's argument that the growth of 
the state and its enhanced role in regulating and reproducing labour-
power requires new functionairies.whose position is dependent on the 
control of knowledge itself (1977). Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich make 
something of the same point, and also stress the reorganisation of the 
production process and the commodification of working class life as 
sources of the professional and managerial class. Like Nicolaus, they 
further note the need for a condition of surplus to support such a 
class, but not to the extent of adopting his view that its capacity for 
consumption is necessary for the continuance of capitalism. In 
contrast, Carchedi locates the key process in the need for control and 
surveillance in the work place in order to produce surplus value under 
monopoly capitalism. Finally Wright draws on the alternative 
tradition, the 'theory of industrial society' to highlight the effect 
of sectoral shift in industrial activity as the specific source of the 
new middle classes. We can thus identify both technical and 
exploitative forces as ultimate causes, with the processes of technical 
knowledge control, of production (commodification, consumption,and 
service), of ideological control (state regulation) and of control in 
the work places all being seen as immediate causes of an expanded 
middle class. 
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Abercrombie and Urry have recently given a more comprehensive 
statement of the causes of middle class growth based on four main 
developments (1983, 95-99). They start in the sphere of circulation 
with the growth in working class consumption power, arguing that this 
has generated new production activities. These entail the manufacture 
of more complex commodities, and the provision of new services, both 
commercial (eg, leisure) and social, as in the case of health and 
education. The organisation of these activities, as well as the tasks 
to be performed, call forth a new differentiated body of middle class 
.personnel. 
Their second area of development is in the sphere of 
production, typified by the growth of the service sector. This has 
been fuelled by the availability of capital, which can be used to meet 
the need to research markets and plan future investment in a 
sophisticated way, so establishing commercial services. In parallel, 
consumer services have expanded through technological innovation: 
whether as entertainment (computer games) or health care (computer 
diagnosis), the range of occupational opportunities in conception, 
planning, marketing and servicing are vastly increased. This overlaps 
to some extent with their third driving force, the faster turnover of 
fixed capital. Due to advanced technology, high rates of obsolescence 
create technical and research employment, while the combination of high 
investment and rapid obsolescence puts a premium on forward planning. 
The final source of the new middle class lies more directly 
in the field of class struggle. The success of working class movements 
like trade unionism provokes an apparatus of managerial and state 
employees whose function is to contain the increasingly 
professionalised forces representing the working class. The expansion 
of the state is a response designed to dominate the 'sphere of 
reproduction'. 
These changes yield not a single class, but a category of 
. labour with complex class functions in a wide range of activities and a 
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variety of production settings and small capital units. They may be 
differentiated by virtue of the four sources of changes that brought 
them into being, but they share a common feature in possessing 
knowledge and educational qualifications (although see Abercrombie and 
Urry's reservations about credentialism, 111-12). The sub-sets of the 
new middle class are capable of entering into class struggle with each 
other, as well as against other classes: their situation is essentially 
fluid, so that any discussion of their role must take account of 
historical processes. For example, although Abercrombie and Urry 
stress the expansion of the middle class, by which they actually seem 
mainly to mean the professional and managerial class, they accept the 
thesis of the proletarianizaton of white collar workers provided it is 
seen as a long-term process (1983, 118). 
This brings us to one of the other major themes in the theory 
of capitalist society, proletarianization. In the foregoing discussion 
this was at times somewhat arbitrarily ignored, for reasons of 
simplifying the exposition (for example in presenting Poulantzas' 
ideas). However, the argument that the middle classes are expanding 
has almost as strong a counter-argument that the constituent 
occupations are undergoing deskilling and increased control in the 
technical process of production, a point not irrelevant to our earlier 
claim that different writers have often concentrated on particular 
fractions of the middle class to the exclusion of others. The 
proletarianization thesis is mainly concerned with production and 
control, and can be presented largely through a brief discussion of 
Braverman and his critics. 
Technology and Occupational Change 
In contrast to the theorists of industrial society, who have 
stressed the creation of new and demanding occupations and the general 
up-grading of skill levels in modernisation (see below Chapters 3 & 5) 
75 
several theorists of capitalist society have in the last few years 
dwelt on the thesis of labour deskilling. Braverman's 1974 
Labour and Monopoly Capitalism is a key text here, while the- control 
aspects of this process have been developed by Marglin (1974), Clegg 
and Dunkerley (1980) and Salaman (1979). It is the former which most 
concerns us here, but the other contributions are mentioned to provide 
a proper representation of the argument in it~ entirety. 
Braverman starts with the paradox that modern work is said on 
the one hand to require 'ever higher levels of education, training, the 
greater exercise of intelligence and mental effort in general' while on 
the other hand, it is said to be 'mindless , bureaucratized and 
alienating' (1974, 3-4). Rather than welcoming the division of labour 
as did' earlier writers, he regards the sub-division of work into 
specialist and unskilled tasks as a retrograde step. The effect of 
Scientific Management was 
'to strip the work~rs of craft knowledge and autonomous 
control and confront them with a fully thought-out process in 
which they function as cogs and levers.' (ibid 136). 
The result is an increase in control by the employer, a reduction in 
discretion and autonomy on the part of the worker, and the further 
alienation of the work force. The subsequent rapid advance of science 
and technology to a central place in the operation of monopoly 
capitalism did nothing to reverse this process of de-humanization and 
deskilling because the new techn_ological processes were not only 
'Taylorised' into trivial work inputs from the outset, but also 
demanded less labour per se. As machines become more sophisticated, 
the need for skilled operators is reduced. 
Braverman reviews each of the major categories of occupation 
in turn. Skil-led manual work, in the sense of craft labour, is the 
centre piece of his argument, because it has existed throughout the 
hundred or so years with which he deals. Drawing on a wide range of 
sources, he demonstrates how craft labour has been largely replaced by 
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worke.rs who, while retaining craft titles, in fact neither have, nor 
are called upon to use, craft skills. Office workers, being a 
relatively recent phenomenon of the twentieth century have been 
recruited from the ranks of women, and their tasks almost from the 
outset have been devised on scientific management lines. Braverman 
regards the semi-skilled workers as merely a census statistician's 
creation, having no basis in genuine task analysis, and virtually 
indistinguishable from 'unskilled' labour. The ranks of management are 
also to be regarded with scepticism since they include many occupations 
which in fact di~charge little in the way of truly managerial duties. 
The 'up-grading' of occupations in this century is seen as an illusion. 
Although Braverman's view was at first received favourably, 
it has since attracted a number of criticisms (see Wood, 1982, 12). 
Braverman is over-dependent on the general applicability of Taylorism, 
whereas the complexity of skill and work tasks makes it difficult to 
treat deskilling as a unitary process (~ing et al, 1981). What counts 
as skill is not a given but a socially-constructed phenomenon, while 
the process of deskilling may not only start fr.om a historical position 
where the artisan is not the typical worker, but will take different 
forms in the course of management struggles with organised labour (see 
the contributions of Elger, Penn, Little, and More in Wood, 1982, and 
Edwards, 1979). The use of skills may vary both geographically between 
regional elements of an enterprise, while employment in the state 
apparatus where different imperatives operate limits the extent to 
which American production and commercial situations can be generalised 
to the whole of modern capitalism (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983, 57-58). 
Despite these several limitations, it is still worth asking 
whether any part of his argument applies to Britain. Almost all of his 
examples are drawn, not unnaturally from his own country, namely the 
United States. While certain similarities exist between America and 
this country, can we assume that the same pattern applies to Britain? 
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For one thing, this country has not experienced the waves of peasant 
immigration that America has, while a different imperial role, earlier 
industrialization, and a stronger trade union movement are all 
plausible potential reasons why occupational change could take a 
different form in Britain. It must be said that there is some evidence 
that Braverman's argument can be applied to Britain. He himself quotes 
Lockwood (1958) on the black-coated ~orker in his own support, while· 
Davies has recently reported deskilling in three samples of craftsmen, 
steel workers and office staff (1979, 175). Crompton, in an explicit 
reference to Braverman and social mobility, claims that changes in 
clerical work have not just degraded the clerk, but that some 
apparently managerial employment has been devalued, since it consists 
only of what was previously clerical work. She makes a parallel case 
for draughtsmen, and to a less extent, for computer-related jobs (1980, 
118-9). 
On the other hand, as Goldthorpe comments in his reply, the 
relative lack of general evidence over large numbers of occupations 
probably indicates that there is only a small number of exceptional 
cases (1980a, 122-3). Gallie, in discussing large scale, high automated 
plant, identifies an early period in which there was 'specialisation of 
the work task, with its concomitants of a sharp reduction in skill 
levels', but concludes that 'automation reversed the trend towards an 
ever-increasing division of labour'. With labour costs now a 
relatively much smaller proportion of total costs there was less need 
to extract so much from the labour force (Gallie, 1978, 7-9). Jones 
(1982) and Penn (1982) have shown how in engineering and textiles 
workers were in some cases even able to enhance their skills. Prandy 
et al (1982,182) are also sceptical about deskilling among white collar 
workers. And Roberts, after discussing the deskilling thesis, 
concludes that on the basis of British studies 
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'it is doubtful that an aggregated impression would justify 
talk of a wholesale degradation of manual work.' (Roberts, 
1978, 45). 
While we cannot produce evidence on job content, it is possible to 
examine whether new, relatively more skilled occupations have been 
created this century~ to balance any degradation of existing jobs, and 
this is done in Chapter 5 . 
. In the meantime, Braverman's thesis poses three kinds of 
problem for social mobility analysis. In the first place, his argument 
that the work tasks of any given occupation have changed means that 
historical comparisons- son's occupation with his father's -must be 
highly suspect. Does it mean the same thing if father and son were 
both 'skilled manual workers'? If the occupation has been de-skilled, 
does this depress the position of the occupation in the occupational 
hierarchy? For Braverman this is not a problem, since following Marx 
he regards all of these non-capitalist class jobs as proletarian. But 
for the mobility analyst who believes such a crude categorisation is 
too great an over-simplification, Braverman's argument is a further 
facet of the basic problem of historical comparison. A period which 
has seen the demise of the horse-drawn omni-bus driver and the domestic 
servant and the rise of the computer programmer and the television 
producer (and for that matter, the professional sociologist) contains 
so much occupational change as to pose a threat to the basic 
operational approach of occupational mobility. What Braverman's work 
does is not just to add more evidence of such changes, but to show it 
applies throughout the occupational structure, and that any 
hierarchical ordering of occupations over a period of half a century 
may well be subject to distortion. 
The second problem which Braverman poses is one central to 
this thesis, namely how far is it true that there has been a change in 
occupations such that an increase in upward mobility is possible. 
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According to Braverman, no such change has taken place: most of the 
alleged new middle classes are in fact middle class in appearance 
alone. The new occupations are as proletarian as any of the deskilled 
manual jobs. His evidence on office work is very strong on this, but 
less so for other middle class jobs: for example, his census data are 
somewhat undifferentiated. Further discussion is obviously desirable, 
but it must wait until we have seen what the rival theory of industrial 
society has to say on the matter. 
Braverman's third problem is a conceptual one, which takes us 
back to our initial comments on class and occupation. His work is 
motivated by a deep humanist concern with the plight of the worker, not 
only expolited by the capitalist but controlled by him down to the 
minutest level of task performance. Thus questions of autonomy and 
alienation assume a major importance in how he conceives of an 
occupation. As Dunkerley has observed, 
'the working class is involved in the execution and not the 
conception of tasks. The working class is controlled; the 
middle class, as agents of capital, control the labour-
process.' (Dunkerley 1979, 15). 
It follows that deskilling is not just task-specific degradation, but 
deals with patterns of relationships; authority, seniority, super-
ordination, autonomy. It is here that Braverman's thesis comes closest 
to other accounts of proletarianism, like those of Carchedi, Baran and 
to a lesser extent, Wright. Therefore the degradation of the alleged 
middle class or any up-grading of skill levels must be measured not 
just in terms of formal titles or qualification, ie, mobility studies 
using survey data cannot provide a complete answer. This difference-of 
emphasis is not just a matter of technique, it is a question of which 
dimensions of class identity receive most attention, and therefore 
appear to be pre-eminent, i,e.~ it is also a theoretical-question. 
Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that the differences 
arise out of fundamental assumptions about the world. The idea of 
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deskilling and technological control under monopoly capitalism is based 
in a critique of capitalism, whereas the notion of technology as 
creator of ever new (occupational) opportunities draws - as we shall 
see in the next chapter - on the theory of industrial society. Much of 
the debate about the role of technology has been carried out in the 
literature dealing specifically with organizational theory !ather than 
with wider issues and not connected with mobility research. For 
example, some writers have stressed the pre-eminence of technology, 
such as Sayles on work group types (1958) or Woodward on management 
structures (1965). Others, like Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) have argued 
that the presentation of technology as a neutral, rational, progressive 
force serves the ideological function of legitimating not just 
increased managerial control over the worker (in line with Braverman's 
thesis) but also the continued drive to profit maximisation. 
Following Marglin (1974) they suggest that 
'the most efficient technology (in terms of the maximum 
production) will be chosen only if it is compatible with 
securing the maximum control over worker behaviour. The 
corollary of this is that the attempt to gain greater control 
may result in a less efficient or productive technological 
system being employed.' (Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980, 343). 
Even though they do not substantiate this claim with empirical 
evidence, their orientation is important because it so directly 
challenges the notion of technology as simple and unresistable 
'efficiency'. For them, technology and work are an aspect of class 
relations: in most mobility analysis, drawing as it does a different 
theoretical tradition, occupation is used only as an indicator of class 
position. The alternative theoretical framework is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OCCUPATIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY:II The Theory of Industrial Society 
· The theory of industrial society differs from the theory of 
capitalist society in the pre-eminence it gives to the processes 
inherent in production based on a complex technology. The essence of 
its argument is that modern society is a unique form, not just because 
it has at its disposal this technology, but also because the kinds of 
social organisation which are compatible with high technology represent 
a distinctive set in their own right. Therefore an explanation of 
industrial society must be based on an understanding of its particular 
characteristics, and take account of the logical imperatives that are 
part of a science-based society. Some writers have stressed the 
rationality of such societies and their superiority in terms of their 
efficiency in providing material rewards for their citizens. Others 
have interposed value systems as the connection between technology and 
social structure and, in a more ideological vein during the later 
fifties and early sixties, argued for the moral superiority of 
(American) pluralist democratic industrial society over other social 
orders. More recent versions have used the label of 'post-industrial' 
society to identify the way in which control over knowledge, and the 
operation of a service economy, lead to new political and class 
allegiances. Thus the pursuit of profit and its consequent 
exploitative class relations which are the pivots of capitalist society 
theory, are replaced by the rational, neutral forces of technology as 
the central common core of theories of industrial society. 
What is Industrial Society? 
One of the peculiar features of the theory of industrial 
society is that it contains relatively few precise statements of what 
an industrial society is actually like. There are some discussions of 
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1-
cases, which indicate that the society under analysis is industrial 
(1), while most contributors deal in a general way with industrial-
isation as the process which gives rise to industrial society. But 
these provide only implicit statements about industrial society per se, 
which tend to be diffuse and unsystematic (2), Not surprisingly, there 
is disagreement over which nations fit the bill: Lenski, for example, 
lists twenty-five 'selected' industrial societies including Spain, 
Ireland and Greece as 'marginal cases', in 1967. Elsewhere he lists 
twenty-seven cases for 1964, based on annual per capita coal equivalent 
consumption (Lenski, 1970, 347, 325-6). Holt and Turner meanwhile 
assert that on 'any commonly held definitions' there are only eight to 
twelve industrial societies in 1970 (Holt and Turner, 1970, 10). 
Again, Kumar in a slightly more elaborated model uses Kahn and Wiener's 
data to propose that at least eighteen nations are already in the 
industrial stage judged by per capita income; and that another forty or 
fifty will reach the 'mature industrial' or 'mass consumption'·stages 
by the end of the century (Kumar, 1974, 352). 
(1) For example, Toura1ne's account of France in the 1960s (Touraine, 
1974). 
(2) Aron's own questions in The Industrial Society still go largely 
unanswered: 
'How are we to define industrial society? Is the term 
appropriate? Is there not already such a thing as post-
industrial society? Where exactly, at the present moment, do 
the essential differences between the two types of society 
occur, and how significant are these differences? ••. Where 
does the so-called industrial society begin and end? From 
what point are we entitled to call a society industrial? 
None of these questions admits of a categorical answer ' 
(Aron, 1967a, 97, 105). 
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These latter views all operationalise the concept of 
industrial society in economic and technological ways, but this 
represents only one part of the industrial society idea. It is the 
social consequences of such technologies that have interested the 
sociologist. Thus we find Cotgrove's survey of the field concluding 
that industrial society can be contrasted with 'traditional' society as 
having 
'experienced a demographic revolution with a sharp decline in 
both birth-rate and death rate, a decrease in the size, scope 
and pervasiveness of the family, an opening up of the 
stratification system with the shift from ascribed to 
achieved status, a levelling of culture with the development 
of mass communications and mass education, and the 
secularization· and bureaucratization of society .•. The 
increasing division of labour which characterizes 
mechanization, and the organization of the labour force in 
factory production is normally accompanied by work relations 
which are functionally specific (confined to specified 
duties), impersonal, and affectively neutral (based on 
contractual relations rather than personal loyalties) ' 
(Cotgrove 1967, 271-2). 
Underlying these changes is the central force of modern science, as 
most writers have emphasised. 
'Science and technology have made it possible for 3 billion 
human beings to live on this earth, for the standard of 
living to rise from year to year in advanced countries .•• 
The qualitative difference between present-day and earlier 
science and technology is obviously the indispensable pre-
condition of all the other features usually attributed to 
modern societies: the lengthening of the life-span, the 
steady increase in national output, the predominant and at 
times obsessional concern with production and expansion, the 
creation of an artificial environment for human life, vast 
labour and administrative organizations, specialization, 
intellectual and social rationalization, etc. It would be 
easy to show that none of the phenomena that observers 
consider essential to modern society would be possible 
without the development of science and technology ' (Aron, 
1967a, 99). 
Although Aron is more explicit in his concentration on the role of 
science, he is not particularly exceptional. As Moore has concluded in 
his survey of theories of modernization, 
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'It is reasona-bly proper, though conventional, therefore, to 
consider modernization in terms of economic growth. In fact, 
we may pursue the convention further and speak of the process 
as industrialization. Industrialization means the extensive 
use of inanimate sources of power for economic production, 
and all that that -entails by way of organization, 
transportation, communication, and so on ••. The studies of 
social change that take industrialization as a starting point 
are extremely numerous ' (Moore, 1963, 91-2). 
He goes on to list much the same set of characteristics as Cotgrove, 
adding changes to the institutions of property, labour and the state 
which have resulted from industrialization (seen as a technical process 
rather than in its more general sense of encompassing its associated 
social concomitants (ibid, 94-105)). 
A convenient summary of these processes (3) is to be found in 
Kerr et al (1973, 56). Under the heading of 'The Logic of 
Industrialization' the authors offer a simple chart which is reproduced 
here as table 3.1. 
Fig. 3.1 -The Logic of Industrialization 
Work Force Increased skills and widening range of skills. 
Scale of Society 
Incre?sing occupational and geographic mobility. 
Higher levels of education more closely related 
to industrial function. 
Structured work force. 
Urbanization and decline of agriculture as a 
way of life. 
Larger role for government. 
Consensus in society Increasing ideological consensus in a 
pluralistic society. 
World-wide industrialism Industrial society spreads out from the centres 
of advanced technology. 
(3) Other similar general statements can be found in Swanson, (1971, 
137-8) and with an emphasis on class relations and organizations, 
in Scott (1979, 17-8). An interesting comparison based on 
Parsons' pattern variables can be found in Banks (1964). 
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In stressing the characteristics of industrial society ·as a type, one 
is implicitly adopting a weak form of convergence thesis. Kerr et al 
are of course exponents of a much stronger form of this argument that 
societies tend to converge to one social and political order because of 
their common technology. Even if pre-existing conditions obscure the 
underlying pattern, 
'the logic of industrialization prevails eventually ..• Each 
industrialized society is more like every other 
industrialized society - however great the differences among 
them may be - than any industrial society is like any pre-
industrial society ' (ibid, 283). 
At risk of undoing this package so recently constructed, it 
must be said that there is no simple homogeneity of ideas underlying 
the summary. Aron has attacked as superficial those accounts by 
statisticians and economists which rely on per capita income levels, 
proportions employed in non-agricultural industry, or percentages 
living in towns or receiving an education. Cotgrove observes that 
traditional forms of social organization (eg, labour and production) 
can co-ex"ist with modern forms. Kerr acknowledges that there are many 
different starting points and different roads for a society's journey 
through industrialization. And Moore is critical of theories of social 
change which posit a series of crude evoluntionary stages, which ignore 
the interaction of structural elements during industrialization, and 
which assume that there is a final static stage of post-
(4) industrialization as the end product of the industrialization process 
(4) See respectively, Aron 1967a, 54-5; Cotgrove, 1967, 272; 
1973, 298; and Feldman and Moore, 1962, 106. 
Kerr, 
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Again, some of these accounts have been heavily ideological, 
reflecting the political climate of the Cold War, and particularly the 
McCarthy Era of the 1950s. A concern for stable pluralist democracy is 
evident in the work of Rostow (1960), Kerr et al (op.cit.) ·and Lipset 
(1960). All three contain versions of industrial society which are 
heavily influenced by an American model, and as Aron has argued 
(following Vilar, Marcuse and others) even less political accounts also 
to some extent serve to 'camouflage capitalism by calling it industrial 
society' (1967, 94-5). This is because there is both a change in 
terminology, and a shift of focus from class relations and mode of 
production to the role of technology. Aron sees this for the most part 
as less an attempt at ideology than a genuine effort to encapsulate the 
unique spirit of Western Societies, that is to say to come to terms 
with the importance of science for such societies. It is science that 
brings us that later variant of the basic theory, post-industrial 
society. 
Post-Industrial Society 
It is not important for present purposes to dwell on the 
differences between 'industrial' and 'post-industrial' society. Both 
conceptions share the central concept of a science-based society, and 
despite differences of emphasis, there is a great deal of overlap. For 
example, Touraine's conception of post-industrial, 'technocratic', or 
'programmed' societies 'retains some characteristics of these earlier 
societies' (Touraine, 1974, 3), while Bell accepts that 'the post-
industrial society is.a continuation of trends unfolding out of 
industrial society' (Bell, ·1974, 115). Indeed, Bell has some fun at 
the expense of scholars who, like himself, have adopted the prefix 
'post' to identify contemporary developments (ibid, 51-58). While 
there may be some case for clarifying the two types of society for the 
sake of intellectual tidiness, it is of more interest to see how these 
later writers have extended earlier interpretations of twentieth 
century society in the West. 
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The purppse of Touraine's nomenaclature is not to suggest 
that in some magical way production and wealth have reached such levels 
that the post-industrial society 
'can abandon concern with production and become a consumer 
and leisure society ••• The type of society we live in is 
more "driven" by economic growth than any other. The 
individualized features of private life, as well as local 
societies and their ways of life have been profoundly 
affected - even destroyed - by ever-growing geographic and 
social mobility, by the massive diffusion of information and 
propaganda, and by broader political participation than ever 
before. Precisely these factors make it impossible for 
exclusively economic mechanisms to be maintained any longer 
at the centre of social organization and activity' 
(op cit, 5). 
It is the connection between production and knowledge, and 
the way in which this dominates the rest of society that prompts 
Touraine to talk about a 'programmed' society: 'All domains of social 
life - education, consumption, information, etc - are being more and 
more integrated into what used to be called production factors' (ibid, 
5). The new domination reduces man to an alienated state, where his 
entire life is conditioned by the ruling class: the new lines of class 
conflict therefore lie not between capital and labour, but between the 
structures of economic and political decision-making and those who are 
reduced to this 'dependent participation;. 
In keeping with the importance of science in such a society, 
the new ruling class consists not of capitalists, but of high level 
technocrats. 'Technocrats are not technicians but managers, whether 
they belong to the administration of the State or to big businesses' 
(ibid, 49-50). Nor are they a unitary group: some favour capital 
accumulation, while others propagate public consumption, and alliances 
continually shift. Membership is defined by 
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'knowledge and a certain level of education ... the education 
of the top level tends to be independent of our specialized 
body of professors and is largely provided for by members of 
the elite ... A hierarchical continuity among bureaucrats 
(middle management) and technocrats may appear to exist but 
it is a rare case when the members of a great organisation 
cannot recognize the line that separates_them'. (ibid, 51-
52). 
The technocrats may suffer gains or losses over time, but 
they do not loose their position, either individually or as a group. 
Secure in their jobs and income, a social group is formed which while 
not being homogeneous, nevertheless develops a degree of self-
consciousness, a distinctive life style, and which ' . exerc1ses 
considerable control over recruitment' (~bid, 53). 
Beneath them the bureaucrats operate the elaborated systems 
of communication and control which are necessary for the operation of a 
planned, technological economy - and society. They are not a 'service 
class' in Renner's meaning: functionaries without any discretion 
operating a bureaucracy in a narrow Weberian sense; These bureaucrats 
are 
'adept at change, agents of progress beyond doubt, but also 
often careerists, vain, distrustful, absorbed in their subtle 
stratagems and their desire to re-inforce their own 
importance by holding back information, by fostering their 
own prestige in every way possible, and by defending the 
internal demands of the organization in opposition to its 
external purposes'. (~bid, 58). 
'Professionals', particularly in higher education and health, 
are the marginal category, while 'experts' like engineers, 
accountants, lawyers, psychologists, G.P.s and teachers are on a par 
with the bureaucrats (ibid, 64-66). 
Besides them, and in Touraine's eyes, contrasted to them are 
the technicians: technical workers, designers, higher ranking office 
workers, excluded from and resenting the bureaucratic game, weak in 
authority, influence or negotiating power, and different from the 
proletariat only in that thejr jobs are less repetitive, monotonous,and 
·restrictive. 
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This way of representing Touraine's idea emphasises the 
elements of occupation and class, and plays down his analysis of the 
student movement, and the cultural and political life of France in the 
1960s, for obvious reasons. As well as being more relevant to our main 
theme of mobility and s~ratification, it serves as a corrective to any 
tendency to see the theory of industrial society as merely an 
ideological tool, concerned only with consensus, affluence, and 
rationality. While Touraine rejects sociological analysis based on the 
idea of two basic classes, or on the interplay of the traditional 
production processes, land, labour and capital, he also refects the 
suggestion 'that advanced industrial societies no longer have class 
structures' (~bid, 81-82). His analysis shows how the occupational 
character of a science-based economy changes the nature of class 
conflict, both by redrawing class boundaries and by shifting the locus 
of the conflict. It is true, as Kumar (1976) has observed, that 
Touraine does not elaborate on all aspects of his view of class - such 
as the proposal that the educated class is internally divided - but the 
notion of conflict is part and parcel of his analysis. 
By comparison, the position adopted by Bell (1974) is 
somewhat more 'optimistic', in that he sees the new groupings and their 
over-riding concern with theoretical knowledge as providing a basis for 
a different kind of social integration and harmony. He identifies five 
'dimensions' or 'components' of the term post-industral society. 
'1. Economii sector: the change from a goods-
producing to a service economy; 
2. Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence 
of the professional and technical class; 
3. Axial principle: the centrality of theoretical 
knowledge as the source of innovation and of 
policy formulation for the society; 
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4. Future orientation: the control of technology 
and technological assessment; 
5. Decision-making: the creation of a new 
'intellectual technology' (ibid, 14). 
If this sounds much like the theorists of industrial society in the 
previous section, the distinctiveness of Bell's writing is that he 
argues his five dimensions are each much further advanced as ·tendencies 
than in industrial society, and that they will continue to become even 
more accentuated in the future. 
Thus in the economic sector, developing the work of Clarke 
and Kuznets, he distinguishes between the industrial society's 
expanding service sector - retailing, commerce, transport, 
communication and utilities - and the post-industrial services of 
health, education, research, and government. On the occupational 
dimension it is the growth not of skilled or technician labour, but 
that of the 'new intelligentsia' of scientists and technical experts, 
w-hose command of theoretical (as opposed to sophisticated empirical) 
knowledge-requires at least a college education. In contrast to 
industrial society's development by haphazard technological innovation, 
post-industrial society is orientated towards planning and the co-
ordination of change, while problem-solving by means of rules-of-thumb 
or intuitive judgements is replaced by the application of systematic 
and complex rules, typified by computer algorithms. Although Bell sees 
the historical roots of these processes, he argues that for analytical 
purposes post-industrial society can be seen as a different type based 
on the cumulation of these elements. In industral society, 
'the chief economic problem has been the problem of capital 
... the major social problem that of industrial conflict 
between employer and worker. To the extent that the 
investment process has been routinized and the "class 
conflicts" encapsulated so that the issue of class strife no 
longer acts to polarize a country around a single issue, 
those older problems of an industrial society have been muted 
if not "solved". 
In the post-industrial society, the chief problem 
is the organization of science, and the primary institution 
the university or the research institute' (ibid, 116). 
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The 'social problem'. becomes one of control of decision-making, of 
bureaucratization, and pluralistic competition in the political arena. 
This image of a society in which knowledge and rationality 
reign supreme, despite the persuasiveness of Bell's argument, has 
attracted a number of critics. We have already noted in the previous 
chapter the arguments of Marglin and others to the effect that the 
kinds of technology developed and the rate of its introduction owe more 
to control (and profit) than to their efficiency. We might add, 
following Kumar, that the 'war economy' of the 1950s and 1960s has done 
more to stimulate research (in terms of increasing its share of GNP) in 
America than any new interest in fundamental· knowledge for its own 
sake. Post-war economic development has owed more to the further 
exploitation of existing knowledge than to original research. The idea 
that 
'post-industrial society, increasingly influenced by the 
scientific and professional ethos, will follow a 
'sociologizing' mode, concerned with non-market communual 
planning in the direction of maximum welfare'. (Kumar, 1976, 
352) .. 
seems even more preposterous in Britain under the Thatcher 
Administration than it did in the mid-seventies. 
Nonetheless, Bell has identified - if exaggerated - an 
important aspect of post-industrial society in its economic and 
occupational shifts. Kumar seems to imply that major changes in the 
focus of economic activity (with increased planning and future 
ori~ntation) and in the occupational structure, have no effect. But it 
has been axiomatic in mainstream sociology that a man's occupation 
relates to his whole social personna. That means that changes in 
occupational structure involve other social changes, so that Bell's 
analysis merits further consideration, not least in terms of 
occupational change and its effects. However, most of Bell's evidence 
- and there is a good deal of it - refers to American society, it is 
not· discussed here, although some paralle 1 British evidence is reviewed 
in a later chapter. 
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For convenience, we conclude this section on post-industrial 
so~iety with Galbraith, whose concept of a 'new industrial state' 
(1967) is another variation on the industrial/post-industrial theme. 
Galbraith's analysis includes the modern corporation in the set of 
characteristic features: large industrial organisations are at once 
possible because of technological production and national systems of 
administration, and also £!9moters of the values and the system which 
generate further technological advance and create employment for 
technical experts. With the economy dominated by very large and 
complex corporations, and capital drawn from numerous sources, the 
capitalist rto longer controls his investment. Professional managers 
take his place, and with ever-increasing knowledge and specialisation, 
a new cadre of technical experts become indispensible to the 
corporation. This 'technostructure' 
'extends from the leadership of the modern industrial 
enterprise down to just short of the labour force and 
embraces a large number of people and a large variety of 
talent'. (Galbraith, 1967, 56) 
Their growth in number (and, paradoxically, their continued scarcity 
value) enables them to play an ever more influential role both in and 
outside of the corporation: their values are more liberal than those of 
the old-style capitalists: a new industrial state replaces the old. 
The parallels with Bell's new intelligensia, and Touraine's 
technocrats and bureaucrats, are obvious. Bell, it is true, attributes 
less to the role of modern capitalism as the cause of this change, 
while Touraine makes an important distinction between the upper 
echelons and the subsidiary level which is somewhat less clear in 
Galbraith's writing. But all three identify technology and the 
separation of ownership and control as having advanced to such a point 
that previous patterns of class relations no longer apply. If one 
wanted to force a distinction between post-industrial and industrial 
formulations, it would have to be that the latter have been more 
concerned with marking off modern society from pre-industrial forms, 
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with the use of inanimate power, and with the nature of urbanism, 
affluence, and large-scale organizations. However, for present 
purposes this is unimportant, and for the remainder of this chapter the 
term 'industrial society' is used to include its post-industrial 
variants. This is permissible, if only because the various 
contributions share a similar style of exposition, many of the same 
intellectual themes, and say very much the same things about 
occupations. 
Occupational Change. 
We also propose to use the term 'occupational transition' ·to 
identify the kind of occupational change - ie, the expansion of jobs 
requiring technical expertise - associated with the development of 
indusrial society. The derivation is from 'demographic transition', the 
changes in demographic profiles which are also associated with 
industrialization. Occupational transition is a convenient way of 
specifying particular changes: it is not a theory which explains those 
changes, nor is it a precise statement about the scale of those 
changes. The sociological significance of occupational transition, as 
against the form it takes, is logically a secondary question, and one 
which is taken up later. Here we are first concerned to see in more 
detail what kinds of occupational transition are generally said to 
occur 
Q5) Despite at least one argument to the contrary (see Jones, 
1977), it is possible to identify a core of assumptions about the forms 
that occupational structures take in modern society as a result of the 
industrialisation process. 
One of the most useful sources in this respect is W.E. 
Moore's ~ocial Change (1974). Despite being a relatively small book 
(in both its 1963 and its revised 1974 editions) it has been fairly 
(5) Many of these accounts are lacking in historical accuracy, operate 
with imprecise occupational categories, deal inconsistently with 
rates of change, fail to account for deviant case, and lack 
specification of causal relationships, For a fuller discussion, 
see Payne, 1977a, 1977b. · 
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influential, not least because its brevity, coverage and precision have 
made it a popular undergraduate text, particularly in America. These 
same qualities explain its role here as representing a central tendency 
among other writers on the theory of industrial society. As Moore 
writes in the preface, the revised edition was designed to be 
'selectively attentive both to the critical comments that 
have appeared in the sociological literature, and to the new. 
approaches that have appeared here and there. Yet ..• I see 
little that adds to our precise and general knowledge of 
patterned sequences' (1974, ix-x). 
With this in mind, he has omitted descriptive studies in search of his 
prime goal of compact, dense exposition (~bid,x). 
From Moore's work, (6} it is possible to draw eight detailed 
propositions about occupational transition. One of these -that there 
will be increased mobility both within careers and between generations 
- is left for discussion in a later chapter. Three of the others can 
be regarded as general propositions: 
1. All economic operations- such as the subsistence 
agricultural sector - are incorporated in the national 
market economy. 
2. There is a change of economic activity from primary to 
secondary, and secondary to tertiary, industrial sectors. 
3. New occupations are created, and differentiation between 
occupations increases. 
The remaining four propositions deal more specifically with 
occupations. 
4. The proportion of workers in agriculture will decline. 
5. An up-grading of minimum and average skill levels will 
take place, resulting in a structure with relatively few 
unskilled workers and 'the vast majority' of workers in 
various middle categories. 
(6) In particular, see Moore, 1974, 104-6. Obviously, there is far 
more to Moore's theories than the limited subset of ideas on 
occupations with which we are here concerned. 
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6. There will, nonetheless, be a shortage of skilled 
workers. 
7. This will be accompanied by an increase in demand for 
professionals of all categories, and in particular 
doctors, engineers and experts in organisation. 
These propositions apply to countries both during industrialisation and 
in contemporary industrial economies (Moore, 1974 104-5). 
Moore is not alone in adopting this view of occupational 
change, although in contrast other writers have been less succinct 
(Kerr et al's work (1973) is less easy to abbreviate into a brief 
coherent statement!). The same basic approach can be seen in a variety 
of writers: Appelbaum's account closely resembles that of Moore, but 
with greater emphasis on convergence (1971, 45-50). Weinberg has 
commented that 'there are implicit criteria of convergence in many 
discussions of industrialisation' (1969,4). Aron says that 
'all industrial societies have similar characteristics from 
this point of view. The proportion of intellectual or semi-
intellectual occupations inevitably increases in industrial 
society. More and more supervisors, engineers and people 
with technical qualifications are needed. Everybody must be 
able to read and write. Thus two of the occupational 
categories become larger and larger, the technical 
intelligentsia who direct the industrial workers and the non-
technical intelligentsia, or those whose technical 
qualifications are mainly literary' (1967b, 23-4). 
Galbraith, Bell, and Touraine, as we have seen above, and Crossland 
(1956), Hoselitz (1954) and Trieman (1970) are other examples, while 
Kerr in particular stresses the technological imperative: 
'the same industries in different countries use roughly 
similar technologies with roughly similar proportions of 
workers in jobs of varying skill and wage levels' (1973, 
248). 
Even Kerr's critics have largely operated within his framework of 
assumptions about the occupational structure of industrial society:. 
among the contributors to the well-known Sociological Review Monograph 
edited by Halmos, only Platt addresses herself directly to this 
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question (Platt, 1964). This is because most of the crjtical 
contributions - including those of Lockwood, Goldthorpe, Banks, Worsley 
and Marshall -were concerned with the consequences for stratification 
theory of the changes in occupations, or with the dynamic force behind 
such changes. They were not concerned with the actual changes 
themselves. As Garnsey has observed of this collection of writings, 
'while the predominance of the economic and technological 
factors in determining the distribution of rewards and 
opportunities in industrial societies has beeen disputed, the 
notion that "the structural and functional pre-requisites of 
a developing technology and economy result in the 
occupational distributions of advanced societies being 
patterned in a fairly standardised way has not been seriously 
called into question. Goldthorpe was concerned rather with 
the corollary of this thesis ... (he) does not actually 
challenge the notion that in its main features a certain 
occupational structure is an invariable and inherent feature 
of industrialization' (1975,439-40). 
Indeed, it is almost impossible to read an account of social 
change written in the 1960s and early 1970s without encountering this 
basic assumption about occupational transition. It was particularly 
influential in work on education and social mobility, where it was 
central to the work of Glass (1954,24); Floud and Halsey (1958, 169-70; 
1961, 1-2), and Westergaard and Little (1964, 302), as we shall see in 
Chapter 9 . However, there has been until recently relatively little 
active investigation of the form of changes that have been assumed to 
take place. Clearly a necessary step is to investigate the nature of 
occupational transition in Scotland, and this is done in the following 
chapter. 
That analysis will also look at the variations in 
occupational transition which different contributions to the theory of 
industrial society have proposed. Touraine's distinction between 
technocrats and bureaucrats, for example, is less concerned with the 
middle of the occupational hierarchy, while Bell's 'new intelligentsia' 
stresses the top and Galbraith's technostructural model covers a much 
wider field. Within the limits of available data, we need to show how 
far these versions of occupational transition have taken place as part 
of our attempt to understand the framework in which mobility takes 
place. 
Sectors and Occupations. 
Bell is somewhat more explicit on occupational transition 
than others, linking it firmly to sectoral shift between industries in 
line with his concentration on knowledge rather than technology. 
'The spread of services, particularly in trade, finance, 
education, health, and government, conjures up the picture of 
a white-collar society. But all services are not white-
collar, since they include transportation workers and auto 
repairmen. But then, not all manufacturing is blue-collar 
work. In 1970 the white-collar component within 
manufacturing - professional, managerial, clerical, and sales 
- came to almost 31 percent of that work force. The change-
over to a post-industrial society is signified not only by 
the change in sector distribution - the place where people 
work - but in the pattern of o~c~pations, the kind of work 
they do' (Bell, 1974, 133-4), 
Bell argues that the •·dramatic' change in proportions of white-collar 
workers is 'somewhat deceptive' because most white-collar workers have 
been women and 
'in American Society, as in most others, family status is 
still evaluated on the basis of the man's job' (ibi~, 134). 
!tis therefore only the change to men's occupations that is 
significant. 
This seems a dubious kind of argument. Even if we accept 
that men and women work for different reasons, that work has a 
different meaning for them, and that they are employed in different 
jobs, this is an argument for analysing them separately, but not for 
ignoring female employment. It is the expansion of white-collar work 
that is the characteristic of industrial society, ~~the gender of 
those who fill the new occupational niches. That is a secondary 
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problem. Perhaps it is a further and as yet neglected characteristic 
of industrial society that a higher proportion of its jobs are done by 
women and that a higher proportion of women do waged work (7) This in 
turn poses the question of why it is the less prestigious jobs which go 
to women: is this an inherent feature of industrial society, or just a 
transitional pattern of adjustment? Again, if the female labour force 
is mobilised into the market, how does this affect the chances of a 
male in seeking employment. And does the status of white-collar work, 
or the husband-based American family status system, remain unchanged? 
It is implicit in Bell's work that when more men do white-collar work 
it matters_: why else does he dwell on the growth and role of the 'new 
intelligentsia'? 
The present author does not pretend to have answers to all of 
these questions, although some further discussion of them can be found 
elsewhere (Payne et al, 1983). The most immediate of these issues for 
an analysis of social mobility is how should the opportunity structure 
for men be conceptualised? 
While it is true that women tend to be concentrated into 
separate occupational categories from men (8), if one is to argue that 
changes in demand for labour generate new mobility flows, then on the 
face of it men and women are both potential candidates. Given the 
relative separation of their spheres of employment, we must modify that 
initial statement to say that the rules of female employment in general 
operate to insulate the male labour force from potential female 
competition. By rules we mean not just hiring or promotion procedures, 
but domestic constraints, socialization, public attitudes, etc: the 
whole gamut of processes which have been analysed by feminist 
sociologists in the last decade. By insulate, we do not mean that 
(7) Bell deals with female labour in one page, under a section headed 
'Some Labour Problems of the Post Industrial Society' (ibid, 145). 
(8) See Hakim, 1979; Payne et al 1980. 
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women never compete for the same jobs but that only a small part of the 
potential female labour force attempt (or are allowed to attempt) to 
compete for certain jobs: this leaves the field more or less free for 
the men. The extent of the separation is demonstrated in Chapter 5 but 
clearly an attempt to reconceptualise the logic of industrialism in 
terms of gender is long overdue. 
This is relevant to one of the more recent views of modern 
society, namely that of Gershuny. He has argued that post-industrial 
society is a self-service economy, in which what was previously 
production activity has becQme consumption activity in the domestic 
(and therefore to a degree, female) sphere. 
'There are grounds for suggesting that future prov1s1on of 
services in developed countries may be increasingly extra-
economic, that jobs in service industries may be replaced by 
activities undertaken within households or by other sorts of 
voluntary associations outside the money economy .•. people 
no longer buy the final service from railway or bus systems, 
but instead buy cars, and produce the final 
service themselve~· (Gershuny 1979 original emphasis). 
A similar·argument is made for replacing servants by consumer durables, 
and the trend to 'in-home' entertainments. Gershuny.distinguishes 
'final service', ie, direct provision, from 'indirect service', such as 
the production of a service good. The more that consumers carry out 
this final service themselves, the fewer jobs that are created in 
service industry. Indeed, because consumer products are essential to a 
self-service economy, jobs are created in manufacturing industry, not 
the tertiary sector. Indeed one might observe that the new 
manufacturing jobs are not necessarily located in the same society: 
jobs can be 'exported' to third world countries (Fr6ebel et al, 1980) 
so that the net result is unemployment in the service society itself. 
Gershuny does not, however, reject the thesis of skills 
enhancement. He contrasts the idea of a service economy (what here has 
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been called industrial or post-industrial society) with its 
undifferentiated drift towards tertiary industry and tertiary 
occupations, with his conception of a self-service economy, where, 
'because of automation and division of labour, a trend towards more 
white collar employment is combined with a progressive concentration of 
employment in manufacturing industry' (Gershuny, 1978, 146). This 
formal economy coexists with an informal economy in which leisure 
services are produced and consumed. 
If Gershuny is correct, there are several implications for a 
theory of mobility grounded in industrial society. First, a self-
service or informal economy involves more kinds of extra-economic, or 
more strictly extra-occupational, activity. Production of services in 
a non-waged way removes those activities, or even the people producing 
servces, from the occupational realm, so that mobility conceived in 
occupational terms cannot encompass them (as is presently the case of 
women in unwaged work). Second, the tertiary sector will not be the 
key area in which to search for major changes in the occupational 
order: rather these will be occurring in a secondary sector. And third, 
if it is the manufacturing sector that dominates, then it will be the 
class structures of that sector which dominate, rather than those of 
the tertiary sector. In other words, many more men in the middle class 
will have experienced the mobility processes of background selection 
and promotion, and the class factors of attitudes, re-socialisation, 
control etc, typical of manufacturing rather than service industry. 
However, before committing ourselves to these results, there 
are a number of objections to the Gershuny scenario. In the first 
place his evidence is rather meagre. The majority of his tables deal 
with the 1961/1971 transition, with an extension to include the year 
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1954 for data on household expenditure. The remainder deal with broad 
categories of industry, rather than occupations, so that the historical 
span covered is a very short one. The examples presented - domestic 
labour, home-videos, private cars - are very few in number, but there 
are many other services which already can be done in the home but are 
only done so by a very small minority. For example, home-brewing and 
home food production , house conveyancing, parental education, clothes-
making, are all activities which could be much more developed in the 
informal economy than they presently are. Each offers the equal 
potential for the substitution of a sale of products which can be used 
in self-service, for the provision of a service (or as Gershuny argues 
as his dynamic, the substitution of profit from sale, for ~of a 
salary of the service worker). Against the potential for self-service, 
domestic labour (effectively dying out by the 1920s), the rise of 
private motoring (a phenomenon of the 1950s and 1960s) and the boom in 
home entertainments (still a minority sport even in the 1980s) seem 
curiously sparse and historically spaced. 
This really is not too surprising once one recognises how 
much of the tertiary sector is not amenable to self-provision (the 
distinction between final service and other levels is not important for 
the present analysis). It is not easy to see how the operations of the 
public sector, as against the private, could be diversified. Do-it-
yourself Town and Country Planning, independent nuclear weapon systems, 
and domestic taxation are non-starters, not to mention most health and 
education. And even many of the 'private' services, once we exclude 
transport and possibly construction, are not susceptible to 
informalisation except for very limited parts of the population: 
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telecommunications, banking, insurance and commerce are examples where 
the service is provided more for organisations than for individuals or 
families. 
Gershuny can be seen, therefore, to over-estimate the 
importance of what is really only a minor phenomenon. Nonetheless, his 
observations serve to make several points. Clearly, technology does 
not necessarily create new jobs, particularly in the service sector. 
It may do so, but that remains an empirical question. Second, his data 
are a reminder that occupational change is not confined to the tertiary 
sector: occupational upgrading occurs in manufacturing too. Finally, 
his analysis shows how within a broad sector, different forces may be 
at work so that a separation of, say old staples from newer 
manufacturing industries, or transport from other service activity may 
well reveal distinctive modes of mobility. In other words, conventional 
industry sector analysis may need to be expanded. 
This is further confirmation of the view already expressed in 
this chapter. Bell's own evidence shows that sectoral shift is only a 
rough guide to occupational distribution. Is it therefore worth 
considering sectors at all? ' ' yes , For Bell, the answer is of course, 
because he is interested in all characteristics of industrialism, and 
the growth of the tertiary sector (transport and utilities), the · 
quarternary sector (trade, finance, insurance, real estate) and the 
quinerary sector (health, education, research, government and 
recreation) are used to show how the resources of a post-
industrializing society are increasingly devoted to knowledge-based 
industries. For Bell, and more so for other writers like Touraine, 
Galbraith, and Dahrendorf, the emergence of a new class on the basis of 
their 'knowledge resources' is predicated on the existence of 
institutions of employment to hire the members of the new class. But 
how far is this relevant to the more traditional area of mobility and 
stratification? 
I"f we leave on one side the underlying rationale that we 
require a general explanatory framework to account for occupational 
transition, there are two important points arising from sectoral 
analysis. The first (and it is one that could also be drawn from the 
theory of capitalist society) is that technological change creates new 
occupations, and therefore that m~bility will be greatest where there 
has been most technological change ( 9). Second, there will be more 
mobility in the quarternary and quinerary sectors (although there is no 
need to insist on those distinctions) than in the primary and secondary 
sectors. However, following Gershuny and Bell's point about white-
collar work in manufacturing industry, there will be more mobility in 
'high tech' production industries than in other more traditional parts 
of the secondary sector. Third, mobility will be most evident at those 
historical times when there is greatest or most rapid technological 
innovation. 
The first and second of these propositions are much easier to 
test empirically than the third. The latter requires detailed 
knowledge of the history of many different industries, and given the 
other two propositions, the effect of the third may be harder to 
identify. Again, current events tend to suggest that technical 
innovation leads to a reduced labour force, as those with obsolete 
skills are discarded. 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1979) have recently implied that the 
era of major sectoral shift may be passed. Citing the reaction against 
government spending in the USA and counter-inflationary policies in 
(9) 'Technology' in this context is used to compass 'social 
technology' as well as purely physical technology. 
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Europe,. they argue that the public sector service industries of 
education, environmental services and welfare cannot continue to expand 
because of the reduction in public finances, 
'the main hopes for future service employment growth must lie 
in the expansion of the private sector, and if aggregate 
demand is raised sufficiently, them this must surely exert a 
demand for goods and services somew~ere in the economic 
system with a growth in jobs to provide these extra goods and 
services' (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1979,48) 
Even so they go on to suggest that the response in manufacturing 
industry may well be one of increased production without any comparable 
increase in employment, as the technology of labour-saving equipment is 
now so well-established. They use the term 'jobless growth' to 
identify a period which begins in the 1960s and is clearly present by 
the 1970s, since when most OECD countries have experienced an absolute 
decline in employment in manufact~ring. Although this comes right at 
the end of the period covered by the Scottish Mobility Study, the 
patterns of mobility in the late 1960s may well be affected by this 
'long-term structural change in the pattern of output and employment' 
(ibid, 38). 
The difference between employment and productivity is also 
emphasised by Browning and Singelmann (whose work in fact is more in 
the tradition outlined in the previous chapter). They argue that both 
primary and secondary sectors in America have been characterised by 
marked increases in output but absolute and relative declines in 
employment in agriculture. Goods-producing is more susceptible to 
technological inputs designed to increase productivity than services, 
because non-material products are harder to standardize. Increasing 
productivity in agriculture and manufacturing 
'allows for economic growth and rising national and per 
capita income, which in turn stimulates a rising demand for 
various kinds of services' (Browning and Singelmann, 1978, 
485). 
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They conclude that, as far as America is concerned, 'the most dynamic 
phase' of sectoral transformation will have occurred by 1970, leaving 
little relative change in proportions of employment between sectors in 
the rest of the century. The transfer of employment between industries 
is almost complete. 
Browning and Singelmann also propose an elaboration of the 
primary /secondary /tertiary model, in which the tertiary sector is 
replaced by four separate sectors: distributive services; producer 
services (ie, commerce); social services (welfare and public 
administration); and personal services (entertainment and personal 
consumption). They report a similarity to the typologies independently 
derived by Katouzian and Singer (Browning and Singelmann, 1978, 491; 
Katouzian, 1970; Singer, 1971). The common element is that a 
distinction is made between industry or production-oriented services 
(distributive and producer services); services which are collectively 
consumed and provided directly or indirectly by the state, such as 
health and educational and personal or individual services which relate 
to leisure consumption. As Browning and Singelmann note, some 
difficulties of classification exist at the boundaries, and the 
analysis used here in later chapters adopts a different elaboration of 
the service sector, empirically based on recent Scottish history. 
What this section has shown is that the basic idea of 
technological change leads to a variety of rather more sophisticated 
positions. In particular, the complexity of the processes involved 
poses a problem for the present study, because if mobility is dependent 
on patterns of employment, then these patterns of employment are 
changing in a number of different ways. While an analysis based on the 
major sectors of primary, secondary, and tertiary industry is obviously 
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improvement on earlier levels, it is theoretically, if not always 
pragmatically, possible to explore even more-detailed sub-divisions of 
economic activity. 
Given that the creation of new·occupations ·is focussed in 
some sectors and not others, and in some times, and not others, and 
that mobility may be similarly concentrated, then changes in the class 
structure must be similarly differentially located within society. 
Therefore to talk about the 'new intelligentsia' -or any of the 
concepts employed by the theorists of industrial society - disguises a 
great deal of variation within society. While this can be taken as 
physical variation, ie, that the mix of industrial change in Scotland 
differs from that in South East England, it is also a social variation 
which may differentiate, say, the electronics industry from the 
newspaper industry (lO), wherever they may be located. One of the 
reasons for studying mobility in Scotland is that it is not simply a 
carbon copy of England. Although we are interested to know why 
Scotland's economy takes its distinctive form, the focus of that 
interest is its occupational constitution. The subdivision of the 
labour market into geographical or skill-level segments is particularly 
relevant for a development of an occupational mobility analysis. 
Occupational Classes in Industrial Society 
Although the previous sections dealt with industrial society 
as a type, the discussion inevitably involved ideas about occupational 
structure and class. If industrial society is based on the separation 
of ownership and control, and the growth of knowledge (processes also 
exercising theorists of capitalist society) then the basis for social 
(10) This example serves two purposes. It shows that there are 
different rates of innovation between industries, but it also 
shows (because of recent changes in type-setting technology) that 
even traditional industries have experienced dramatic 
technological changes (a la Bell): there are no purely 
'traditional' sectors, only variations in the rate of change. 
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formation changes. A number of writers, most notably Parkin, Giddens, 
Dahrendorf, and Goldthorpe, have suggested ways in which the new 
occupational roles provide the basis for new classes. 
Parkin argues that industrial society is not dominated by the 
social relations of the capitalist firm. On the one hand the state is 
a major employer, while on the other (following Dahrendorf) work 
relationships do not dominate all other non-work activities. Thus 
while work is justifiably a major focus of interest, non-marxist 
sociology, concerned with the division of labour 'as the main area in 
which observable realities of class played themselves out' (1979, 14) 
has defined out of existence 'the sister concept of capital' and yet at 
the same time failed to recognise the salience of other sources of 
social differentiation. Race, religion, language and gender are all 
independent bases for cleavage or coherence: 
'A model of class relations that addresses itself exclusively 
to inequalities surrounding the occupational order is 
therefore bound to be defective.' (ibid, 15). 
Parkin uses the concept of closure to demonstrate how groups may 
. restrict access to resources and opportunity: in 'modern capitalist 
society' closure takes two main forms, those institutions relating to 
property, and academic or professional qualifications. It is the 
latter that most concerns the present analysis. 
Parkin identifies several groups within the middle class who 
have established control over entry to their occupations, based on 
possession of educational credentials (this being a viable strategy 
because of the technical nature of work tasks in industrial society). 
Here, closure is on occupational lines: class and occupation coincide. 
Their shared identity comes from their strategy of closure, not from 
property ownership nor from any 'indispensibility' of their function. 
However, the credentialist closure has a drawback: it makes 
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transmission of socially-advantaged occupational positions to one's own 
children much more difficult: 
'Dense children of the professional middle class •.• will 
continue to stumble at the intellectual assault course set up 
largely for their parents' own protection. Conversely, large 
numbers of bright children of the culturally dispossessed 
will sail through to claim the prize of professional entry' 
(~bid, 61, original emphasis). 
Parkin regards the middle class as having been 'guilty of grevious 
errors and miscalculations in its reproductive designs' (ibid, 62) to 
allow so much upward and downward mobility. Even if the examination 
system does work in favour of the expensively schooled or otherwise 
socially advantaged, so reducing the risk of competition from the 
offspring of other classes, the patterns of mobility can only be 
explained by a misguided commitment to credentialism as a system based 
_on sponsorship and careful selection, rather than hereditary 
transmission. 
However, there are several alternative views that we can 
advance to a model of self-inflicted injury. First, while the 
.professional middle class may be extremely powerful, that is not to say 
that as a class it is all-powerful. There is no need to believe that 
any one class exerts anything like total control over social events. 
Second, the expansion of new professions outpaces the credentialist 
procedure: new professions take time to impose closure, while demand 
for expertise in the short run_exceeds supply (see below Chapter 9). 
Third, again as we shall see, the process of credential competition in 
fact becomes important only in the 1960s, at which point some indices 
of upward mobility begin to suggest that the middle class starts to 
achieve higher rates of self-recruitment. 
Parkin's account of credentialism and mobility shares some 
similarities with that of Giddens, not least because of a common debt 
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to Weber's ideas on non-class sources of association. Giddens also 
identifies possession of educational or technical qualifications as one 
of his three sorts of market capacity, arguing that within the non-
manual middle class, 
'the most significant type of difference in market capacity 
is undoubtedly between the capacity to offer marketable 
technical knowledge, recognised and specialised symbolic 
skills, and the offering of general symbolic competance' 
(Giddens, 1 973, 186). 
Professional credentials are what mark off draughtsmen and social 
workers from routine white collar workers, not their place in the 
hierarchy of organisations or as a bridge between rulers and ruled. 
Qualifications, together with possession of property and manual labour-
power 'tend to be tied to closed patterns of inter- and inra-generation 
mobility' to yield a three-class core system (1973, 107). 
Giddens sees mobility as playing a key role in linking market 
capacity to the formation of socially identifiable classes. This 
'mediate structuration of class relationships is governed 
above all by the distribution of mobility chances which 
pertain within a given society •.. the greater the degree of 
'closure' of mobility chances -both intergenerationally and 
within the career of the individual - the more this 
facilitates the formation of identifiable classes' (ibid, 
107). 
However, Giddens is theorizing on the basis of the 1949 Glass study of 
mobility (and possibly on a misreading of Miller's comparative data), 
'virtually all movement, whether upward or downward, inter-
or intragenerational, across the non-manual/manual division 
is 'short-range': that is to say, takes place in such a way 
as to minimise achieved differences in market capacity' 
(Giddens, 1973, 181 ). 
He also assumes more or less constant rates of mobility (ibid,182). As 
will be shown below (and as the results of the Nuffield study also 
show) there is in fact considerable 'long-range' .mobility, and mobility 
rates do vary. Therefore the formation of socially identifiable 
classes is a weaker process than Giddens implies, because there is less 
closure of mobility. 
Although on the surface he is dealing with class 
structuration and classes, Giddens, like Parkin, necessarily places 
occupation very much to the fore, because occupations are a kind of 
concrete representation of market capacity; qualifications and mobility 
processes relate to entry to occupations. Similarly in identifying the 
manual working class, he uses the division of labour in the sense of 
'the allocation of occupational tasks within the productive 
organisation' (108). In other words, Giddens draws on those key 
attributes of industrial society, the technical division of labour and 
the importance of knowledge, to identify class formation. Of course, 
he links these ideas to others, such as ownership of property, and 
'distinctive groupings', so that class formation is a mo;e dynamic, 
complex, and less technologically determined process than in, say the 
writing of the convergence theorists. Nonetheless, his formulation 
depends on many of the same basic understandings about the social 
relations of technology in industrial society,·while the emphasis 
placed on mobility provides an important link between occupations and 
cla$ses ( 11 ) , 
Parkin and Giddens share with Dahrendorf the view that 
contemporary society is no longer to be explained primarily by the 
ownership of the means of production, but the latter differs markedly 
in where he places the emphasis. The sheer scale of activities outside 
of the capitalist-employee relationships -as much in bureaucratized 
firms as in the state apparatus - indicates a social order in which 
classes far from being missing, owe their existence to forces beyond 
property. Dahrendorf identifies authority relations as the key, rather 
than market situation (1959, 136-140), rejecting occupation and market 
situation per se as bases for classes. The authority structure becomes 
(11) Although it is interesting to note that Giddens seems to think in 
terms of 'class mobility', not occupational or social mobility: 
see the index entries (or rather, absence of them) for these 
terms 1973; 327, 332 and 334). 
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'the structural determinent of class formation and class conflict' 
(ibid, 136). More recently, Dahrendorf has presented his view of a 
fragmented middle class with a heavy emphasis on access to educational 
qualifications (1982, 57-9). 
Goldthorpe's position lies between these two views. His use 
of the term 'service class' expresses the idea of property-based 
authority positions, but his framework is firmly based in market and 
work situations. For the service class to be 
'a class of employees who are appointed to the positions they. 
hold, some higher agency is evidently presupposed ... (having) 
power, whether the bases of this are economic, political, 
military or whatever' (Goldthorpe, 1982, 170). 
The members of the service class are 
'typically engaged in .the exercise of delegated authority or 
in the application of specialist knowledge and expertise, 
operate in their work tasks and roles with a distinctive 
degree of autonomy and discretion •.• (and) are accorded 
conditions of employment which are also distinctive in both 
the level and kinds of rewards that are involved. In other 
words, professional, administrative and managerial employees 
are in these ways typically differentiated from other grades 
of employee - and most obviously wage-workers - in the 
character of both their work and market situations' (ibid, 
169). 
Goldthorpe differs from Giddens in seeing that these shared elements 
justify the treatment of managers and professionals as occupying a 
single class location, even if their precise technical function is not 
identicaL 
Both of the above quotations also show how dependent 
Goldthorpe is on employment even when dealing directly with conceptions 
of social class. His position vis-a-vis industrial society is however 
a sophisticated one. The growth of professional and managerial 
occupations is presented as 'a response to organisational exigencies' 
and being possible because of 'economic growth'. Nonetheless, this is 
not taken to mean that the growth is a 'natural' development of the 
division of labour in the course of economic growth' as sectoral shift 
accounts (eg Clarke) imply. Rather the service class's form reflects 
'the structures of organisational and political power and the character 
of dominant values and ideologies' (op cit. 302-3). By implication 
(although it is not very evident from his main work on mobility) 
Goldthorpe sets class formation in discrete historical and social 
settings, so marking himself off from many of the main theorists of 
industrial society whose accounts have often suffered from both a lack 
of case studies and an uncertainty about the connections between the 
elements in economic change that they sought to theorize. 
~obility and Labour Markets 
Because mobility research has been inspired by an interest in 
class structures, it has taken as its unit of analysis either·whole 
social structures (ie, societies) or, for reasons of practicality, 
geographically discrete settlements like cities. The individual is 
seen as competing against all other individuals within that unit to 
achieve the 'best' occupation possible. Individuals are not equal, so 
that the outcome of the competition reflects the handicaps (family 
origin, qualifications, etc) of the competitors. This process 
resembles the operation of a labour market, and in particular, its 
implicit assumptions closely resemble those of neo-classical economics 
(12) However, the significance of this has not previously been 
recognised, because mobility research has not taken its occupational 
dimension sufficently seriously (although see Kreckel (1980)) (l 3). 
(12) Some similarities between neo-classical economics and the theory 
of capitalist society will also shortly become clear. 
(13) Kaufman et al (1981,1) list several 'students of stratificat~on 
(who) have begun exploring structural characteristics of jobs, 
firms and industries', while Smith (1983) explores mobility and 
labour markets for football coaches. The connection between 
mobility, labour markets and ideas of class is taken up in the 
final section of this chapter. 
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The idea of a labour market encapsulates 
'the institutions and practices that govern the p~rchase, 
sale and pricing of labour services, the means by which 
workers are distributed among jobs, and the rules that govern 
employment, mobility, the acquisition of skills and training, 
and the distribution of wages and other rewards obtained 
contingent upon participation in the economic system' 
(Kalleberg and Sorensen, 1979, 351-2). 
Neo-classical economics treats labour in the same way as other 
commodities in positing a single, perfectly competitive.market. The 
normal laws of supply and demand apply, with the worker (as supplier of 
labour) maximising his rewards in a rational manner by adjusting his 
wage demands and his geographical location in response to those laws. 
In a more sophisticated version, the market may be regarded as 
disaggregated into different skill levels, but the same principles then 
apply within these sectors. On the supply side, rational economic man 
is assumed to have the knowledge which enables him to evaluate all 
opportunities and to decide which balance of costs arid benefits best 
suits him: the worker exercises choice. On the demand side, the 
employer is interested in the productive potential of labour as against 
alternative factors of production, and therefore differentiates between 
workers as units of labour according to their qualifications, 
experience, work record, etc. He sets up a hierarchy of utility, which 
manifests itself in wage differentials, rewarding most those workers 
with the greatest productive potential. In exercising his choice of 
whom he will employ, he seeks to constrain the choice available to the 
worker. 
The similarities of this to the unspoken assumptions of 
mobility analysis are evident. Distribution to destinations comes 
about through inter-individual competition, with the interaction 
between the supply of individuals having particular attributes, and the 
demand of occupational opportunities having certain entry requirements, 
representing the framework in which that competition takes place. The 
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handicaps of origin which explain the outcome for any given set of 
individuals are ·those implied by Kalleberg and Sorensen's list: the 
rules of employment, the acquisition of skills, the means by which 
workers are distributed among jobs. The central conception of mobility 
echoes perfect competition in that it measures deviation of the 
observed pattern from the expectation under perfect mobility. Apart 
from providing an economic, as opposed to a sociological, principle as 
the core explanatory device and dealing more explicitly with the demand 
side of the relationship, the neo-classical economic formulation of the 
labour market takes the same underlying model as social mobility 
analysis. 
There are therefore two sufficient reasons why a discussion 
of mobi1i ty requires some consideration of labour market theory. 
First, the logic of taking mobility's occupational dimension seriously 
must immediately establish a connection with areas of sociology 
previously compartmentalised under the heading of 'work' rather than 
'mobility'. Second, the congruence of the underlying models suggests 
that labour market theory is one of the more fruitful of these areas to 
explore, not least because it points to assumptions in mobility 
research which have hitherto received little attention. In particular, 
recent criticisms of orthodox labour market theory hold out the promise 
(14) 
of generating parallel critiques of mobility theory What we are 
working towards at this point is a reformulation of the social mobility 
process as a labour market process. 
In the first place, although it can be assumed that all 
workers require employment, the labour-force is not in a constant state 
of flux, with every member actively seeking to change his employment at 
(14) And, as we shall see, of reviewing the critiques of labour market 
theory on the basis of mobility findings. 
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the same instant. 80% to 90% of people are in work, and remain in the 
same post for some time. Anything less than this would render 
conventiona·l economic activity impossible, because of the high turnover 
of personnel in any one institution: the case of an office dependent on 
the services of 'temps' is a good example of how, without a stable work 
force, efficient operation is severely impaired. Low labour turnover 
is in the interest of the employer, as it ensures continuity of 
procedures. It is also frequently in the interests of employees, who 
avoid the upheaval of frequent changes both in their own work routines 
and in those of work colleagues. Even if we assume that labour inertia 
reflects a conscious maximisation strategy on the part of the workers, 
it still means that the active workings of the market are confined to a 
marginal process. Everyone must at some stage seek employment, but at 
any one time, the market is likely to be relatively inactive. 
But how do those who are seeking employment make their 
choices? In the first place, the 'choice' of employment is seen as not 
following strictly rational, optimising behaviour. This may not seem 
very significant to a sociological audience, but the more recent 
contributions to labour market theory are part of dialogue with neo-
classical economics, in which, for example, rational economic man has a 
central place. As Loveridge and Mok conclude, numerous studies suggest 
that there are four good reasons for abandoning such assumptions: 
'1. Few workers are oriented towards maximising their 
monetary rewards either in the short or long term. 
2. Job security is more important than wage differentials. 
3. The labour market is opaque rather than transparent and 
this contributes to the lack of mobility between 
segments. 
4. There is little inclination to move between regions or 
occupations' (Loveridge & Mok, 1979, 117-118). 
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In the second place, a number of writers have reported that 
the actual 'search' for employment, such as it is, is a restricted one 
particularly for unemployed manual workers (Reynolds, 1·951, 85-6; 
Parker et al, 1971, 92; Martin and Fryer, 1973, 138-41). Worker 
knowledge of what jobs are available, what those jobs entail, what the 
exact. wages might be, or what qualification the employer may be seeking 
is very limited. Virtually no mechanism exists for the dissemination 
of this information, beyond a partial Employment Exchange system which 
conveys far less than complete data. This is not surprising, because 
it is not in the employer's interest to promote one. By restricting 
knowledge, he is able to constrain the worker's choice, to control 
access to employment, and to ensure a low turnover of labour. The only 
avenue open to the rational economic worker would be to sample a number 
of jobs in order to obtain first-hand experience, but this is likely to 
be interpreted as an undesirable employment record by the typical 
prospective employer who is concerned with maintaining a stable work 
force. Not only is the trial and error approach inconvenient for the 
worker - despite its 'rationality' - but the superior economic power of 
the employer enables the latter to block this avenue. However, as 
Blackburn and Mann observe, the market can operate with workers having 
a very crude level of knowledge, such as that a firm is offering 'good 
wages I (15) 
Just as the worker may have a crude idea about wages· and 
vacancies, he is also likely to have only a partial picture of the way 
in which employers differentiate between workers' abilities. While. 
formal selection criteria exist -education, training, experience, and 
even aptitude tests- for many jobs (including some ·of those in the 
(15) Blackburn and Mann, 1979, 15-6. This notion of choice of 
employment on the basis of vague (and even inaccurate) knowledge 
resembles the model proposed in Appendix I, namely that the 
ranking of jobs as more or less desirable can be accomplished 
with very little precise knowledge. Here we are dealing with 
access to employment, in the appendix we are dealing with 
perceptions of occupations. 
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upper middle class) the process of selection is haphazard, depending as 
much on impressions created during a brief interview with a personnel 
manager as anything else. At the manual level, Blackburn and Mann 
estimate that in Peterborough 
'about 85% of the workers possess the necessary ability to 
undertake 95% of jobs' (Blackburn & Mann, 1979,12)·. 
Instead of seeking quality, employers 'screen out' workers who have 
some attribute which is treated as if it equated with a lack of 
ability. 
'In the first stage of the selection procedure for "good 
jobs" are weeded out the blacks, the women, those with 
several jobs over a recent short period, the very young and 
the very old, the single and the school dropouts •.. What all 
these criteria have in common is that they are aimed less at 
"ability" than stability. The sought-after worker is less 
the skilful initiative-taking worker than the worker who will 
arrive on time, do as he is told, and not quit' (ibid, 13). 
Selection criteria such as these (l6) result in a stratification of the 
labour market into at least two sectors. One consists of a market in 
desirable jobs sought after by a relatively favoured labour force, 
while the other consists of undesirable jobs competed for among sets of 
stigmatised labour. 
This is the basis for 'segmented' labour market theories, and 
in particular dual labour market theory as outlined by Fiore and 
Doeringer in the early 1970s. This postulates a labour market 
operating as two segments, a primary sector and a secondary sector. In 
the first are 
'jobs with relat:i.vely high wages, good working conditions, 
chances of advancement, equity and due process in the 
administration of work rules and, above all, employment 
stability' (Fiore, 1975, 126). 
(16) With which, it may be pointed out, many white male trade 
unionists would sympathize. Obviously, in dealing with such 
'non-economic' or 'non-technological' criteria, we are moving 
some way beyond the theory of industrial society. Writers such 
as Blackburn could equally well be treated as part of the marxist 
tradition, although his inclusion here enables the question of 
market segmentation to be more easily linked to the labour needs 
of certain technologies. 
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In contrast, jobs in the secondary sector are much more likely to 
'be low-paying·, with poorer working conditions and li tle 
chance of advancement: to have a highly personalied 
relationship between workers and supervisors .•• and to be 
characterised by considerable instability in jobs and a high 
turnover among the labour force' (ibid, 126). 
Not surprisingly, it is the stigmatised categories of labour which are 
confined to the secondary sector, and this model has been accordingly 
directed towards an understanding of poverty and under-employment. 
On the demand side, the market is equally segmented. The 
primary sector is dominated by large monopoly capitalist firms using 
high technology and which are relatively profitable. They are 
insulated against short-term fluctuations in demand and so are more 
concerned with maintaining a stable and experienced workforce which can 
handle its high technology. The secondary sector consists of firms 
operating on a smaller scale in a marginal and more chaotic market. 
Such firms must respond rapidly to changes in market conditions, 
shedding and re-hiring labour at short notice. As these small firms 
operate with limited capital, their technology is likely to be low and 
therefore less dependent on highly specialised labour. Averitt (1965) 
has expressed this difference as the division under monopoly capitalism 
into .'core' firms which dominate the primary sector and 'peripheral' 
firms which operate in the secondary sector, often as sub-contractors 
to the core firms. 
It follows that if only certain categories of labour can 
participate in the primary sector, and if the employers in that sector 
wish to maintain a stable workforce - with, as we have already noted, 
only a small proportion of the labour force actively seeking new 
employment in conditions of low knowledge levels - then the conditions 
are set for high mutual dependance between employer and worker (Mann, 
1973). In such a dual market, a secondary principle comes into 
operation, the 'internal' labour market. Doeringer and Fiore (1971) 
have suggested that the primary sector consists of a set of internal 
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labour market segments, each consisting of a single firm which controls 
entry to· a range of jobs. Unlike the secondary sector, workers are 
trained and promoted within such a firm, with external recruitment 
restricted to only certain types of work, most noticeably the most 
menial. It is possible to regard a particular skill group, already 
inside a firm, as advantaged by these practices, even if their external 
movements are restricted. In other words, both employer and employees 
could benefit from an internal market structure. 
This is not the view taken by 'radical' labour market 
theorists (see for example Edwards et al, 1979). In that formulation, 
the divisions of the labour market are not merely a contingent result 
of capitalism, but rather an outcome both necessary for the system's 
continued existance and a deliberate manoeuvre by the capitalist class 
to weaken the working class. As Blackburn and Mann (1979) have pointed 
out, this combines functionalist explanation with an excessively 
conspiratorial theory of history, while at the same time failing to 
account for the economic significance of stigmatised labour. It may be 
in the political interest of the capitalist class to divide the working 
class against itself, but closer integration of blacks, women, 
adolescents etc into the primary market would force down wage levels 
and generally weaken the bargaining position of white male workers 
(17) Nor does radical labour market theory explain the variety of 
practices that can be observed, ranging from active collaboration 
between workers and employers in maintaining an internal market, to 
disputes over the restrictive practices of craft unions, and arguments 
(17) In this discussion of labour markets, the question of ethnic 
discrimination and migrant labour has largely been omitted, 
because Scotland has such a small proportion of her labour force 
which falls into this category. This should not, however, be 
taken as implying that the problem is not important: see Moore 
(1977), and Blackburn and Mann (1979) on which account this 
section draws. 
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over seniority as a principle of promotion. There has been no single 
coherent policy on the part of the capitalist class. 
The variety of practices is seen as a key element in the 
critique developed by Loveridge and Mok. While they accept the general 
points that the labour market discrimination exists in institutional-
ised form, and that workers seek to maximise their condition, they 
favour a more complex explanation than that put forward by Doeringer 
and Fiore. Although gender, race, language, age, and religion may all 
operate as stigmatising characteristics, 
'whether the market conditions facing these multi-various 
groups are sufficiently homogenous for them to be considered 
to be sharing the same market situation is to be doubted' 
(Loveridge & Mok 1979, 110). 
Workers experiencing more than one stigma are presumably more 
disadvantaged than others, while different employers at various times 
will discriminate on different grounds. A simple dual market model 
does not adequately encompass this variety. 
This critique has been extended by Kaufman et al (1981) who 
examined segmentation in the American economy using ten broad 
dimensions ranging over size, capital, control, productivity, 
unionization and growth. This enables them to identify eight major 
segments extending from an 'oligopoly sector' with seven major 
multinationals, through wholesale and small shop sectors, to utilities 
and services. Although their prime concern is not employment, their 
argument that a dual model does not take sufficient account of 'the 
interaction of profit seeking, technology, environment, union struggle 
and government intervention', and that such dimensions do not coincide 
in any simple way, is a powerful one. 
What makes their study particularly interesting is that their 
cluster analysis begins to take on an appearance reminiscent of the 
industrial sectors discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. On 
the other hand, some of the clusters do strike one as surprising: the 
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similarity of the three sectors 'local monopoly', 'education and non-
profit', and 'agricultural' are three strange bed-fellows, sharing low 
scores on capital intensity, size, concentration and unionization. 
Clearly the use of such variables as level of trade union membership or 
government intervention, which are culturally-specific, restricts the 
precise transfer of conclusion about America to Scotland. 
Nevertheless, Kaufman et al's analysis reinforces our concern to 
disaggregate mobility into several industrial sectors as a means of 
approximating labour markets, and to go beyond a simple dualistic 
conception. 
Mok has attempted a further variant of the model by 
suggesting that there are potentially a higher number of labour market 
segments, with relatively more permeable boundaries. Their exact 
status depends on the interaction of the primary and secondary markets 
with the internal labour markets. In two dimensional terms, one axis 
expresses how people (or jobs) stand in terms of job rewards, 
conditions, autonomy and security while on the other axis people and 
jobs are characterized by their tasks, skill, training, and place in an 
organizational hierarchy. The combination of the two dimensions gives 
the possibility of less attractive labour situations within internal 
labour markets, and more attractive outside, as well as the more common 
situation which is the reverse (Mok, 1975). 
One difficulty with these latter views is that the dual 
labour market model begins to disintegrate into such a segmented 
structure that all coherence is lost. In that case, any statements are 
likely to be ones about small clusters of occupations which are linked 
by the career patterns of individuals. This may not matter in terms of 
the original labour market debate, in which racial and sexual 
discrimination loomed very large, but in terms of discovering mobility 
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structures it is somethin_g of a disadvantage. If segments of labour 
market exist, then to be viable for empirical and conceptual use they 
must be differentiated. That is to say, there must be some degree of 
segregation between them. The evidence of segregation consists for the 
most part in differences between wages. For example Barron and Norris 
(1976) report an overlap of male and female earnings of less than one 
third, but there is less evidence of ethnic segregation in this 
country, certainly as compared with America. Segregation of actual 
jobs, say by gender, is not always clear cut, if only because 
conventional categories are too crude to identify the underlying 
pattern. Nonetheless there is a concentration of female labour in some 
occupations, and male labour in others (routine white collar employment 
. b" . 1 f f 1 t t. ) (lS) 1s an o v1ous examp e o ema e concen ra 1on • 
Against this there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
segregation is not inherent in the operations of the market per se. 
Differential· treatment of the genders is not only rife outside of work, 
it also predates modern capitalism. Gender segregation of occupations 
therefore requires no special explanation based on market forces. A 
parallel argument can be made for ethnic discrim~nation: arguably there 
is greater concentration of ethnic groups in education and location of 
residence than in work. 
Again, the segregation of markets implies the allocation of 
all desirable jobs to the primary sector, and all undesirable jobs to 
the secondary sector. But there is a hierarchy of desirability within 
-both sectors, so that there is penetration of the primary market by 
stigmatised labour, and of the secondary market by what is assumed to 
be non-stigmatised labour, ie, white males. The dual model may hold 
(18) See Clegg and Dunkerley (1980, 400-405) and Hakim (1979). 
good at the extremes, but not for the crucial area of the supposed 
boundary between segments. One reason for this is that the activity of 
a firm in the primary sector is frequently supported by many small 
firms which eke out a tenuous existence (in the secondary sector) as 
sub-contractors to the major firm. Some of the occupations, the skills, 
and the wage rates are common to both, or as one study as part of the 
Glasgow labour market has shown, the flows of labour between sectors 
and the complexity of pay structures are so complicated that it is not 
possible to identify a coherent wage pattern (Robinson et al, 1970). 
The same inter-connection also applies between internal and 
external labour markets. If there were impermeable barriers to an 
internal market, then labour mobility would be chiefly by means of 
promotion. Although promotion does take place, it is by no means the 
dominant process: Mackay et al (1971) report that in the engineering 
industry 'between firm' moves accounted for more upward mobility than 
promotion·within single organisations. 
In the light of this pessimistic appraisal, the reader might 
be excused for wondering about the value of a lengthy account of labour 
market theory. The rationale for it consists of two kinds of reasons, 
those to do with a basic orientation in our approach to the mobility 
process, and those to do with the more detailed features of the 
mechanisms by which labour is allocated among occupations. 
Once the initial step has been taken towards recognising the 
centrality of work in understanding mobility, an examination of 
available models of the work process naturally follows. If labour 
market theory has failed to provide a complete and tidy explanation, it 
is not surprising, given the nature of the complex phenomena it 
attempts to encapsulate. Despite the limitations discussed above, 
labour market theory is centrally concerned with the forces which 
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determine what jobs people get; it draws attention to the fact that the 
outcome of the total process depends on the interaction of supply and 
demand; and (in its segmented form) it delineates the internal sub-
divisions of the job market. Its utility for mobility analysis is 
accordingly to reinforce the argument that the economic dimension is of 
major importance; to demonstrate that access to employment depends both 
on the ava1lability of, and rules of access to, jobs, as well as the 
suitability of the would-be workers for those jobs; and to suggest that 
the mobility competition is not a war of all against all, but rather 
that the competition tends to be compartmentalised. Not least, labour 
market theory helps to provide an explanation of why mobility takes 
place, in terms of the central human activity of production, which 
helps to release mobility research from its relative isolation as a 
captive of stratification theory. 
At a more detailed level, the fore-going discussion suggests 
several features of labour markets which can be explored as 
mobility process, or more accurately, we can seek empirical evidence as 
to whether particular mechanisms of job allocation seem to be in 
operation. The level of analysis and the site restrict what can be 
done: for example the occupational segregation of ethnic groups and 
women cannot be properly analysed with the present data. However, if 
we can legitimately extend the perspective to the rest of the labour 
force, and in particular to unskilled manual workers, then the 
connection can be made. Fiore (1975) has suggested in passing ·that 
both class and mobility can be related to main segments of the labour 
market. Although it is not his main concern, he distinguishes three 
segments - an upper and lower primary sector, and a secondary sector -
which comprise types of work corresponding to middle class, working 
124 
class, and lower class sub cultures, the latter being sociological 
categories (1975, 128). In the course of careers, if not at entry, 
people from middle clas,s backgrounds gravitate to upper primary types 
of work, while those from working class origins come to occupy the 
lower primary jobs and the. lower classes end up in the secondary 
market. In the more familiar mobility terminology, Piore is suggesting 
that the effect of family background is not greatest at first job (as 
is normally assumed in mobility analysis informed by ideas of 
ascription giving way to achievement) but rather at the 'present job'. 
The mechanics of this are not spelt out, but appear to reside in the 
fact that the middle class in particular enter occupations which are 
part of a cluster of jobs comprising a mobility chain, that is, they 
have careers. Such mobility chains are concentrated in the upper 
primary sector. The validity of this model can be tested by comparing 
mobility at different points in the career. 
A second concrete proposition which can be tested is drawn 
from Loveridge and Mok. Developing Mok's earlier two dimensional, four 
segment mode1, they argue that the segment with higher wages, better 
working conditions, higher unionization, involving sophisticated 
technology, autonomy, and high levels of internal promotion are 
concentrated in the following industries: oil, chemicals, public 
utilities, and metallurgy. Conversely, the segment with lower wages, 
poorer waking conditions etc are to be found in textiles, leather 
goods, glassware and food (interestingly, not in service occupations). 
While we cannot present data on all of these variables, it will be 
possible to examine similar industrial groupings, and also to use this 
proposition as a special case of Fiore's argument above. 
Third, and more generally, if the internal/external market 
concept is taken seriously it means that promotion should feature 
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predominantly in the explanations respondents give for their job 
changes. This shifts attention away from pre-work attributes like 
education, and towards intra-career events. Similarly, the logic of a 
secondary and external sector can be extended to those who have no 
skills but only muscle power to sell. We would expect to find these 
categories of worker concentrated in certain industries, such as 
manufacturing r~ther than service industry. Similarly, number of jobs 
held - as respondent attributes - should be correlated with type of 
industry and class position. If there is a segmented labour market, 
mobility can be used as a measure of that segmentation, in the same way 
that mobility is used to identify class boundaries. Thus if there is 
evidence of segmentation, we can examine careers to find whether those 
presently occupying segments have ever worked in other sectors of the 
market (l 9). In this way there is the possibility both of refining 
mobility analysis, and of providing some evidence on labour markets. 
The theory of industrial society offers a number of 
perspectives by which stratification can be linked, through mobility 
and occupations, to the historically unique feature of advanced 
technology. In this chapter, we have been less concerned with class 
per se than occupation, but the nature of the upper middle class 
emerges from the early section as being particularly problematic - as 
indeed it did from the discussion in the previous chapter. This strata 
will therefore be prominent in the later empirical analysis. At the 
same time, the present account has argued for an analysis which goes 
beyond broad statements about technology and society, or industrial 
sectors, to examine in greater detail how different sectors, with their 
characteristic technologies, create occupational demands. This 
(19) To quote Jain and Sloane (1977), 'the essence of segmentalist 
theories is the all pervasive nature of natural barriers to 
mobility' (mobility here having a wider meaning than social 
mobility). 
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approach assumes a somewhat less-integrated and untidy character for 
industrial society than some earlier writers, with various sectors 
being 'more advanced' than others. Regional variations in industrial 
mix are seen as an important example of this, but in the more general 
case, the overall patterns of employment and mobility may respond to 
changes which operate only in one (or a few) of the several sectors. 
To put it another way, trends and counter-trends are not society-wide 
phenomena, but can be located in areas and industries. It follows that 
the class structure of a society is seen primarily as an aggregation of 
these many labour/technology (and organizational) processes, rather 
than having an objective existence.in its own right. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the basic position adopted in the 
opening chapter has been elaborated by reference to two broad bodies of 
writing. This has provided alternative explanatory frameworks, as well 
as specific propositions which wll be empirically treated in later 
chapters. The first exercise, which draws on the ideas about capital, 
technology, and location which have been discussed, is to consider the 
site of the investigation, ie, Scotland. On the one hand, it is 
necessary to describe the main features of Scottish society that 
justify a separate analysis as a society in its own right. This having 
been done (in the next chapter) it will be possible to examine in 
greater detail how the more recent history of the country has shaped 
the life-experiences of the adult males who comprise the sample. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
The Historical Context of Mobility: ·the Social ·and Economic Character 
of Scotland 
The two preceding chapters have both been concerned with 
models of society, capitalist society or industrial society. In debates 
about such models, any one society is treated as being.more or less 
interchangeable with any other, because each society is only of interest 
to the extent that it demonstrates the particular attributes of the 
type in question. However, in the opening chapter, it was also argued 
that the real events of history like wars or the rise and fall of 
industrial enterprises change the occupational process and so affect 
mobility. The two views are not entirely contradictory: at times one 
rather than the other may be emphasised, according to the level of 
analysis. 
Given the duality of this approach, the next step 1s to 
consider the historical setting of the research site. As the cases of 
mobility to be analysed in later chapters consist of adult males 
resident 1n Scotland in 1975, we need to review the development and 
character of Scottish society. On the one hand this involves a 
concern with the unique situation of Scotland, while on the other the 
theories of society already discussed suggest key processes requ1r1ng 
attention as typifying capitalist or industrial society. For example, 
much of Scotland's particular development can be attributed to her 
patterns of capital accumulation and transfer, and ownership of 
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production, together with the introduction of new technologies and changes 
in the public administration of the country. How do these effect mobility? 
The task of situating mobility in a wider context is not without 
difficulties. In the first place, we need to consider why 'Scotland' is 
a suitable unit of analysis. The reason depends less on seeing Scotland 
as a nation-state than on seel.,ng that the country comprises an 
interesting set of social process-es which cannot be explained without 
some reference to Scotland's discrete existence within a wider web 
of connections. There are several facets to S~otland's discrete 
existence. It has a distinct physical area, with a very sparsely~ 
populated and geographically extensive southern border country, so 
that it is both distant and separate from England. It is an 
administrative unit, with separate laws and state powers operating 
within its boundaries. Third, it can be claimed that it possesses a 
national culture, which exists not so much in the artificial symbols 
of. kilts, haggis and. highland games, as in the shared interests in the 
mundane events of life north of the border. Finally, since so much 
of 'British' sociology stops short of th~t border, it can be claimed 
that de facto, sociology has defined Scotland as something different, if 
only in the negative sense of not including the country in its actual 
co 
studies. 
This negative approach to Scotland's separate existence 
actually compounds a second difficulty, that of relating sample survey 
data to other kinds of social science informatiun. Not only is 
information often not available on Scotland as a distinct from Britain, 
but what is known about related social processes (from, say, the 
Census or economic histories) covers a vari·ety of periods, a range of 
selected phenomena, and multitude of classifications and definitions. 
Integration and comparison is therefore at times not possible. 
(I) That is to say, English sociologists have on the whole carried out 
no empirical research in Scotland, despite in practice going on to 
describe 'British' society, thus implying (but without any 
evidence) that Scotland is just the same as England. See for 
example Westgaard and Resler (1977), Butterworth and Weir (1975) 
and to a lesser extent Noble (1975b). 
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A further di~ficulty is tha~ despite the small amount 
of sociological research on Scotland, the field is· already disputed by 
competing schools. These divisions are not just between theorists of 
capitalist society and theorists of industrial society (eg Dickson 
1980, 9-10) but between those who variously stress the separateness of 
Scotland or her dependence on England, the place of Scotland in the 
world system or her distinctive cultural development, the uniqueness 
of Scotland or her similarity to other types of society. Kendrick and 
McCrone have recently suggested that three sorts of mechanisms must 
all be examinied: those dealing with the international division of 
labour and external relationships; those dealing with the processes 
common to all societies of similar types; and those-specific to 
Scotland herself (Kendrick and McCrone, 1981, 10). They argue that 
most accounts concentrate too much either on the last of these, so 
exaggerating differences, or on the particular relationship with 
England, so distorting the picture into one dominated by rigid notions 
of dependency. The forme.r (and for us less significant) error lies in 
histories of Scottish culture and her people, particularly debates ~n 
marxism about the ro1e of indigenous ruling classes. The latter 
error is to be found in the writings on national identity by such 
commentators as Nairn (1977) and Hechter (1975). 
Thus for example Hechter's explanation of Scotland's 
development attaches more weight to her political domination by England 
than to events within Scotland. His list of 'possible' features of 
dominance is all-embracing: economic, legal, political, military, 
religious, and 'other cultural forms', although he admits that 
'there does not seem to be a general consensus •· on what is to be 
included (1975, 33). There is no need to dwell on the details of his 
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h (2) h . h . 1 k . ( } case ere: ··· 1..s t eorect1.ca framewor ~ ll.ke Bryden J 9.79. _ and 
Buchanan 0 9681 represents an over~ ambi.tious- attempt to t-ransfe-r a 
core/periphery model from one context to another, inappropriate one. 
Nairn takes a broader view, regarding nationalism as a 
· response by a less developed nation to the impact of more advanced 
capitalism, ie by the uneven development of world capitalism. In 
concentrating on the global scale, he needs to treat Scotland as both 
over- and under-developed. Neither view squares with the fact that 
Scotland was part of the world's first industrial revolution (Kendrick 
et al, 1983, 3l. 
While Kendrick and the Social Structure of Modern Scotland 
Project team at Edinburgh University are correct to criticise both 
ethnocentric and excessivley externalist theories, their own pos-ition 
is in danger of becoming equally entrenched. (3) By concentrating on the 
similarities between Scotland and other industrial societies they 
underestimate the extent to which Scotland does have a separate 
existence. For Scots in particular, there is a framework of 
institutions and identities that is integral to their daily lives, and this 
has to be taken into account together with the external linkages and the 
(2) For an extensive critque of Hechter's theorectical, methodological 
and evidential weakness, see Page (1978). The general problems 
of this kind of core/periphery analysis are that, unlike '"ork in 
political science, there is seldom a dependant variable left to 
explain, and that the mechanisms of the relationship are under-
specified: see Rallings and Lee (1980, I and 33). 
(3) See for example their deliberately provocative title to a recent 
paper, 'Scotland is British' (jbid). 
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sit_nilarities between societies, I:n order to establish this balance, the 
review of Scottish hist-ory that follows starts with some of the 
contemporary differences bet,veen Scotland and England, before going ·on to 
consider how, among other things, world markets, political control, and 
international flows of capital shaped the economic conditions of 
twentieth_ century Scottish society. 
Contemporary-scotland 
It is in itself interesting that it should be necessary to say 
something about Scottish society for an English audience. l-lhile the 
political debate over devolution in the 1970's went a long way to 
acquaint the English public with some of the more obvious differences, 
there had been,little sociological analysis of Scotland (the first 
chai_r of Sociology was not established in Scotland until 1968). A need 
still exists to differentiate between the popular image and a 
systematic analysis of Scottish life, namely life in a society highly 
d 1 b . d d . 11 . d . 1 (4) h concentrate , ong ur an1se , an essent1a y ~n ustr1a . T e 
(4) What is being argued here is that a separateness based on major 
institutional forms is more important than the relatively superficial 
customary or cultural signs. The totality of such institutional 
differences from England justifies treating Scotland as something 
more than just a region of Britain: in contrast, Wales for all its 
cultural distinctiveness, is institutionally more akin to England and 
regional status. We cannot assume a priori that what we know as 
sociologists about England (eg the basic studies in the 1950's and 
1960's of corrnnunity life, education, religion, etc) also applies to 
Scotland, for there has been very little sociological study of 
Scotland. See Ander_son (1974) and Kent (1980): 
~as yet there is relatively little empirical material 
which would for example make possible comparative 
studies between Scotland and England and Wales. In 
short the sociography of Scotland is weak·and needs 
to be developed.' (Anderson 1974, I) 
Despite the appearance in 1977 of the Scottish Journal of Sociology 
Parsler could still identify the same gap in 1980 (Parsler, 1980, vii). 
The present chapter can be seen as a contribution, albeit a brief one 
towards identifying and filling this gap. 
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culture of Scotland is not dependent on language, unlike Wales: less than 
2% speak Gaelic. Rather,regiond dialect helps to reinforce a worldview 
created by Scottish insitutions, despite a relatively limited literary 
d . 1 1 ( 5) an mus~ca cu ture. 
The list of these institutions ~s an extensive one. Radio and 
television production centres, both BBC and lTV, regional programming, 
Scottish editions of the Mail and Express together with five major 
indigenous daily papers and two Sunday papers provide an introspective 
involvement in the country's own doings. Education, religion, legal/ 
judicial and local political systems were. not fully integrated under the 
terms of the Act of Union. The education: system does· not share England '·s 
structure, selectivity, subject specialisation, lack of practical 
orientation or final quali'fications (Ford et al ~ i 975). The churches 
have much higher membership, with Catholicism and Presbyterianism both 
playing a more important part (Highet, I 960). The law is based on 
Roman law, and requires separate. Acts of Parliament (which are often not 
forthcoming) to bring about changes. Although for some periods the 
administration was run from London, increasingly affairs have been 
d • d' b h (6) h b h 'd . . h concentrate ~n E ~n urg , so t at y t e mi -s~xt~es t ere were 
55,000 civil servants in Scotland dealing with local problems (Jellas, 
1963, .150 and 120-155; Hanham, 1969, 50-63). 
In addition there are separate employees and employers 
organisations, separate trade associations, banks, charities, and political 
parties. In October 1974 almost a third of Scots voted for a party not 
contesting any seat ~n England and Wales, and Budge and Urwin (1966) have 
( 5) See for example Paton (1968, 215-221), Kellas (1968, 6-9) and 
Hanham (1969, 44-46, and 147~.150), 
(6)- Public Health, Registration, Public works, Police and Prisons, 
Trading Standards, Education, Transport, and parts of manufacturing 
Fisheries, Taxation and Local Government (HMSO, 1970). 
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argued that separate voting traditions eyen for the ma~n parties 
operate in Scotland. Scotland may not be a classi:c nation'="'S'tate, out 
together these various elements form a pattern of dis-ti'nctiveness nowhere 
matched by any mere region of England or Wales (for further details·, 
see Payne et al, 1975}. The cunnnulative ef£ects have prompted one 
commentator opposed to Scottish separatism to admit that Scotland 
demonstrates 'a unity and cohesion of its own' (Cairncross, 1954, 1). 
One other type of difference is the physical disposition of 
the population. At the beginning of the century, over 74% of the 
population was classified by the Register-General as 'urban', and by 
1931 this figure had risen to 8J% (HMSO 1951; HMSO 1966, 182-3). In fact 
this means that around 65% of Scots lived in towns of over 20,000 
populations. This is a low definition of 'urban', but the 1971 figures 
for population density - which are not radically different from the 
earlier part of the century - confirm Scotland's centralised nature. The 
average urban density was 3007 persons per square kilometre (compared with 
1755 in England and Wales}: the rural density was 20, compared with 85 
(Morton, 1978). 
'Four~fifths of the Scottish people live in the 
highly urban central lowlands - in the planning 
regions around Glasgow, Stirling-Falkirk, Edinburgh 
and Dundee. About a tenth live in Aberdeen and 
its hinterland. The vast areas covered by the 
Highlands, South Western and border regions contain 
the remaining tenth, (~bid, 800). 
This concentration and the isolation effect of the sparsely-populated 
Border countries, is clearly visible in Fig. 4.1. In the Highlands, 
with its population of 283,000 in an area of 14,500 square miles, the 
average density is less than 20 to the square mile while that for the 
rest of the U.K. is 95, and for central Scotland is 910. Although 
the highlands consist of 20% of the U.K. land area, 
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'Two-fifths of the population live in settlements 
of less than J,QOO people and a further one-fifth 
live on crofts •.. For theprovision o~ education, 
transport and public services in general, the 
sheer physical extent of inhabited country presents 
a difference of degree so great as to constitute 
a difference of kind.' (McKay, 1973, 21). 
Thus the Highlands is, in a social sense, a small separate 
repon of Scotland that has different characterist1cs from the rest 
f h (7) h . 1 . d . 1 . h . o t e country; · · w ~ e ~t nee s spec~a attention, t ere :ls a danger 
of it distorting one's perception of Scotland, precisely because of 
its physical scale and the extent of its problems as a declining area 
increasingly dependent on tourism. In fact, most Scots are willing to 
collude with the English whose holidays in the Highlands (and 
conference trips to the north) and whose reading of 19th century 
literature, lead to a romantic image which misses the basic truth: the 
main bulk of Scottish life is essentially urbanised and industrial and 
has been for the whole of this century. 
The Emergence of Modern Scotland: 1700 to 1980 
Contemporary Scotland developed out of a long and complex 
history, during which the country became increasingly involved in 
outside forces, A convenient starting point is around 1700, at which 
time Scotland, despite a strategic location on trading routes, was 
still a poor agricultural society, exporting a few basic raw materials 
(Lythe, 1960, 233-246). Still largely feudal with strongly 
independent burghs, difficult geographical conditions, weak government 
and protecti·onist trade restrictions abroad hindered economic growth 
of the kind beginning on the continent and in England: 
(7) The Highlands are also characterised by concentrations of 
land ownerships: half of its 6.5 million acres are owned by 
individuals or firms (McEwan, 1975, 236). 
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'The tragic dilemm~ of the years around J700 was 
that the old economy was- already moriound because 
it could not work wi-thout complete sepa,ratio.n from 
England, and the new economy must fail because it 
could not work without complete integration; as the 
existing Union of Crowns provided neither, the 
nation was rapidly heading for commercial disaster' 
(Smout, 1963, 278), 
The Act of Union in 1707 provi-ded the beginnings of a solution, and 
integration into the English sphere of economic influence rapidly 
followed. 
The Act of Union dealt not just with political links· to the 
British state but also with fi.scal and trade matters .,.. codifying taxes 
and standardizing navigation privileges together with weight and 
measures (Lenman, 1977, 58-60), ·Furthe.r measures to extend English 
control inevitably followed the Jacobite Rising.· The long process· 
of economic integration had begun, setting up a 
'unique blend of economic experiences which shaped 
the political and social habits of its people' 
(Lenman, 1977, 7). 
The integration of the Scottish economy during the late 18th 
and early 19.th centuries worked in a number of ways to stimulate a 
precocious industrialisation, Markets in the Americas, from 
geographically advantaged west coast ports, were newly available and 
were followed by those in China and India: manufactures could flow out 1 
raw materials flow in (Harvie, 19.77, 106.,...7). The failure of the '45 • 
resulted ~n a more powerful, homogeneous, and less traditional elite 
based in the Lowlands, which was not slow to exploit such opportunites. 
It also resulted in improved internal communications for reasons of 
military security, and in a ready supply of cheap labour from the 
Highlands, later augmented through connections with Ireland (Lenman, 
1 9 77 • 1 0 1-6) • 
The supply of cheap labour, combined with traditional 
activities like linen making and cattle breeding, was the basls of 
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Scotland's economy until the second half of the 18th century (Lenman, 1977, 
87). The country, particularly the west, was dependent on English 
capital and impo:t:ted technology·, but tfie opening of colonial trading ~n 
tobacco marked a new turning point,.providing not only a source of 
capital out also a network· of contacts· and ass-ociated trading 
connections (Slaven, 1975, 24}. Capital from tobacco reinforced 
the linen trade, and in turn provided the appropriate setting for the 
new cotton trade: the same merchants and manufacturers were involved in 
all three (Lenman, op cit, '117; Slaven,opcit 1 90). The same period 
saw the foundation of banking system (Campbell, J965, J35 .... J5J)., 
Cotton, wool and later jute textile manufacturing showed the. 
first signs of use of inaminate power sources and factory production. 
together with the associated chemical industry. By the last quarter of 
the century, Glasgow was the premier linen town in Britain, with the 
power loom and the help of English capital prompting a rapid growth 1n 
cotton from the turn of the century to 1830, /it the same time the 
primitive road system was substantially upgraded, to be followed by the 
railways which·like England were major foci for capital and employment, 
although of course concentrated in the lowlands. The railways 
stimulated the iron industry, which expanded to the extent that by the 
middle of the 19th century 90% of Britain's iron exports came from 
lowland Scotland. The population was 1.6 million in 1801, 2·9 million 
~n 1851, and 3.4 million by 1871: most of that growth was concentrated 
in West Central Scotland (Lenman, 1977, 103; Campbell, 1965, 178). 
The same part of the country saw a second wave of new banks, with 
largely Scottish directors (Scott and Hughes, 1980b, 20.,..25).. Scottish 
capital was by now largely self-sustaining and could draw its 
technology from home and abroad. 
13"8 
Well before the middle of the century, a combination of world 
trade factors (not least the growth of Empire markets·) and new· technologies 
meant that ship-building, iron and coal had taken over as the major 
s·ectors of growth, with 60% of British steam tonnage launched on the 
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Clyde. Further developmen_t of the steam enpne - particularly 1n 
their railway and marine applications - followed, so that half or 
more of the British ship-Building laoour force was employed in 
Scotland, and Glasgow was the biggest world centre of locomotive exports 
well into the 20th century (Lenman, op cit, 173). Steel-making 
developed rather late, in the 1880's, partly due to Scotland's iron 
ore having an unsuitably high phospherous content, but also due to 
this ready market for cheap pig iron, There was no shortage of 
technological information: the two traditional features of an advanced 
. (8) . . . 
educat1on system, and l1nks Wlth contlnental Europe made Scotland 
a fruitful place for general new developments in production originating 
in England. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Scotland 
shared with England almos.t all of the conditions which promoted the 
Industrial Revolution south of the border (Hanham, 1969, 23), together 
with several additional advantages of her own. Up to th~ outbreak of 
the First World War, Scotland was every bit as 'advanced' as any part of 
Britain outside London. 
Yet in less than a decade, Scotland was showing clear signs of 
economic distress, and was soon to suffer all the woes of the English 
economy to an eyen greater extent. The last sixty years, the life-times 
of the older men in the sample, haye seen Scotland slip further and 
further behind England on almost every indicator of economic success. 
Why did such a dramatic turnabout occur? 
(8) In 1868, I in 40 Scots attended a secondary school; in England only 
1 in every 1300. 1 in 1000 Scots attended university compared with 
1 Englishman in 5,800 (Wade, 1939, 25-33). Hhat is more, the 
Scottish system paid more attention to 'practical' knowledge than did 
its English counterpart. 
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The Decline of Modern Scotland: the 20th Century 
Central tq tlii~ decli:ne- was- tfie use of Scottish capital. 
The initial surpluses from trade and textiles had gone into indigenous 
development such as· the railways· cons-tructed in the 1840's, ship-
building and iron smelting. However, in the wake of international trade, 
from the latter half of the J 9th. century the profits of Scottish 
industrialisation were re-invested not in Scotland but abroad. Investment 
from Edinburgh and Dundee in American railways, real estate, mining and 
ranching from Aberdeen and Dundee in railways and commercial agriculture 
in the Indian sub-continent, from Edinburgh and Aberdeen in Australia 
and New Zealand, and from Dundee in South America, was channelled through 
the comparatively well-developed and effective Scottish banks and 
investment trusts. As a contemporary commentator remarked, 
'whether this vast exportation of our surplus 
wealth be wise or unwise, Scotland is to a 
large extent responsible for it. In proportion 
to her size and the number of her population, 
she furnishes far more of it than either of 
_the sister kingdoms ... Scotland revels 1n 
foreign investment' (Blackwoods Magazine Oct. 
1884, quoted in Jackson, 1968, 297). 
Lenman, who is no critic of what he regards as a natural feature of 
'mature economies' estimates that 'Scottish foreign investments may have 
risen from £60 millions in 1870 to as much as £500 million in 1914' 
(Lenman, 1977, 193). 
Although a parallel process was taking place in English capital 
(Hobsbaum, 1969, 188-192), it was more pronounced in Scotland. Nor was 
it an unreasonable policy of self-interest by the Scottish capitalist 
class: their home production was yielding a good return (allowing for 
trade cycles) but could not be indefinitely expanded in the home market, 
whereas an expanded overseas market offered new growth potential. 
The very success of Scottish industry was a disincentive to further 
investment. Furthermore, land, railways and mining were sectors with 
which Scottish investors were familiar, and which offered high returns 
wi.th. relatively low risks. They were therefore more attractive than 
investment in new industrial technologies a,t home, ,Apart from the steel 
industry, which attractEd new funds in the face of problems with iron 
ore supplies, and some developments in marine propulsion (ie the 
turbine), little new industry was es.tablished in Scotland in the sixty 
year period following 1880. (g)_ As Hobsbaum has oberved, 
'to change from an old and obsolescent pattern to a 
new one was both expensive and difficult: it involved 
the scrapping of old investments still capable of 
yielding good profits ... (in favour of} new 
investments. of even greater ipitial cost; for as a 
gene.ral rule newer technology is more expensive 
technology' (}Iobsbaum, 1969, 188). 
The result was a Scottish economy that was under-capitlaised, 
narrowly-based on the old staple industries oftextiles, ship-building, 
iron, and steel and coal, and largely dependent on international trade. 
In as far as there was a home market, it chiefly consisted of a few ma~n 
industries interdependent on each other; coal and steel being largely 
d h . '1 . (10) geare to s ~p-bu~ d~ng. · The low wages of the labour force that had 
for so long helped the competitivene.ss of Scottish industry, meant 
that there. was little home market for consumer goods or new housing. 
It was these latter markets which led the slow recovery of the inter-
war years ~n England when after the First World War, the rise of 
new nati-ons in international trade, and finally the Great Slump, had 
destroyed the foundation of the old industrial order. 
In other words, many of the defects of the English economy 
were to be found in accentuated form in Scotland. Almost immediately 
(9) 
( 10) 
Two exceptions were the Singer sewing machine factory in Clydebank 
(I 884) and some generally unsuccessful small motor vehicle companies 
in the first two decades of the 20th century. 
See Slaven's account of the failure of the West of Scotland coal 
industry due to the coincident· decline of its two markets, steel 
and shipping at home, and international competition abroad. 
(Slaven, 1975). 
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after the end of the Great War, production began to fall and labour was 
laid off. There were few alternative sources of work because what 
distinguished the Scottish e.conomy was its concentration in the heavy 
industrial sector. These 'old staplest suffered wherever they were 
located in Britain, but the consequences were worse in Scotland. Most 
of the staples experienced absolute falls in employment, while cotton and 
ship-building suffered absolute falls in trade between 1920 and 1937. 
With most relying on exports for nearly half their markets, all saw 
relative falls in share of trade and proportion of the labour force 
employed during the period 1913 to 1937 as the staples' share of a 
static world trade fell from 14% to 9.8% by value (Glynn and Oxborrow, 
1976, 89-90). Table 4.1 shows the decline in four major industries: 
Table4.1 
Performance of four British Industries (Source: adapted from Hobsbaum, 
1969, 207) 
Industry 1912/13 1938 
Shipping 12m tons less than 11m tons 
Ship-building ·almost 1m tons less than O.Sm tons 
Cotton - production 8000m sq yards 3000m sq yards 
- export 7000m sq yards 1500M sq yards 
Coal 287m tons 227M tons 
At the low point of the depression in 1931/2, unemployment among miners 
reached 34.5%, among pig-iron workers 43.8h, among steelworkers 47.9%, 
and among shipyard workers 62%. 'Central Scotland resisted even the 
modest recovery of the later 1930's' (ibid, 208-9), not least because 
more even than other parts of Scotland its industries were interdependent 
(McCrone, 1980). The likelihood of son following father into the same 
job was perforce reduced. 
Elsewhere in Britain, and particularly in the Midlands and 
South East of England, the rigours of the Depression were palliated by 
the development of new products in high technology industries. The 
interwar period saw the introduction of the small electric motor, 
resulting in more flexible factory layouts, and a new complex of machine 
tools and engineering techniques, The internal combustion engine, 
artificial yarns (rayon), plastics (bakelite, casein, celluloid) and 
radio were all older inventions which went into industrial production• 
.Other innovations included new steel alloys, paper based on wood pulp, 
and organic chemistry. While older industries changed their products .. 
printing, furniture, leather goods and the construction industry began 
to gear up for a consumer market. The press, the vacuum cleaner, 
electric irons, cosmetics, the cinema, electric light, the 
d . f h . d h' . (1l) epartment store are creat~ons o t e twent~es an t ~rt~es. 
Comparatively little of this penetrated north of the Border 
until well after the Second World War. Even new ventures, such as the 
Argyll Motor Company, failed due to lack of a local market and 
under capitalisation (Slaven, 1975, 200). Scottish capital was 
dedicated elsewhere (with dividends seyerly reduced) while the absence 
of local consumer demand and the additional problems of transport 
motivated English capitalists to invest south of the Trent, let alone 
the Border. Scotland remained trapped in her dependence on older 
industries that could no longer support her until newer for.ms of 
engineering began to be established from around 1950 (Lenman, 1977, 204). 
A rival interpretation has recently been advanced by 
Kendrick et al, who argue that: 
(II) See Glynn and Oxborrow (op cit, 105-110) and Hobsbaum (op cit, 
218-9)for other examples of the new consumer products. In 
contrast, see Harvie's account of the decline of the old staple 
industries in Scotland, both before and after the Second World War 
(op cit, 168-174). 
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'In terms of the pattern of industrial employment 
the most striking aspect of the Scottish distribution 
has been its similarity to that of Britain a~ a 
whole. Contrary to .conventional wisdom, Scotland 
as a ~-Thole ranks among the least specialised re~i0n s 
of Britian, and in many respects, its industrial 
structure is ·the most diversified of them all, 
(Kendrick et al, 1983, 20) (12) 
This radically different conclusion is based on examlnlng positive 
percentage differences (p,p.d.'s) ie a measure of where Britain exceeds 
144 
Scotland, for two time series scores: those for industrial sectors (Lee, 1979) 
and socio-economic groups (Payne, 1977). lVhile the authors present 
a great deal of interesting mate~ial, particularly on ~ub-regional 
variations (see also Kendrick et al, 1982b), their conclusions are 
closely tied to the way in which they use the p.p.d. calculations. 
Thus their main evidence relates to male and female employment within 
manufacturing, in a comparison of Britain and Scotland ,~-Thereas much of 
the present study is concerned with male employment across all sectors 
ln a comparison of Scotland with England and Wales. Second, the p.p.d. 
lS a reasonable indicator of overall differences, but a poor indicator 
of where within a set of variations the chief source of difference 
lies. 
For example, if we consider 1851 and 1911, Scotland had 
p.p.d.'s of 12,3 and 10.3 with Britain as a whole (Kendrick et al, 1983, 
7 and 22). That means that there was a growing similarity between the 
two countries~ but the nature of that similarity (or difference) was 
very different across the two time points. In 1851, the bulk of 
the differences lay in Scotland's overconnnitment to textiles C44.4% to 
(12) Paradoxically, one could argue that if Scotland is the region most 
like Britain as a whole, this suggests that it is closest to 
being a fully developed society in its own right. 
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32.2%}: if we remove that industry, and recalcul~te the percentages for 
the remaining industries, the· new p.p,d, i's 6.2 not 12,.3, In other 
words, apart from textiles, the two areas were not greatly dissimilar 
on this measure, with no contribution to the p.p.d, from ship~buildingr 
the me.tal trades, or mining because these have excesses in S<:_o_!:_l_a_~~' 
rather than excesses in Britain Cthe p,p,d, could of course be 
calculated in reverse so th~t these sectors would show-up directly as 
contributions to the Scottish p.p,d.J, 
In contrast, the 1911 distribution shows textiles much more 
in line, 19,3% in Scotland and 18,1% in Britain so removing the textile 
sector would not chan9e the other percentages and therefore the p,p,d. 
very much, The p.p.d, of 10.3 must be produced by ot.h:er variations, so 
that while the textile factor produces a closer similarity, that one 
factor masks a number o~ other changes. For example~ mining, metals 
and ship..-building comprised 38.8% of Scotland's manufacturing 
employment in 1911, as against 30% in Britain. 60 years before the 
respective figures were 18,1% and 19~4%, 
This argument refers to manufacturing, not to o.ther sectors, 
but we can extend this by using Kendrick et al~s Table 6 (o!' cit,27). 
This shows that manufacturing for 1911 Cold series) provided 52.6% of 
Scottish employment, and 47.8% of Britaints employment. Mining, metals 
and ship-building therefore catered for 20.4% of all Scottish employment, 
compared with 14.3% in Britain as whole. Of course, that 14.3% or 2,5 
million workers owed a lot to Scotland; 0,4 million or over 2 of the 
14.3 percentage points. 
Althou9h the methodology used by Kendrick et al does not 
therefore reveal all aspects of Angl6-Scottish differences, one can 
nonetheless accept their first conclusion (?~~~!' 9-lO) that at the 
turn of the century, Scotland was uniquely well-placed to exploit the 
Empire markets. Where one would wish to differ is in their analysis of 
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the period after the First World War, when they underestimate the 
extent to which_ Scotland remained tied to the old staples until recent 
times. It would oe wrong however, to over~emphasi'se the alternative 
v1.ew. In the first place, as· their data show, the under-:-representative 
proportions of servi:ce employment begin to disappear during this century,_ 
and most of the broad brush changes· move in parallel (op cit, 2.7). 
Second, even though there was disproportionate dependence on 
increasingly non't"viable old' staple industries, there were consideraole 
changes taking place even in - or even arguably because of .,.. the 
Depression. 
First, as implied above, even existing industries introduced 
new processes, such as the new manganese steel alloys in steel-:-making, 
and changes in hull design 1.n ship-building. These, combined with 
labour lay-offs, ensured that productivity was actually increased: 
in fact 
'productivity increases were greatest in the primary 
and secondary sectors of the economy •.. Some of 
the old staple industri_es made remarkable increases 
in productivity'(Glynn and Oxborrow, op cit, 91-92). 
Changes in product and production process mean changes in the type and 
amount of labour required. 
Second, the economy experienced a drastic concentration of 
ownership and control. The pre.,-war economy, outside of heavy engineering 
had been 
'wedded to the small or medium sized, highly specialized 
family-operated and family-financed, and competitive 
firm •.. in 1914 Britain was perhaps the least 
concentrated of the great industrial economies. 
and in 1939 one of the most'(Hobsbaum, op cit, 214) .. 
Bj that latter year, Pollard could observe that ~as a feature of industrial 
and commercial organisation, free competition has nearly disappeared from 
the. British scene' (Pollard, 1972, 168). The combination of new 
technology with capital concentration resulted in new giant combines: of 
the top 20 firms in 1965, 19 were 20th century creations. Shell, BATs, 
Imperial Tobacco, and Courtaulds have Edwardian origins; ICI, AEI, 
·Ford, Bowater, and GKN started between the wars, a period which also 
saw the emergence of major banking and insurance groups. Hobsbaum 
argues that 
'the economic concentration which took place between 
the wars cannot be primarily justified on grounds· 
of efficiency and progress. It was ovenvhelmingly 
restrictive, defensive, and protective. It was a 
blind response to depression, which aimed at 
maintaining profits high by eliminating competition, 
or at accumulating great clusters of miscellaneous 
capital which were in no sense productively more 
rational than their original individual components, 
but which provided financiers with investments for 
surplus capital or with the profits of company 
promotion. Britain became a non~competing country 
at home as well as abroad' (op cit, 17). 
These changes received active backing from the government (Stevenson, 
1977, 19-21). 
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The occupational implications of these changes are considerable. 
At first between the wars and then after the Second World War, large 
organisations required bureaucratic systems of operation: face to face 
communication was replaced by written records, vastly expanding the 
army of white collar workers. At the same time, economies of scale 
permitted greater specialisation, so that new specialisms developed out 
of increased division of labour. As the theory of industrial society 
suggests, the owner no longer manages, the manager no longer buys, or 
does the accounts, or hires and fires, or watches over the test bench or 
laboratory. The age of the professional expert is born. Large 
organisations also have greater capital resources, so that investment ~n 
new, more expensive technologies is at least in principle much eas~er 
to achieve. This aga~n promotes occupational change either by creating 
new skills (the new machining techniques referred to above, or by 
deskilling previously skilled manual tasks Cas in large-scale furniture-. 
making). 
The third maJor industrial change which dates from this period 
is the growth of a governmental apparatus to cope with greater state 
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intervention ~n regulation, taxation, and the provision of welfare 
services. Government controls during the First World War had acquainted 
the country with the possibilities- for intervention. Commissions on the 
collapsing coal and ship-building industries advocated concentration and 
reduction in capacity, which_was achieved in the second case. 
The Special Areas and Special Areas Amendment Acts- also empowered regional 
development programmes to the 1930's even if their impact until the 
19.40' s and 1950's was -not great (see Slaven, ·op cit), Following the 
Second World War, Scotland as part of Britain saw the nationalisation 
of the power, rail, and iron and steel industries, the establishment of 
a National Health Service, expanded unemployment benefit provision, 
increased council house building, a new towns policy, a change in 
educational provision and greater local and national government 
administrative involvement in planning and regional development 
(see Harvie, op cit, 169-70). These new ventures, together with a 
leisure industry based on shorter working hours and greater affluence 
constitute an entirely new service sector, with new kinds of occupations, 
Thus the old occupational structure, tied to the old staple industries, 
was modified not just by their economic decline, but by the growth of 
whole new enterprises requiring a different workforce~JJ)_ Employment 
dependent on the old staples thus \vas in relative decline, whatever 
their absolute fate at the hands of market forces. 
It is important to balance these general trends against the 
actual experiences of Scotland. Nationalis·ation, for example, did not 
(13) 
The 'new' workforce was needed for example in offices, a type of 
work not best suited for redundant miners. 
result in the central offices of the new organisations being located in 
Glasgow or Edinburgh (LMS and LNER became ultimately the London-
based British Rail), while Shell's research and development sections are 
not based in Grangemouth along with its refinery. When Brunner-Mond, 
United Alkali and Nobels became ICI, control and the occupations of 
control went to England. The 'branch plant,, syndrome may provide a 
route for Scots to high status occupations, but -it is a high road that 
leads to England~_l4) The Scottish occupational structure is modified 
by concentration of capital and technological development, but because 
of the metropolitan pull of South-East England, less so than the theory 
of industrial society might suggest. 
Nor does the branch plant syndrome extend merely to the 
control of Scottish capital by the English. From the late 1930's it has 
been Government policy to move 'work to the workers'. Slaven 
(1975) identifies 16 new Scottish factories for external companies 
resulting from state intervention by 1940, and the establishment of new 
towns (Cumbernauld, Glenrothes etc) and a vigorous campaign following 
the publication of the Toothill Report (1961) saw an influx of 
international - and particularly American - capital. 10 American firms 
set up plants during the 1940's, and the total was over 40 by 1960, By 
1973, the number had reached 148, employing 15% of Scotland's 
manufacturing labour force, and almost a third of new jobs created post-
war (Harvie, op cit). Firn (1975) and Scott and Hughes (1975) have also 
documented this shift ~n control of Scottish industry away from the 
(14) American firms employing over 87,000 workers in Scotland hired 
an average of 50 Scottish graduates a year in the late 1960's 
(Hargrave, 1971, 32). 
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indigenous capitalist class. Scottish capital is now doubly 
internationalised; the export o~ capital at the end of the last century 
has been matched by the import of capital in the middle of the 20th 
century. 
The introduction of ~orei9n capital under Government schemes 
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helped to build up light and electrical en9ineering during the 1950~s 
and 1960's, and went some way· to lay the basis for localised 
developments in electronics in the lq7o'~. It has not, however, been 
without problems, Firms like National Cash Register in Dundee, or Singer 
in Clydebank, provided largely female employment so that male 
unemployment is not 'solved'. Nor are the long term prospects assured. 
In the face of recessionr branch plants are vulnerable to closure 
decisions taken elsewhere: NCR, Timex, $inger, and Monsanto are but a 
few of the major companies which have developed subsidiaries on the 
basis of fiscal inducements, only to close down their Scottish 
operations while maintaining their original operations intact when world 
trade contracted in the 1970's. The new plants provided only a limited 
range of occupations (management was almost always introduced from 
outside Scotland) for only a limited period. They did not form the basis 
for careers or life strategies. 
To some extent, the same use of foreign investment was also 
made in England, in areas like the Nnrth East, and in South Wales. 
However, the.large English-based co~ines were able to operate in a 
larger market and the greater diversity of the English economy 
cushioned merry of the upheavals. The Scottish economy remained less 
diversified for much longer, and its industrial history over the last 
sixty years has constrained employment opportunities, so giving the 
Scots a distinctive set of mobility life-chances if they wish to work 
and live in th.eir own country. 
· Idus·trial Employment 
This can be seen by contrasting industrial employment 
between Scotland a,nd Engla,nd (where developments happened 'faster') and 
between the Census years of 1921 and 1971 which bracket the life 
experience of the men in the Scottish sample. 14% of Scotland'·s· 
workforce was directly employed in 1921 in ship-building and iron and 
steel production, with a further proportion in allied trades, which was 
serving the needs of these two groups. The rest of the economy was 
relatively undiversified: 
Table 4.2 A comparison of the Industrial bases of Male Employment 
in Scotbnd arid England and llales, 1921 and 1971 
1921 19Jl 
SCOTLAND ENGLAND SCOTLAND ENGLAND 
Agriculture, Fishing 
Mining, Quarrying 
Ship-building, Iron . 
and Steel 
Other Engineering 
Textiles, Clothing 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 
Other Manufacture 
Building 
Transport 
Distribution, Commerce 
Misc., Service 
Professional Services 
Admin and Defence 
Other 
12.1 
l1,5 
14.1 
8.6 
5,3 
3.2 
6.5 
4.3 
9.7 
12.1 
3,6 
2.3 
6.4 
0.1 
n 1,521,337 
n = 
AND WALES AND WALES 
8.9 5.7 3.3 
10.1 2.6 2.5 
5.4 6.1 3.4 
10.5 13,] 11.2 
7,1 3,0 3.2 
3,2 4,4 2,8 
7,5 8,4 17,5 
5.9 12.3 10.3 
9..6 8.7 8.6 
14,0 13.1 15,0 
7,8 6.5 ],2 
2.3 7.2 6.9 
8.1 7.9 7.4 
0.1 0.3 0.6 
n = 1,350,100 
12,127,118 n = 13,681,450 
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As Table. 4. 2 shows, more Scots worked m primary industry (including 
mining) than in Eng'l.and and Wales (23% to 19%) and fewer in general 
manufacture, other engineering trades, distribution and commerce, 
public administration and defence, and miscellaneous serv~ces. The 
serv~ce and distribution sectors are also not-iceably different: ~n 
Scotland, these were just under 25% of all male jobs; but in England 
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and Wales they made up 32%. At the start of the contemporary period then, 
the two economies were structurally different, although of course each 
area was contributing economic functions to the other (see also Jones, 
1977, 402-3)_. 
By 1971, the national differences had changed. Primary 
industry had shrunk to less than 7%, and showed only a small excess 
over the England and Wales figure. General engineering was now more 
important in Scotland, while ships and metals had virtually disappeared 
Although services and distribution still provided more employment south 
of the border, the difference had decreased to only a couple of 
percentage points. The two countries had become modernized, and ~n 
that re1pect more alike (,see also Kendrick et al, 1983). 
This process of change since 1921 has not been a simple or uniform 
one. Agriculture and Fishing have dropped from just under 184,000 jobs 
to 76,800; Mining from 175,000 to 35,620; ship-building and steel 
(currently under further review) from 214,500 to 82,800. In 1921, 
these three sectors had over 38% of Scottish jobs. By 1931, at a time 
of massive unemployment, only Agriculture and Fishing was holding its 
position while the other two industries had contracted to about 75% of 
their previous s~ze. By 1951 all three were in decline and this has 
continued to the present; it has steepened slightly between 1961 and 
1971. At the latter census, only 14.4% of male Scots were working 
in the three industries which had formerly provided 38% of the jobs 
Table 4. 3 Industrial Base, Scotland 1921,1951. 1961 and 1971. (excluding out of work) -:- Male Jobs. 
Agriculture 
Mining, Quarrying 
Ship-building, 
Iron and Steel 
Other Engineering 
Textiles, Clothing 
Food, Drink, 
Tobacco 
Other Manufacture 
Building 
Transport 
Distribution 
and Commerce 
Misc. Services 
Professional 
Services 
Admin and Defence 
Other 
1921 
12.1 
ll.5 
14,1 
8.6 
5.3 
3,2 
6,5 
4,3 
9,7 
12,1 
3,6 
2.3 
6.4 
0.1 
1931 
13.1 
8,6 
6.3 
6.8 
4.7 
3,5 
7.6 
6,4 
ll,2 
16,8 
5,5 
3.9 
5.4 
0.2 
1951 
9.6 
6,4 
8,6 
12,4 
4.0 
8.4 
9,5 
10,0 
12,3 
4.1 
7.0 
0.1 
'1961 
7,8 
5,6 
7.8 
.ll.4 
3.2 
7. 9_ 
11.0 
9.9 
14.1 
5,9 
5.3 
6,4 
0.4 
1971 
5,7 
2,6 
6.1 
13.7 
3.0 
4,4 
8.4 
12,3 
8,7 
13,1 
6,5 
7.2 
7.9 
0.3 
n = n = n = n = n = 
1,121,337 1,253,403* 1,526,754 1,504,210 1,350,100 
* Source: 1951 Census reports, Table 1, p XXIX adjusted totals, 
except for Ship-building and Iron and Steel, which are not 
available in this form, and are therefore unadjusted. 
In the 1931 Census 65,788 men ''in" these indus·tries '"ere 
jobless, and only 80,188 were in work - an industry 
unemployment rate of over 45%. 
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Any career structures or ,life plans based on the organisations in these 
industries would have required major re-orientation. 
The other industries of Scotland show a more mixed pattern~ 
Transport has fluctuated narrowly around the 10% mark, which is not 
unlike England and Wales, while Textiles and related trades have 
declined consistently from 5.3% to 3.0%. Only Building and 
Professional Services show a consistent increase, with both being 
nearly 3 times as important in 1971 than in 1921. 
Although these clear trends are more appealing, the remaining 
industries are of interest in a different way. '·Other engineeringj, 
Foods, 'other manufactures', Administration and Defence, Distribution, 
and Miscellaneous Services all show variations over the period. 1961 
seems to mark a relative.and absolute fall-back on steady growth, and 
while 1971 had in the case of the first four of these industries shown 
a recovery of their growth, the inter-censal contraction and expansion 
has been between 12,000 and 25,000 jobs 1n each industry. Distribution 
and Miscellaneous Services have troughs in 195l.and the former a 
compensating peak in 1961. This may be an elaborate way of saying what 
should be obvious: a modern industrial society not only goes through 
booms and depressions, and changes 1n its structural balance, but 
that its various sectors display trends of expans1on and contraction 
at varying rates. 
Although there are no very clear patterns, there is an 
interesting underlying current of change which can be detected by 
calculating percentage differences between censuses. The largest 
difference (in p.p.d. terms) is between 1921 and 1931: as Table 4.3 
deals with those actually in work, this is not surprising, because as 
argued earlier unemployment was differentially associated with various 
industries. Next in magnitude comes the twenty-year gap between 1931 
and 1951, but if this is averaged out by dividing it by two, the mean 
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decadel rate of change 1.s half that of the J920~s, and what is more, 
about the same for the 1950 Is' I.e. about ] percentage points. Finally 
between 1961 and 1971, the pace of change 1ncreases to a p.p.d. of 
over 10. A similar conclusion is dra~vn by Kendrick et al ("1983, 12). 
But as we have just seen, these p.p.d.ts are made up of a 
range of sectoral changes. The main changes can be listed as follows: 
Table 4.4~ Main Sectoral Changes 
Census Period 
1921 - 1931 
1931 - 1951 
1951 - 1961 
1961 - 1971 
Increases 
Distribution and 
Corrunerce 
Building, other 
Engineering 
Building, Services 
Building, Services, 
other Engineering 
Decreases 
Ship-building, Metals, 
Mining 
Distribution and 
Commerce, Agriculuture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture, Mining 
Ship-building 
This shows that both new employment opportunites, and reduced 
opportunities in other fields, varied, so that men starting work at 
different periods would have different exper1.ences. Not least, the 
opportunity structure typical of the earlier years, in heavy industry 
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and agriculture, is replaced, and services become a feature, particularly 
in the 1960's when the rate of change increased. 
Lesser and Silvey (1950) have argued that the inter-war period 
was marked by several kinds of industrial decline. Not only were the 
old staples in decline - as they were elsewhere in Britain ~ but of 
equal importance was the failure of the 'expanding manufacturing 
industries' to expand as rapidly as in the South. This they attribute 
largely to product failure, ie a failure to produce the right kinds of 
goods for available markets. Product failure was compounded by 
'contagion': particularly in an economy dependent on a small range of 
. industri.es, poor performance by even one large firm depresses local 
demand, dragging down both those trades servicing the key firm, and 
those not directly connected but reliant on the local market (1950, 
173-4). Lesser and Silvey, and Jones (1977) talking about 1971, also 
make the point that within industrial classifications are contained 
considerable variation of product and organisation: for example the 
Scottish iron and steel industry relied on older labour-intensive 
production methods to produce relatively old-fashioned alloys, and 
the branch plant syndroli'.e. referred to above· means that Scottish nlant 
employed more workers and fewer managers than did equivalent factories 
in England. Jones appears to give these technological and 
organizational factors a larger part to play in sectoral composition. 
Having examined the 1971 Census socio-economic and industrial order 
data using shift-share analysis to identify between industrial sector, 
and use of occupations within sector, differences,he concludes that, 
'Scotland's relative excess of 'undesirable' jobs 
has been, in the recent past, due as much to the 
internal structure of her industries as to the 
industrial distribution of the labour force' 
(Jones, 1977, 405). 
Kendrick et al (1982b, 1983) adopt a similar position, but do not 
advance an explanation for why the occupational structures differ if it 
is not due to industrial composition. Their analysis deals with the 
period 1961 to 1971 in some detail (1982b, 95-132) leading to the 
conclusion that for this particular decade, while professional and 
scientific services (notably Health and Education) were a very important 
industrial factor, and one can discern the beginning of new 
technological innovation that was to follow, 
'For the non-manual groups it is safe to say that 
the occupational component of change predominated 
for male manual workers, industrial change tended 
to be the main factor although the effect of 
occupational change was almost as great' (op cit, 95). 
156 
157 
Although the Kendrick et al analysis may appear to emphasis 
the occupational rather than the sectoral, it would be wrong to attach 
too much weight to this. First, their evidence by no means dismisses 
the sectoral effect, and second, as we have seen, the 1960's differ 
from earlier decades. One cannot extrapolate from one to the other. A 
third factor to be born in mind i-s that the occupational effects and 
the industrial effects are products of particular historical processes 
which have operated differentially in the two countries, not least 
because of their close proximity and mutually interacting histories. 
There remain two other aspects of those histories which might arguably 
effect mobility which can best be dealt with here, before exploring 
occupational change in more depth in the next chapter. 
Not working in Scotland 
The two outstanding issues are unemployment and emigration, 
both of which can be seen as outcomes of limited occupational opportunity. 
Table 4.5 gives unemployment rates for Scotland, which are 
consistently higher than those in Britain as a whole, and even by current 
standards, exceptionally high in the years 1923 (the first year of 
reliable figures) to 1939 during which time the rate was never less than 
double figures, with a peak in 1932 when one in every 4 Scots was out of 
a job. Since the Second World War Scottish unemployment has run at twice 
the British average. In general, the difference in rates is greatest in 
'good times• : only in 'bad times' does the rest of the British economy 
begin to approach Scottish rates, Thus the lowest post-war Scottish 
rate (2.4%, 1955) is only matched by the two highest years for 
Britain as a whole (2.5%, 1963 and 2.4%, 1967). The most recent figures 
show no change in this relationship. 
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Table 4.5 Unemployment Rates, Scotland and Britain, for Selected Years.* 
Scotland Britain Scotland Britain 
1923 14.3 11.6 1946 4.6 2.4 
1926 16.4 12.3 1950 3.1 1.5 
1927 10.6 9.6 1955 2.4 1.1 
1930 18.5 15.8 1959 4.4 2.2 
1932 27.7 21.9 1963 3.8 2.5 
1935 21.3 15.3 1965 3.0 1.4 
1939 13.5 10.3 1967 3.9 2.4 
* Adapted from Kellas, op cit., Table 9, p 243. 
It should be noted that male unemployment runs consistently higher than 
total umemployment, although not at a constant level of difference 
See H.M.S.O., 197lc, Tables 165 and 166, 
Unemployment in Scotland would have been even higher, had not 
emigration taken place on a large-scale. In as far as there was a 
Government policy to tackle the situation after the First World War, 
it consisted of the hopes of the Cabinet that a simple outflow of 
population, particularly to Canada and Australia, would solve the 
problem. Until the c.hanges of policy brought about by the Depression, 
this might have worked. Large numbers of the Scots have emigrated. (15) 
The question of emigration brings us full circle to this 
chapter's initial concern, namely the notion of Scotland as a unit of 
analysis. For purely pr<Jgmatic reasons, the chances of mobility that are 
(15) Since the First World War, Scotland has lost approximately 1,300,000 
emigrants to the five most favoured destinations of the 1 \.Jhite 
Conunonwealth' and the U.S. The figure is based on data supplied to 
the author by the Embassies and High ·conunissions of the countries, 
and is necessarily to be treated with caution. About 8% of the 
Nuffield Mobility S~mple had been born ~n Scotland. 
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discussed In this study are those for people work;ing in Scotland. The 
Scot born and bred north of the Border who leaves his native shores to 
work abroad, or in England, is excluded, even though he was once 
potentially part of the original supply side of the Scottish labour 
market at one time and is now part of the supply in another place. Of 
course, this problem is not unique; any national s-tudy has the same 
difficulty, although it IS alnost universally ignored (see for example 
Halsey et al (1980) and In particular the index). It only assumes 
prominence here because of the scale of Scottish emigration between 
the wars. We have the unusual situatio-n among mobility studies, of 
a society which has had a declining male workforce(l6), so that we 
need to consider if this creates any special conditions for mobility. 
Even if the migrants are excluded, what effect did their moving have 
on those who stayed behind? 
The first thing to establish is that, despite emigration, 
there has been a surplus of male workers over jobs, as evidence by 
the high unemployment rate. Thus there is not a congruent decline of 
men and jobs so that the opportunity structure remains constant. 
Second, at a conunonsense level, industries contract by shutting down 
plants and making men redundant. In milder forms, posts are frozen: 
chances to change posts are restricted and without growth of 
establishments or technological innovation, promotional avenues are 
blocked. The supply of men remains constant (or increases): the 
supply of occupations contracts. The work force is thus confronted by 
a worsening of its position in the labour market - and thus a worsening 
(16) Despite a higher birthrate between 1921 and 1971, the Scottish 
population grew by only 350,000 or 7.4% compared with 28.6% south 
of the Border; it fell from the equivalent of 12.9% of the 
population of England and \vales to 10.7%. The male labour force 
declined 170,000 over the same 50 years. 
160 
of its class position, While strongly-unionised occupations may 
resist longer, and white-collar employees with contracts hold on in 
greater security, the events between the two wars were of such a scale 
as to outweigh the power of workers' organisation, while the Trade Union's 
political party did little to intervene. (l 7) 
In the general Depression between the wars, there were then 
two classes of depressed worker: the unemployed and those whose mobility 
chances were restricted. Which provided most of the emigrants is an 
open question, but inevitably some of the leavers were highly-trained, 
impatient of constraint, and with ambition: the would-be occupationally 
mobile.(lS) At first sight, this may appear to reduce upward mobility 
rates further, since the "successes" would disappear from Scotland. In 
fact, drawing on economic ideas, this is not necessarily so. If, in a 
situation of unemployment, a man leaves a job to emigrate, this creates 
a vacancy for someone who is unemployed to fill. This emigrant 
ultimately removes one unemployed man from the region, His post may be 
filled by a promotion, or by a new hiring: in both cases it may admit 
(17) Despite the strength of the Labour Movement in Scotland, the close 
identification of Clydeside's M.P.'s with the I.L.P. meant. that 
Scotland was effectively a political wilderness even in the early 
days of Labour Government. 
(lS) This is not to argue that migrants are the 'best' of any society, 
and that the less able, less educated, less imaginative and less 
achievement-oriented are left behind. Such an impression - to be 
found for example in Erikson (1972, 22-24), Blau and Duncan (1967, 
chapters 6 and 7) or Uhlenberg (1973, 296-311) - owes much to the 
conspicuous success of English-speaking migrants to the USA (as 
against the less successful European Peasant migrant - see Richmond 
(1969,267-296) and Thomas (1973, chapter IX)). It also reflects the 
fact that internal migration over long distances is primarily a 
middle class phenomenon, because of the organisational contexts 
of many middle class jobs (Watson, 1964, 149 and 153-4; Payne, 197Jh). 
It is typically such 'organisation men' who cannot directly inherit 
their positions, and therefore are recruited from a wider range 
of backgrounds. Not least, most sociologjsts fall into this latter 
category, and maybe predisposed to see all migrants· as 'stars'! 
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someone poorer qualified, or equally qualified but.younger than his 
predecessor when he s~arted. So the net effect is to allow easier 
access to the vacated post, much as ~n the manner of the American 
South where whites at g~ven occupational levels have lower educational 
qualifications than whites in the North. 
But this is to assume that the post is filled. Bet~een the 
two wars this was not always true. Thus, while stayers could be expected 
to have higher achievement for, say, lower qualifications this would 
not be as marked in the inter-war period as in the American South where 
a power structure exists to reinforce their positi·on. A second point 
~s that every man who leaves removes his spending power from the country, 
so reducing demand, Thus 
'there will be a multiplier effect on employment; and 
my guess is that, in a typical British region, one 
extra man will lose his job for every s~x or seven 
who go elsewhere' (Brown, 1969, 236). 
This again will restrict the "\-lhi te-Southener Effect", so that 
if there ~s an effect, it can be looked for in the latter 20 years, 
rather than earlier. The loss of migrants, then, sets up a number of 
processes, both increasing and decreasing mobility with the result that 
their empirical detection is almost impossible, even if this represents 
a further disiinctlve feature of Scottish ~ociety. 
Scotland: a separate ·unit of analysis 
The strong emphasis on grounding the nobility analysis in 
Scottish social conditions, which as Annendixii explains, has been one 
of the distinctive features of the present study, is the outcome of an 
empirical and historical perspective on social events. Such an approach 
relies more on the concrete than the abstract, and the absolute 
complexity of social life seems to the author to demand descriptions and 
explanations that may sometimes be lac~ing in generality but are at least 
grounded in everyday experience. It may also owe something to a 
resistance to an over-metropolitanised and simplified view of British 
society. 
The argument that Scottish society has a characteristic 
institutional and cultural existence and history, made in the first 
part of this chapter, seems well established. The argument for an 
analysis of economic phenomena on a separate basis is less clear: it 
can only be justified in terms of Scotland's connections with 
international capitalism, and the historical effects of its integration 
into that world-system, in particular with the English economy, This 
argument lies midway between the view that Scotland has been 
dependent on, or subordinate to English interests since the Act of Union 
(Dickson, 1980, 90) and the contrary view that Scotland~s development is 
best understood as a example of an industrial society, only marginally 
connected to England (Kendrick et al, 1983, 21). The position adopted 
is closer to Lenman's judgement that Scotland has 'developed a very 
specialised regional branch of the British economy' (1977, 204), an 
economic position overlaid with cultural specifics so that Scotland 
can be treated separately (but still within a wider framework of 
international markets and capital flows). 
Thus the second half of this chapter has tried to explore 
features which make the Scottish economy unlike the English. This 
has served three purposes. First, it has shown that one cannot simply 
generalise from one country to the other - as Goldthorpe (1980) implies. 
Second, even if Scotland can be neatly classified as an 'industrial 
society', there are variations within that type that require 
consideration. Finally, since Scotland is regarded as both typical and 
unique, a separate analysis of her occupational structure and mobility 
is justified. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Scotland: the occupational structure 
A discussion of industrial employment, although commonly used to 
depict occupations (see Chapter 3 above), provides only a partial picture 
of how groupings at various skill levels have expanded or contracted. 
The Census, albeit with confusing changes of categorisation, can be adapted to 
produce a decennial time-series which deals directly with occupations. This 
forms the basis of the present chapter, and can be used both for reference 
in the later analysis of occupational mobility, and as an empirical 'test' 
for the theories outlined in the previous two chapters. The census data for 
the years 1921 to 1971 (1941 excepted) cover the working lives of the men in 
the sample (the oldest respondent was born in 1909 and began work in the early 
1920's) and also coincide with the economic and social changes that have been 
discussed in the last few pages. It should be remembered however, that 
direct comparison between census data and the sample data reported later 
cannot be made for technical reasons of classification, time points, and ages 
of the populations concerned. 
A number of sources are already available for an examination of this 
period. Routh (1951) deals with the years up to 1951 (and subsequently to 1971 
(1980)) while Bain (1972) has extended the analysis to include the 1966 sample 
census. However, both deal with Great Britain as a whole. More recently Goldthorpe 
and Llewellyn (1977) and Brown (1978) have produced tabulations for England and 
Wales. None of these quite meets present needs, so that it is necessary to return to 
the Census Reports and carryout a re-analysis(!). This is a very time-consuming 
operation and care needs to be taken to ensure continuity in categorisation, as clas: 
ifications have changed several time~ most notably in 1951 and 1961 (see below). 
(1) Although the censuses have recorded occupations (with some modifications) 
since the 19th Century, its use of larger aggregates of similar occupations 
is a recent innovation. 'Social Class' tables were first prepared for 
1951, and then significantly changed in 1961, which year also saw the 
introduction of Socio-Economic Groups'. These in turn were redefined in 
1971. Therefore to present a summary of occupational change in a 
manageable form requires a reanalysis of the original occupational tables. 
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The units chosen for the analysis are based on the Registrar 
General's Socio-Economic Groups (SEGs) as used in the 1971 Census (ID·ISO 197la). 
This schema identifies 17 groups on the basis of their occupations and 
the status attached to them. Like all occupational classifications, they have 
their minor peculiarities (Bechhofer,l969, Hope and Goldthorpe, 1974, 22-7); 
in this account 'armed forces' (which does not differentiate officers from 
other ranks) and the residual category 17 of 'unclassified' persons are 
discarded, and the very small numbers in the 'large' proprietors and managers 
category (SEGl) have heen merged with the 'small' proprietors and managers 
category (SEG2). ( 2) This leaves 14 categories. Previous census 
Occupational Tables were then reprocessed to obtain comparable groupings. To 
achieve this requires the re-classification of over 900 occupational categories, 
each ~.;rith four or more grades of seniority, at each census point. Obviously, 
the.level of comparision with which one works is limited: if it 1s too precise, 
the accuracy. of the reconstruction becomes crucially important, whereas if 
it 1s too general, the point of the exercise is lost. (3) 
As noted below (fo~tnote (4)) this use of census material is 
not without its problems. As Kendrick et al have observed prior to using 
the data presented 1n this chapter (and published in a recent paper: See 
(2) Although the SEGs contain an 'own-account workers' category, the classifica-
tion .does not. othenrise differentiate between those who own and those 
who merely manage enterprises. Its blindness to property obviously 
restricts any consideration of m·mership, or the managerialism thesis 
in the present context. 
Full details of the SEG classifica~ion are to found 1n the 
Classification of Occupations 1970 (HNSO 197lb), but the labels used 1n 
this section should be self-explanatory. 
(3) The generation of the time-series is onerous, requiring great arithmetical 
care, rather than difficult. It took several man-weeks of \vork for the 
author to devise the method and produce the figures, and almost as long 
for a colleague, John Mackenzie, to replicate the process using the same 
procedures (incidentally producing identical totals). The prefaces to 
the reports and later the classifications of occupations give a great 
deal of guidance about modifications of definitions (the 1961 Census 
General Report (HHSO 1968, 184-193) is particularly useful). The author 
also discussed his time-series with personnel at Titchfield and 
Edinburgh who had long experience of occupational coding, to mutual 
agreement on the interpretations made. The essence of the comparability 
problem lies in the changes to classifications in 1951 (1921 and 1931 
are very similar) and again in 1961 (1961 and 1971 are also very similar 
... / (3) Contd. 
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Payne 1977a), there are two types of problem with such an exercise. The 
first is methodological: without returning to the original raw data, the 
earlier census information can never be exactly translated into the 1971 
categories. However careful and detailed one may be with the technical 
procedures , 
'All one has to go on in performing the translation 
are common-sense assumptions of continuity between 
meanings, the concrete referents, of the component 
occupational titles of the two classifications' 
(Kendrick et al 1983, 17). 
The second problem is an epistemological one. Even if one 
could solve the technical difficulties, the time-series still requires 
acceptance that the same conceptual category can be applied to phenomena 
fifty years apart. Industrial change changes the content and standing of 
occupations, so that only a detailed historical examination of every 
occupation over 50 years could even begin to tackle this problem of 
historical comparison. The reader must therefore proceed with all due 
caution; recognising that as ~n all such time-series, the new data can 
provide only a basic outline of a very complicated process. 
(3) 
cant/ 
at an occupational level). The method adopted was to take each entry 
in the early tables, and to search for its closest equivalent in the 
Classification of Occupations 1970 (HMSO, 1971-b). In the vast majority of 
cases the same titles occured in both; for example 'rivetter' can be 
found in both, even if the specific work tasks have evolved in the interim 
(code 146 in 1921 and code 02lin 1971). The 1921 rivetter can then be 
allocated to the same SEG as his 1971 equivalent by consulting the SEG 
listings at the rear of the Classification of Occupation 1970. Fortunately 
the earlier published tables use a more detailed listing of occupations 
than do modern reports; 1921 has over 900 occupational categories, 
reducing to 600 in 1951 and around 200 in 1961. Thus the data are presented 
in greater precision for the tables requiring modification, with over 900 
row entries in an occupational table running to nearly forty foolscap 
pages for the national level \::OUilt. (see Census 1921 Scotland 
Occupation and Indus.tries 'leport pp 12-50). Th~s wealth of information for 
the early years makes it easier to identify equivalents and to aggregate 
accurately into the 1971 SEGs. 
One limitation to this process concerneci managers. The tables do not 
distinguish between managers of large and small operations. This distinction 
in the later tables was therefore abandoned to maintain comparability at 
the expense of detail. The result may be to inflate the number of 'real' 
managers with wide responsibilities. After 1921, tables show 
managerial status crosstabulated against occupation, so that there 
is a check against any person exercising managerial functions being 
omitted because the word 'manager' was not part of their main job title. 
(3) ... /Contd. 
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The general format of the SEGs identifies six groups of non-
manual workers and five groups of manual workers. The former consist 
of proprietors and managers; self-employed professionals; employed 
professionals; semi-professionals (including technicians and white 
collar supervisors); supervisors; and junior non-manual workers-mainly 
clerical. Manual workers are grouped into skilled workers; semi-skilled 
workers; unskilled workers; agriculture workers; and personal service 
workers (mainly servants and catering employees). The three remaining 
groups are large farmers (with employees), small farmers, and 
'workers on their own account' (i.e. the non-professional, non-farm, 
self-employed). For convenience, the exact SEG titles used below are 
slightly different from the census but this is intended as a convenient 
shorthand: the SEG number remains the same. 
The advantages of these categories should be fairly obvious. 
Since the debate about 'skill levels' in modern society has been conducted 
1n an imprecise fashion (see Chapters 2 and 3) there is no guidance as 
to what, sa~ an 'upgrading of skill levels' means or does not mean in 
empirical terms. At least the SEGs provide a specific framework in whi·ch 
to identify 'skilled manual workers' as having -or not having - the 
3. 
Contd. 
The same cross-referencing is possible for foremen and supervisors from 
1931 on, while '~vorking on own account' is a concept used throughout (SEG 
12 in 197.1). SEG 11, unskilled manual work, consists of jobs 
insufficiently specified to warrant a title: it is possible that 
amalgamating· 'labourers' and 'other workers' may, with the reclassifications 
of 1951 and 1961, produce some artefactual error in the boundaries 
between unskilled and semi-skilled manaual workers (SEG 10)· 
In all cases, the data refer to the population in or seeking work. This 
condition, which later Censuses refer to as 'economically-activ~ excludes 
those in full-time education or who are retire~ but includes the unemployed. 
It therefore is not responsive to short term cyclical changes in employment 
such as the Depression of 1931, except to the extent that people may record 
themselves as workers in an occupation which in fact is a temporary 
expedient job, taken because they are unemployed in their main occupation. Th' 
time series, in other words,refers to an amalgam of characteristics of the 
labour force and the occupational opportunities,rather than to one or the 
other. Clearly the time series must be used with caution. But as is argued 
later, at the level of SEGs (i.e. in practice sub-division into 14 categories· 
the degree of precision required is not as great as if one used many more 
categories. Surprisingly few occupations per se are added or subtracted 
from the listings: 'crofter-fishermen' and 'crofter-farmers' were amalgamated 
in 1961 into 'crofters 1., for instance and 'computer· programmer' \vas added in 
1951. It is this continuity, together with the greater detail of the 
earlier reports, which provides the solid basis for the development of 
the time series. 
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level of skill to which others are upgraded. Even though the original 
formulations did not intend to refer to the conventions of the 
British Census, this course of action should at least serve to clarify the 
range of meanings which could have been intended. ( 4) At the same time, the 
construction of the categories are reasonably visible. In the past, the 
reader has been given little guidance whether.one man's 'administrative employees 
in the non-agricultural sector' is the same as another man's 'white collar' and 
'professional workers'. Most commentators on occupational transition have 
been willing to take such equivalences as non-problematic (see Garnsey, 1975, 
308) despite a more general sensitivity to such nuances by the rest of 
sociology. 
( 4) One critic has objected to this kind of analysis, arguing that the changes 
in categorisation between censuses makes it impossible to reconstruct a 
valid times series, and (more suprisingly) that the whole enterprise of 
testing occupational transition in the Britain of this century is misguided. 
Jones (1977) invokes Mitchell and H. Jones'comment on the changes between 
1951 and 1961 as evidence that a time series cannot be established 'even 
between fairly large aggregates of occupational codes'. However, the 
original statement runs to several tightly argued pages (Mitchell & H. Jones: 
1971, 184-93) the main thrust of which is that direct comparison of the 1951 
and 1961 Census class tables is not possible. Indeed the General Report 
of the 1961 Qensus contains a comparison based on a reclassification, which 
indicates that the census statisticians themselves were satisfied that a 
time series was feasible, provided it was not based on a simplistic reading 
of the basic occupational tables with different systems of classification. 
In the second place, the quotation used by Jones refers to a table which 
lists 260 occupational a8gregates organised into about 70 larger 
aggregates, which in turn are aggregated into 29 even larger occupational 
blocks. In this context, what do 'fairly large aggregates of occupational 
codes' (Mitchell and Jones, op cit, 36) emphasis added) mean? The 260, 
the 70, or the 29? The same section refers to some of the occupational 
units (the 260) as 'larger', so it is not at all clear. that the Report 
is referring even to the 29 occupational orders. Jones has made two 
errors of interpretation here: the size of grouping which can be compared 
is much smaller than he implies, and neither Mitchell and Jones, nor the 
General Report, are referring to the much larger 14 SEG's which are used 
here. 
The analysis which follows concentrates on male, female and combined 
distributions for Scotland, as being most relevant to a study of mobility 
. h (5) J.n t at country. At the same time, these can be used as a case study of 
occupational transition in industrial society, as the concluding table below 
specifically demonstrates. (In all cases the figures are for civilian 
populations, excluding the residual 'SEG 17', viz occupations not elsewhere 
classified, and as specified for census enumeration). 
Occupational Transition: Highly-skilled Non-farm Occupations 
The first occupations to be considered are those in ~.rhich expertise derives 
from long periods of education, both formal and informal. Since these are 
not all 'salaried', or 'administrative', or 'professional', they are referred 
to as the 'highly-skilled non-farm occupations' - a title which also avoids 
confusion with the lower skill levels of intermediate or manual occupations. 
The numbers for these at the five census points covering the sixty years since 
the end of the First World War are given in Table 5.1 
(Table 5.1 follows on the next page) 
(5) A parallel discussion of England and Wales can be found elsewhere, on 
which account much of the present section draws (see Payne, 1977a,l2-29) 
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Table 5.1: Highly Skilled Non-Farm Horkers (SEG 1 - 5) in Scotland, by Sex. 
Source: see text above. 
SEGs Occupations Category 1921 1931 1951 
-
1 - 5 All Highly Total 214,660 206,542 262,526 
Skilled, Non- Males 152' 724 143,379 177' 186 
Farm Females 61,936 63,163 85,340 
1 & 2 Employers and Total ll7 ,035 ll4,065 129,043 
Managers Males 106,684 99,988 109,914 
Females 10,351 14,077 19,129 
3 Self- Total 12,416 8,795 9,178 
Employed Males 8,482 4,930 7,763 
Professionals Females 3,934 3,865 1,415 
4 Salaried Total 25,953 21,689 33,470 
Professionals Males 21,666 19,494 28,598 
Females 4,287 2,195 4,872 
5 Semi- Total 59,256 61,993 90,835 
Professionals Males 15,892 18,967 30,911 
Females 43,364 43,026 59' 924 
1 - 15 All Total 2 '114 ,850 2,173,256 2,221,443 
Economically Males 1,480,834 1,517,266 1,540,784 
Active Females 634,016 655,990 680,659 
1961 
332' 720 
224,740 
107,980 
147,470 
121,510 
23,960 
15,340 
14,690 
650 
38,710 
34,660 
4,050 
131,200 
53,880 
77 '320 
2,281,970 
1,550,190 
731,680 
--
1971 
429,820 
282,660 
147,160 
175,930 
141,640 
34,290 
14,410 
13,540 
960 
60,650 
54,380 
6,270 
178,830 
73,190 
105,640 
2,266,410 
1,432,930 
833,480 
i 
i 
I 
I 
....... 
0'\ 
\0 
Ceasidering first the overall totals, the most notable feature of the highly-
skilled non-farm workers is their increase, more than doubling 1n size from 
1921 to 1971, while the economically-active sector increased by less than one 
third. The second feature is that the four categories behaved differently: 
while salaried professionals and em~loyers and managers have very similar 
growth profiles, the self-employed professionals did not follow that pattern 
after the 1931 decline, and the semi-professionals have an equally distinctive 
pattern, one of more rapid expansion than the other groups. This is shown in 
Figure 5.1: it will be remembered that there was no 1941 census. 
Tig. 5.1 Changes in Highly Skilled Non-Farm Occupations, 1921-1971 
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These patterns do not fit the conventional model of occupational 
transition that was encountered in Chapter 3 above. In the first place, 
econom1.c modernisation appears· to have received a severe setback between 
1921 and 1931, with only SEG 5 (the lowest skilled of the five SEGs) showing 
any growth. This is not in accord with two of the propositions that were 
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drawn from Moore, namely that there is an up-grading of average skill levels 
(unless something dramatic has happened in the next skills band to weight up 
that average) and second, that there should be an increased demand for 'prof-
essionals: of all categories, and in particular doctors, engineers and experts 1.n 
organisation'. The theory of industrial society has nothing to say directly 
on'de-modernisation'; the logic of industrialism is uni-directional. 
Second, the increases 1.n this sector during other parts of the period 
are quite different, particularly in the latter twenty years. The theory of 
industrial society gives no explanation of why rates of change should vary so 
much in consecutive decades in the same society. If the two propositions are 
meant to be descriptive statements of what actually takes place, then they are 
inadequate in that they do not describe rates of change. If, on the other hand, 
the propositions are meant to be a theory of industrialisation (and it is not 
clear which is the case for most of the writers mentioned above) then the theory 
does not provide an immediate explanation of why rates of change are so varied, 
as inspection of the graphs demonstrates. 
A further problem involves the different performance of the four 
sub-sectors which jointly comprise the highly-skilled non-farm work-force. These 
sub-sectors are not arbitrary categories but manifest an attempt to identify 
functionally-different occupational units. One of the key propositiom calls 
for an increase in demand for professionals, particularly doctors and experts 
in organisational skills such as lawyers. In Scotland these are two self-
employed professions. If there has also been a greater need for other 
professions (such as engineers, by the same proposition) we would also expect 
at least some (the new, most specialised consultants) to join the ranks of 
the self-employed. SEG 3 should therefore show both an absolute and relative 
grmvth. But as Table 5.1 shows, while absolute growth has been (erratically) 
from 12,500 to 14,400 its relative position has only.fluctuated around half 
a per cent - and fell in the last decade. 
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Conversely, the semi-professions-have out-performed their highly skilled 
partners, overtaking the managers as the largest single highly-skilled group. 
SEG 5 has experienced almost perfect straight-line growth since 1951, and the 
semi-professions are now two-and-a-half times bigger a proportion of the labour 
force than 50 years ago. The propositions of occupational transition do not 
describe/predict/explain this exceptional growth of one particular occupational 
category among the professions (in the American sense): indeed, 1n proposing 
that the 'vast majority' or workers will be in the middle range of skills (the 
remaining part of the other proposition that is relevant here) there is no 
allowance for the shift of nearly 10 percent of the labour force out of the 
middle range of skills and into the highly-skilled sector. Once again, the 
propositions are an inadequate guide to the fluctuations in the basic data, and 
this will be found to be true for the three other broad sectors to be considered. 
It would be perhaps a little unfair to criticise the theory of 
industrial society for not also identifying which of the highly skilled elements 
would expand by means of female labour. Both table 5.1 and fig 5.1 show that 
men and women have had separate experiences of occupational transition. Wo~en 
have made little impact in any of the professional and managerial sector (SEGs 
1-4) except the semi-professions. While their nu~bers in management have 
tripled, this is only an increase of around 20,000 during the time that male 
managers expanded by nearly 60,000. Because the males outnumber the females 
by more than 2 to 1 overall, the male trends are more or less the same as the 
general trends already discussed, except that their growth is little higher in 
all SEGs except SEG 5. Even here, the expansion 1s from 16,000 to 73,000. (6) 
Occupational Transition - The Low Skilled 
To some extent, grouping SEGs 7, 9, 10 and 11 together is a little 
arbitrary •. It could be argued that skilled manual workers, having served 
formal training of periods in most cases lasting up to five years 1n 
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apprenticeship, should be discussed with the 'intermediate' skill sector. Again, 
service workers are a moreheterogeneous group, and are not mainly concerned with 
industrial production, as are the other three. However, all four together 
comprise the non-farm manual sector, and most sociologists accept that manual 
_workers share greater components of life chances than skilled manual workers 
share with white collar or supervisory employees. It might have been more 
consistent to include agricultural workers in this section so that all manual 
workers would be considered together, butthere is more heuristic advantage to 
be gained in concentrating on their. industrial sector and so discussing them 
with farmers. The numbers of workers engaged in the four SEGs is given in 
Table 5.2 
(6) These data refer to women who by the census definition are employed 
full time. Part-timers are excluded, and information is not available to 
quantify this extra labour: one estimate based on Tables 1 and 24 of the 
1961 Census Scotland Occupational Report shows about 85% of women in paid 
employment listing themselves as full time. Women out of paid work under-
register themselves as unemployed: it is possible that they also under-list 
themselves as economically active (i.e. looking for work) in the census 
returns. Unfortunately, as more women have taken paid employment towards 
the end of our time-series, this potential error factor would have a 
differential effect during the fifty years. The present analysis is of course 
not unique in suffering from this defect, although by reporting men and 
women separately one source of confusion is contained. Implicit in this 
analysis is the idea that a -vroman in paid work takes on an independent 
occupational identity, i.e. that she should not be classified as belonging 
to her husband's occupational category. This seems self-evident for purposes 
of labour market analysis, but is more problematic when occupational 
categories are presented as classes. The distinct profiles of female 
employment are further support for the original SMS decision to consider 
male and feamle mobility separately, 
Table 5.2: Non-Farm Hanual Workers (SEGs 7, 9, 10, and ll) in Scotland by Sex. 
Source: see text above 
SEGs Occupations Category 1921 1931 1951 
7' 9' All Hanual Total 1,305,060 1,378,ll0 1,314,810 
10, ll non-farm Males 947,196 984,795 977,042 
workers Females 377,864 393,315 337,768 
7 Service Total 149,232 179,219 ll8' 443 
Workers Males 17,643 28,810 18,360 
Females 131 '589 150,409 100,083 
9 Skilled Total 680,306 633,385 601,890 
Manual Hales 564,570 533,850 518,387 
Workers Females ll5 '736 99,535 83,503 
10 Semi- Total 297,508 284,138 308,673 
Skilled Males 187,786 186 '131 215,772 
Manual Females 109 '722 98,007 92,901 
ll Unskilled Total 198,014 281 '368 ' 285,804 
Manual Males 177,197 236,004 224,523 
Workers Females 20,817 45,364 61,281 
1 - 15 All Total 2 'll4,850 2,173,256 2,221,443 
Economically Males 1,480,834 1,517,266 1,540,784 
Active Females 634,016 655,990 680,659 
1961 
1,263,910 
943,970 
319,940 
102,180 
15,480 
86,700 
610,990 
541,210 
69,780 
342,490 
232,640 
109,850 
208,250 
154,640 
53,610 
2,281,870 
1,550,190 
731,680 
~ 
1971 
1,184,620 
833,160 
350,860 
124,300' 
15,880 
108,420 
531,560 
480,080 
51,480 
303,190 
189,930 
ll3,260 
224,790 
147,270 
77' 700 
2,266,410 
1,432,930 
833,480 
---
' 
I 
' 
I 
I 
' 
.I 
I 
....... 
-...j 
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The most striking feature of these data ~s the decimation of the 
skilled manual workers. Scotland has lost nearly 150,000;this represents a 
drop from an index of 100 in 1921, to about 78 in 1971, while the economically-
active population has increased from 100 to over 107. To put this another way, 
had the skilled manual workers simply performed as the economically-active 
population as a whole did, there would have been 729,300 of them in 1971, not 
531,600. Clearly the expansion of the economy was not in this sector, nor was 
it unequivocally in the other manual sectors either, as Figure 5.2 shows. 
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These four SEGs are particularly relevant to the argument that 
minimum and average skill levels rise, leaving relatively few unskilled 
workers (proposition number 5 in Chapter ~;that there is a shortage of 
skilled workers (proposition (6));and that new jobs are created, while 
differentiation between jobs increases (proposition (3) in Chapter 3). If 
the skilled manual worker is treated as low-level on the skills continuum, 
· then the •·non-farm low-skill sector' has contracted, in line with the usual 
transition proposition. However, the sector increased from 1921 to 1931, 
declined slowly up to 1951, and generally fell more sharply after that. But 
even this statement disguises the upturn of the unskilled manual category 
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in the 1960's, the 30-year rise in semi-skilled manual occupations1931-1961, 
and the upturn of the service worker sector since 1961. Moreover, one might 
reasonably expect the contraction of those sectors with minimum skills to bite 
first and most sharply into those with least skills - service worker and 
unskilled manual worker sectors -but it does not. Skilled manual workers were 
first and most affected, while service workers and unskilled manual workers 
are the two categories which have been most buoyant in the last 10 years. In 
this respect minimum and average skill levels do not rise in the appropriate 
transition pattern among the non-farm manual workers of Scotland. 
Alternatively, skilled manual workers can be regarded as having 
'intermediate skill level' on the occupation continuum. In this case,the 
long-term proportional contraction of the low-skills sector is only about 1.8% 
which makes Scotland an embarrassing inconsistency to the theory of industrial 
society. However,we are still left with the 'recovery' of these sectors post-
1961, while the contraction now bites first into the semi-skilled manual 
category (now the most skilled of the three low-skilled sectors): the unskilled 
manual category is proportionately still higher than in 1921; and the decline 
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~n this latter category ~s confined to the 1950's, whereas service workers 
decline most sharply before this, between 1931 and 1951. If the hidden hand 
of economic change is active for one category in this period, why is the 
obviously-similar unskilled manual worker left relatively untouched until the 
next ten years -· during which time the service workers begin to stabilise? 
The theory does not tell us. 
These data also impinge on other propositions of occupational 
differentiation. If an occupation becomes differentiated, it presumably 
becomes more recognised, more specialised, requires a more specific system 
of recruitment (and training), and cannot just be taken on by any casual worker. 
If new occupations are created, they too presumably exist in an organisational 
framework, and by definition must fulfill a specialised work function that is 
now demarcated from other occupations. Among the most highly differentiated 
and restricted occupations are skilled manual occupations, entered only by 
prolonged apprenticeship, and safeguarded by rigorous Trade Union rules 
(supported by management practices in many cases). But there is not only no 
evidence of an increase in occupational differentiation, that is, in skilled 
manual occupations, but the evidence shows the reverse. Alternatively, 
semi-skilled manual occupations - which, it might be argued are the more likely 
occupations for new technologies to expand, as new skills are capital-intensive 
even if specialist - show a long term and now accelerating decline. Unskilled 
manual and service occupations, with the lowest levels of skill requirement and 
therefore the greatest interchangeability of labour, typified by the labourer, 
the cleaner, and the casual all-purpose hand, show an upturn in their numbers. 
Among the lower skill levels, which comprise about half of the labour force, 
there is no evidence at this level of analysis to support the proposition that 
occupational differentiation is occurring, let alone increasing.(]) 
(7) This would be in keeping with Blackburn and Mann's argument introduced above 
in Chapter 3 that most men are capable of doing most jobs outside of the 
skilled trades: occupational differentiation operates at a very minor level 
for SEGs 10 and 11. 
17tl 
While these data do not directly indicate 'shortages', or 'demand' 
for particular types of labour, it is difficult to see how a long term decline in, 
say, the skilled manual category is compatible with a 'shortage of skilled 
workers' - unless of course skill in this case refers to professional skill 
only, something which is not specified. By Moore's first proposition, that all 
economic operations are integrated into the national market economy, any 
shortage of skills should be corrected by market mechanisms. Thus, while a 
long term decline of a broad occupational category could be occurring, workers 
to fill specific occupations may be in short supply (and scarce in some regions 
but not others) in the short run. But one cannot imply the dominance of market 
mechanisms on the one hand, and then explain away a fifty year long-term decline 
on the other as characterising numerous localised short run shortages. Indeed, 
none of the writers in question even advancesthis adjustmene thesis to account 
for this shortage, so that one is left to assume that they see a shortage as the 
pre-condition for the increase in skilled occupations which they believe takes 
place, since these are the only two items included in thep.ropositions. In this 
sense, the proposition of skills-shortage· is incompatible with the proposition 
of market incorporation and without further evidence of whether we are dealing with 
a supply or demand effect, the former seems untenable. 
This discussion of the less-skilled occupations so far concentrated 
on the perspectives derived from the theory of industrial society. It is 
equally possible to consider the same data as they impinge on Braverman's 
thesis of deskilling, in which the skilled manual worker in particular looms 
large. 
In the first place, the decline in numbers of skilled workers (SEG 9) 
1s as generally predicted by Braverman. However, the rest of the picture is less 
clear, for rather than this decline being matched by an increase in semi- and 
unskilled work, to replace skilled workers in new production processes,the 
latter categories change little between 1921 and 1971. Taken together (in 
line with Braverman's rejection of the notion of a semi-skilled category) 
they increase absolutely, from 495,522 to 534,750, but decrease relative to 
the total labour force, from 23.5% to 23.3%. If we restrict ourselves to 
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the male labour force, there is not even an absolute growth in numbers. And 
in the intervening years, the levels of less-skilled manual workers fluctuate 
with the lowest category (weighted by labourers, cleaners etc) varying 
inversely to the slightly more semi-skilled category. A more plausible 
explanation for these figures would be that entire industries lost their 
prominant position in the economy: for example, a high proportion of female 
skilled labour was employed in the decli"ning textile·trades. 
At best, Braverman's thesis can be sustained in a very weak formo 
The degradation of labour would appear to be contained within categories, 
with skilled status being attributed to reduced work tasks, and therefore 
invisible to this kind of analysis (although see Chapter 10 below)o Braverman 
would have to make rigorous use of this argument if he were to explain away 
the 215,000 increase in high skilled occupations that we saw in the previous 
section a 
Before leaving the less skilled, it is worth noting once again 
the gender segregation of occupations. Not only are women much more reliant 
on service work (SEG 7) but the decline in skilled employment has been sharper 
for women, soheightening the segregation: in 1971 one-third of Scottish males were 
still skilled workers, whereas among females the figure had fallen from over 
a fifth to one-sixteenth. The number of women 1n unskilled work has generally 
been on the increase, the reverse of the trend 1n the other three manual 
categories among women. In other words,within the manual class, occupational 
degradation seems to be the main characteristic of the female labour force 
since 1921. 
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Occupational Transition: The Intermediate Skilled 
In the previous section, it was suggested that the skilled manual 
worker might be considered part of the intermediate occupational sector: if 
this is so, then the proportion that this sector comprises has contracted 1n 
50 years from 49 per cent to 47 per cent. This is clearly not in support 
of the proposition that the 'vast majority' of workers move into the. 
intermediate categories. Only if SEG 5 is drafted out of the highly-skilled 
set, and down into this version of the intermediate sector, could such a 
proposition be upheld, but this would make sociological nonsense by combining, 
for instance, teachers with degrees with clerks who have no post-secondary 
education and manual workers who finished full-time education at the minimum 
school leaving age: the intermediate sector would be too heterogeneous to 
have any meaning, except as the residual category left once 'true' professionals 
and unskilled manual workers have been accounted for - which is not a helpful 
concept. If SEG 9 is not included, the intermediate sector so defined has 
grown by 6.7 per cent, but this growth hardly represents the 'vast majority' 
of workers. The skilled manual workers have not been included in either 
Table 5.3 or Figure 5.3 but readers can of course make their mvn adjustments 
if they \vish. 
The junior non-manual occupations show a steep, indeed spectacular 
growth from 1921 to 1971 of 190,000. But in the last decade, junior non-manual 
occupations have seen a decline in the rates of expansion: currently these 
occupations are about 21 per cent of the workforce. This again suggests that 
increases in skill levels and the supposed increasing dominace of the middle 
categories is not a uniform process, even if one wishes to argue that it does 
partially apply to the largest single intermediate category. 
Table 5.3: Intermediate Non-Farm Workers (SEGs 6, 8 and 12) in Scotland by Sex 
Source: see text above 
SEGs Occupations Categories 1921 1931 1951 
6, 8 All inter- Total 386,396 437,227 495,488 
Intermediate Males 214,855 252,512 251,800 
Females 171,541 184,715 243,688 
6 Junior Total 282,822 320,812 403,610 
Non- Males 145,241 161,656 175,207 
Manual Females 137,581 159,156 228,403 
8 Foremen Total 27,726 30,584 40,092 
and Males 26,284 28,736 36,834 
Supervisors Females 1,442 1,848 3,258 
12 Own- Total 75,848 85,831 51,786 
Account Males 43,330 62,120 39,759 
Workers Females 32,518 23,711 12,027 
-
1- 15 All Total 2,114, 850 2,173,256 2,221,443 
Economically Males 1,480, 834 1,517,266 1,540,784 
Active Females 634,016 655,990 680,659 
----
1961 
568,170 
274,510 
293,660 
473,040 
191,300 
281,740 
54,800 
51,550 
3,250 
40,330 
31,660 
8,670 
2,281,870 
1 ,550,190 
731,680 
~-
------
1971 
573,610 
247,960 
325,650 
472,230 
161,090 
311,140 
56,590 
51,140 
5,450 
44,790 
35,730 
9,060 
2,266,410 
1,432,930 
833,480 
! 
) 
....... 
00 
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Not only does SEG 6 show the greatest change, but it also 
manifests the most striking gender differences. At the start of the 
series men outnumber women, whereas by 1971 the women outnumber the men 
almost two to one. In the later decades, junior white-collar work 
comprises in excess of one-third of all female employment, while SEGs 
8 and 12 are of little significance. This stands out clearly in Fig. 5.3. 
Fi& 5.3: Chanf;eS in Intermediate-Skilled Non-Farm Occupations 
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Occupational Transition: Farm Occupations 
The three remaining SEGs are all.agricultural (given that we are 
not concerned with SEGs 16 and 17). Farm employees are the biggest category, 
and have also experienced the major changes. The current labour force is 
almost one-third of its 1921 level. No other occupational category has 
undergone such a marked decline; farmers (and their managers) have 
declined to something like half of their 1921 numbers. 
(Table 5.4 follows on the next page) 
Table 5.4: Farm Occupations (SEGs 13, 14 and 15) in Scotland by Sex 
Source: see text above 
SEGs Occupations Category 1921 1931 
13' 14 All farm Total 190,683 154 > 371 
and 15 Occupations Males 168 058 139,580 
Females 22,625 14,791 
13 'Large' Total 31,353 36,180 
Farmers Males 28,678 34,059 
Females 2,675 2,121 
14 'Small' Total 25' 722 13,397 
Farmers Males 23,384 ll ,495 
Females 2,338 1,902 
15 Farm Total 133,608 104,794 
Employees Males ll5 '996 94,026 
Females 17,612 10,768 
1 - 15 All Total 2' ll4, 850 2,173,256 
Economically Males 1,480, 834 1,517,266 
Active Females 634,016 655,990 
--
1951 1961 
148,785 ll7 ,070 
134,922 106,970 
13,863 10,100 
37,834 31,420 
36,279 29,100 
1,555 2,300 
16,679 17,660 
15,464 16,470 
1,215 1,190 
94 '272 67,990 
83,179 61,400 
ll ,093 6,590 
2,221,443 2~281,870 
1,540,784 1,550,190 
680,659 731,680 
1971 
78,700 
69,150 
9,550 
17,160 
15,560 
1,600 
16,810 
14,710 
2,100 
44,730 
38,880 
5,850 
2,266,410 
1,432,930 
833,480 
t-' 
00 
.1:0-
185 
The~e has obviously been a major exodus from the land, but it 
has not been a uniform flow. The decline of workers slowed in the twenty years 
that included the Depression and the Second World War, while small farmers 
increased in number, as did large farmers. The scale of agricultural change 
is not fully reflected in these figures, as they deal only with individual 
persons and do not show the companies who have been the winners in the 
competition for land to use in large-scale agri-business concerns. Thus 
proposition (5), that the proportion of agricultural workers declines, is 
generally supported by these figures, but Scotland has experienced changes 
in the rate of decline for which occupational transition theory does not 
provide an explanation. Figure 5.4 makes this clear (note that its vertical 
dimension has been stretched to show SEGs 13 and 14 more clearly). 
Fig. 5.4: ChanBeS in Farm Occupations in Scotland, 1921 - 1971 
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While agricultural employees have declined sharply, there has 
also been a reduction, although less sharp, in large and small farmers. 
It could be claimed, albeit on very small numbers, that there have been 
short-run periods of expansion. It would seem that an uncritical acceptance 
of the proposition of a labour force transition from primary to other 
industrial sectors would be unwarranted, since this effect works differen-
tially, both in terms of the groups involved, and the time-period in 
question. With less than 3% of men employed in farming, it is hard to imagine 
much future reduction in this sector. 
Before leaving the set of propositions derived from Moore's work, 
it is worth commenting that even basic propositions can be less than explicit. 
The fundamental proposition of a transition of activity from primary to the 
secondary (and tertiary) industrial sectors may be a valid statement about 
'activity' conceived of as 'number of employees' in agriculture. However, 
the value of the output of agriculture has been increasing at constant prices; 
the 1960's for example saw an increase Ln output of around 10 per cent, with 
a drop in manpower of near 25 per cent. Both absolutely and in output per man 
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this is an increase in economic activity (Johnson, 1971, 103-4). Again, while 
capital investment in agriculture is only one-tenth of what it was 100 years 
ago, it has not changed greatly this century, consistently accounting for 
around 3 per cent. of the nation's total fixed capital formation (ibid, 199; 
Deane and Cole, 1962, 306). Thus while gross manpower levels have fallen in 
the primary sector (fishing being very much the junior partner in this sector), any 
changes in the balance of general economic activity between this and the secondary 
and tertiary sectors must be due to greater growth in these latter, rather 
than absolute decline in the primary sector. 
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In an earlier chapter (Chapter 4 above) an argument for a separate 
consideration of society in Scotland was advanced, and the foregoing analysis 
has concentrated on that line of analysis. It remains an interesting question 
to consider whether the occupational changes are unique to Scotland or also 
are true for England and Wales. At a gross level, the latter is the case, with 
for example the time-profiles generally congruent, and broad similarities for 
the major changes - the moderate expansion of the highly skilled and more rapid 
growth of SEGs 5 and 6 and the decline of SEGs 9 and 15. (S) This suggests 
that the same forces operate on the two economies. This is certainly the 
v1ew taken by Kendrick et al 1n their extended analysis of the time-series 
earlier produced by Payne (1977a), although their interest lies more in the 
manufacturing labour market for male and female workers, rather than all 
sectors(but mainly for male employees)as in this study. Their account 
(Kendrick et al, 1982b, 86-132) stresses the decline of skilled manual 
employment and the use of non-manual employment. In particular, they 
conclude that 'there was an unambiguous deskilling of the industrial workforce 
in the 1920s', even allowing for the effect of the Depression on the 1931 
Census. However, they may have overestimated the buoyancy of" the Scottish 
economy 1n 192l·(see the previous chapter). They also note how SEG 7 
changes 1n this period from being mainly domestic servants to other kinds of 
personal service worker (ibid, 89). 
In addition to the SEG series, Kendrick e~ al (ibid, 95-7) present 
a shift share analysis of changes between 1961 and 1971, tqe only two 
census points in which this can be carried out. This attempts to partition 
occupational change between changes due to the use of labour within industry, 
and the shift of employment between sectors. Perhaps the most striking 
result is the great complexity of movements, the main features of which are 
produced in Table 5.5. 
(8) Further details can be found 1n Payne (1977a). 
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Table 5.5: Sqift/share Analysis of Occupational Change: 
Scottish Males, 1961-1971* 
SEG Gains Losses Shift/Share 
Non-manual; Prof. & Sc. None %rds occupa-
1 - 5 Services, tional Various manu-
facturing 
Skilled manual; Newer industries Old staples, More industrial 
9 eg engineering distribution & than occupa-
transport tional 
Semi Skilled Various, but Old staples %rds industrial 
manual; not old staples (esp. mining), 
except textiles Transport 
10 
Unskilled Various but not Transport, old 4fsths occupa-
manual; old staples staples, tional 
except textiles Public Admin. 
ll 
*adapted from Kendrick et al (1983, 107-129). 
The interaction of industrial change and occupations is clear 
Ln the middle two columns: gains of new occupations of whatever level are 
either Ln newer industries or widely spread, but not in mining, shipbuilding 
or metals, and in fact only 2,700 new jobs in semi- and unskilled manual 
work were recorded. Conversely, job losses were in the old staples, but 
also in transport, showing how the industrial heritage of the 19th century 
continues to be reflected in the occupational structure" At the same time, 
the non-manual SEGs (we omit some of the intermediate SEGs because of their 
small numbers for male workers) show a strong occupational effect, Le a 
response to technological innovation which applies across the board and 
not just Ln specialist new service industries. These results, which will be 
important f~r an understanding of the changes in mobility rates discussed 
in later chapters, can be sunnnarised as follows: 1n 
'the non-manual groups it is safe to say that the 
occupational component of change predominated 
for male manual workers, industrial change tended 
to be the main factor' (Kendrick et al, 1983, 132). 
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Kendrick et al also point to long terra similarities between Scotland 
and the situation south of the border, a broad similarity which must be 
acknowledged. On the other hand, there is not a complete coincidence of patterns, 
with differences of levels, rates of change, and even smallscale, short-run 
counter trends. These can be summarised by examining the degree to which the 
several occupational categories are over- or under-represented in Scotland, 
as against England and Wales, using a simple comparison of actual nurnbers,and 
the expected frequencies if there were no differences between the two countries. 
Table 5.6 makes this clear: it gives the number of jobs in each SEG, and the 
percentage of these which are in Scotland for the census year in question. 
This can be thought of as firstly an expression of social justice, in that if 
Scotland is, say 10 per cent of the mainland UK's labour force, it should have 
10 per cent of the desirable or skilled occupations and 10 per cent of the 
undesirable or unskilled ones: Table 5.6 suggests the scale of national 
imbalance. Secondly, the figures can be taken as an indication of convergence 
or divergence of 'Occupational structures over 50 years - although of course the 
interim fluctuations must be borne in mind. 
The occupations in Table 5.6 have been arranged in a very rough 
hierarchy of 'desirability': those towards the top. tend on average to be more 
skilled, to receive better income~ have greater security, have superior 
working conditions, receive better holidays, fringe benefits, and flexibility 
of working hours, and to be popularly recognised as more desirable (i.e. 
'following the argument of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale). Some readers may wish to 
adjust the hierarchy to suit their own perceptions, as the arrangements 
given here is recognised as a very approximate solution and not one which is 
Table 5.6: Deviations between Observed and Expected Frequencies in 
Scottish SEGs* 
SEGs Occupations 1921 1931 1951 1961 
13 Large +3.8 +7.4 +12.6 +7.3 
Farmers 
3 Self- + 2.1 -2.1 +1.1 +0.7 
Employed 
Professionals 
4 Employed +2.5 +2.5 +0.1 -2.1 
Professionals 
1 & 2 Employers -2.0 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 
and 
Managers 
5 Semi- -0.8 +0.5 +0.7 -0.1 
Professionals 
8 Foremen +0.2 +1.5 +3.0 +0.1 
6 Junior +0.9 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 
Non-Manual 
12 Own Account -3.3 -2.2 -4.2 -3.9 
Workers 
14 Small +6.8 +0.4 -1.4 +0.5 
Farmers 
-· 
9 Skille~ +0.1 +0.2 +0.1 +1.0 
Manual 
10 Semi -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 
Skilled 
Manual 
ll Unskilled +0.9 +0.4 +1.1 +1. 3 
Manual 
7 Service -1.6 -1.0 -0.3 -0.4 
Workers 
15 Farm +4.0 +3.7 +4.0 +5.6 
Labourers 
Scotland 11.3 10.5 10.1 9.4 
1GB (%) 
190 
1971 
+3.1 
+0.1 
.-1. 2 
-1.6 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.5 
-4.3 
+1.7 
+0.6 
+0.1 
+2.5 
+0.1 
+5.5 
9.4 
* Each cell gives the difference between tne percentage of the SEG for Scotland, 
England and Wales that is located in Scotland (the observed), and the percentage 
of the total labour force of England, Wales and Scotland to be found in the latter 
country, as shown in the bottom row (the 'expected' frequency). For example, 
Scottish large farmers in 1921 numbered 31,353, or 15.1 % of the 208~113 large 
farmers in the three countries: the difference between 15.1 % observed and 11.3 % 
exoected is 3.8 %, · 
inherent in the OPCS definitions of the SEG's: the exact order of hierarchy 
is not crucial to the argument. 
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What Table 5.6 shows is that Scotland's position v~s a vis England 
has changed ~n the last 50 years, on the whole for the worse. Among the top 
50 per cent of 'more desirable occupations', Scotland started with a better 
share of large f~rmers,self-employed,and employed professionals: only in the 
large farmers, a relatively closed group, has Scotland maintained an 
advantage, and this in a small and currently declining sector. Scotland was 
deficient in managers and in semi-professionals: the latter are now in balance 
with England, but the former remain behind. The otheremployed highly-
skille-d category, the salaried professionals, started with a 'surplus' 
in Scotland but since 1961 has also moved into 'deficit'. Scotland 
therefore does not now have any advantage over England 1n the highly-skilled 
non-farm sector, and despite a relatively good performance in the semi-
professions, the situation in this sector has deteriorated since 1921. 
In the intermediate occupations, relative advantage among foremen, 
and junior non-manual workers has given way to disadvantage. Scottish own-
account workers have dropped further behind, while small farmers have ended 
a period of considerable fluctuation with a much reduced position. In each 
of the four intermediate categories which form the second part of the more 
desirable 50 per cent of occupations, Scotland has lost ground to England. 
In the 'lower skilled half', the biggest change has been the 
growth of Scotland's excess of the lowest skilled occupations, the unskilled 
manual and the agricultural, together with an increase in the semi-skilled. 
Of course, in this context, these occupations are 'undesirable', so that 
an 'excess' is unwelcome. Scotland has positive scores on all five manual 
occupations for 1971, and although the excess of skilled workers throughout 
the period is the least unwelcome feature, in that these are the most skilled 
of the lower half, even this is another declining sector. 
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Clearly, Scotland has become more working class in occupational 
terms and its population is now less skilled, vis a v~s England, than at any 
time since the First World War. In ten out of fourteen SEG's, the skill 
distribution in 1971 is in England's favour (two of the remaining cases are 
farm occupations, and three of the four involve ownership of capital):in 
twelve of the fourteen SEG's, Scotland's position has actually worsened s~nce 
1921. This suggests that an inter-country economic relationship which 
benefits the south at the expense of the north has been the outcome of the 
unified economic policy. The cumulative effect of the small differences in 
each SEG has been shown to be considerable. 
The data given in Table 5. 6 can also be regarded as impinging on 
the convergence thesis. One of the peculiarities of this thesis is that 
while independent nation states are expected to converge, very little is 
said about how regions within a state are expected to behave. If more extreme 
form of technological determinism is advanced, regional convergence is the 
outcome; a weaker form of the argument would be that functional specialisation 
of regions (divergence) could occur as part of an overall national convergence. 
Scotland does not unambiguously fit either model. Ten out of the fourteen 
SEG's are now closer to the 'norm', which appears to mean that the occupational 
structures of the two countries are now more alike than fifty years ago. 
But conversely, there are four SEG's which have diverged (mainly in the 
lower part of the hierarchy), and the growing similarity between both sides 
of the Border should not be allowed to obscure the marked shift of the 
balance in types of occupations. 
Again if occupational convergence is said to have occurred up to 
1971, why has the institutional differentiation observed in Chapter Four 
above remained intact? Although functional regional divergence seems just as 
plausible ;t proposition on the ~reseut·evideu~e, ti1is ~as uot arisen as a result 
of public or private official economic policy, which has been to encourage 
a 'balanced' growth. Furthermore, the institutional differentiation, while 
(9) 
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not uniformly being a hindrance to economic efficiency, has been a source of 
some difficulties in the areas of law, religion (especially the Sabbath), dual 
centres of administration, and possibly in education. Without a more precise 
statement of what are the essential institutions and units of convergence, 
no progress can be made on these lines. 
A bett;:er model of explanation liesin the style of historical 
account used in the previous chapter, which stresses the interplay of 
technology and decisions about the use of capital, and the relative autonomy 
h ld h . . f . 1 . . . ( 9) h - or s ou one say t e 1nert1a - o soc1a 1nst1tut1.ons. At least sue an 
account goes some way to explaining Scotland's subordinate status, and the 
reasons for her declining occupational position. The synthesis of the several 
perspectives and the empirical.evidence shows that an industrial society can 
both expand its high-skilled labour force while at the same time be relatively 
proletarianised (in occupational terms) in the wider context. Neither a 
Braverman-type degradation, nor (to a lesser extent) a Hoore-type expans1on 
of the middle range seems to be a major feature of such a change, as far as 
Scotland is concerned. 
The results of these changes, if conceived of as changes in social 
class rather than just in occupations, are considerable. Between 1921 and 
1971, the patterns of change are 130,000 increase in the upper .middle class, 
11,000 increase in the intermediate classes, and over 190,000 decrease in the 
manual working class, all in a period of relatively little change in total 
A fuller treatment of rival theories of regionalism can be found in: (a) Holland 
(1976, 36-48), Rogers (1978), Mewett (1979), Massey (1978) and Carter (1971; 
1974; 1975) who in varying degrees attempt to apply the theories of Myrdal 
(1957)• Peroux (1955), Wallerstein (1974), Manda (1975) and Frank (1967, 1970) 
to Scotland; (b) Davies (1974), D<m ette and Poncet (1980), Carney et al (1980), 
and Holland (1976) who discuss the role of the state in regional development 
from a marxist perspective; and (c) Richardson (1969), Richmond (1969), 
Cullingworth (1972), Pryor (1974), Humphreys (1977), House (1977) and 
Hawley (l978) for a more 'mainstream' view. 
size of male labour force. Eyen allowing for ~igration and unemployment, 
these figures indicate a framework :).n whi.ch upward social mobility is 
fosteredo Where else were the extra 141,000 middle class employees to 
be recruited, except by a combination of reduced downward mobility and 
increased recruitment from below? The composition of the new middle 
class is not a uniform one of traditional middle class backgrounds, but 
must contain at least a substantial minority of people with origins 1.n 
working class families. It is not surprising that subjective social 
class ratings yield such complex results, or that voting patterns appear 
inconsistent, or that father-son education levels are poor predictors of 
son's 'occupational achievement', once the importance of underlying details 
of the occupational structure are recognised. 
These latter comments are made as a reminder that our concern 
with occupations is a sociological, rather than a narrowly economic, one. 
As was observed in the first chapter, mobility analysis has been class 
analysis, and even if one wishes to propose a modification of this approach, 
that is not simply to ignore the tradition and earlier evidence. Having 
established the broad theoretical, historical, and occupational context, 
the final step before presenting new data on mobility is to see how this 
must modify existing 'knowledge' about mobility. In particular, the 
phenomenon of occupational transition must bring into question the 
results of that cornerstone of British mobility writing, the work of David 
Glass, and this forms the basis of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A Reappraisal of 'Social Mobility in Britain'. 
The two previous chapter.s have established a context for the 
study of mobility in Scotland, but before we can present contemporary 
evidence, there is one other major background feature to discuss, namely the 
work of D.V. Glass. Glass's general contribution to ideas about mobility 
and class in Britain have been crucial, and although not reported at length; his 
LS the only previous study of mobility in Scotland. However, 
to appreciate some of the criticisms that will be made of Glass's work, it 
was necessary first to understand both the general social and the specific 
occupational character of modern Scotland. Although the point should not be 
laboured, Social Mobility in Britain typifies the mainstream approach to 
mobility, and exemplifies the dangers of ignoring the occupational dimension. 
In the account that follows, it is the latter aspect which receives 
most attention, but the former should not be forgotten. It is not in any way 
the author's case that all prevLous mobility analysis is irrelevant because of 
its emphasis on social rather than occupational mobility, but rather that 
greater care taken with occupational analysis will pay dividends in improving 
explanations of social mobility and class formation. In dealing at some length 
above with economic change, this ultimate interest in stratification may have 
been obscured. However, even if the underlying orientation of the Scoftish 
Mobility Study has been towards occupational mobility, interest in its results 
has stemmed from other sociologists' wishes to know how far general patterns of 
social mobil~ty apply to Scotland. To put it another way, the present study is 
part of a wider intellectual tradition, to which its findings must be related. 
Thus the development of the present work cannot neglect 'what every sociologist 
knows' about mobility (as one eminent sociologist has put it). ~his 
chapter therefore returns to the fountainhead of British mobility research. 
Glass's Influence on Mobility Research 
There can be few areas of British sociology that are so dominated 
by one study, as social mobility is dominated by David Glass's Social Mobility 
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1n Britain (1954)(l). In the twenty years that followed the appearance of this 
book, there were only a handful of mobility publications which did not rely 
on Glass for their empirical evidence, and those few that disagreed with the 
LSE study - such as Benjamin (1958) and Noble (1972, 1975a)- \-Tere larr;ely 
ignored. Leading English writers in the field of social class such as Bottomore 
(1965), Westergaard and Resler (1975), Worsley (1977), Parkin (1971), and 
Giddens (1973) all quote Glass (or more precisely, Miller's re-working of the 
Glass data (1960)) as the foundation of their ideas about rates of mobility. 
As one key figure in the second generation of mobility studies, Keith Hope, 
observed in 1974, Glass h~ 
'contributed materially to the theoretical debate on British 
stratification. Indeed, theories of British occupational 
mobility, so far from being derived from some broad body of 
speculative sociology, have tended to ground themselves in 
an agreed reading of the findings of the 1949 inquiry, 
differing from one another only in the supposed mechanisms 
and processes which they postulate to explain those findings.' 
(Hope, 1975, 1-2). 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that for over twenty years Glass was 
to social mobility what Darwin was to the theory of evolution. 
How are we to explain this? Firstly, there is the kind of useage 
to which Glass's datawereput. British sociology has been centrally concerned 
with social class, and social mobility was subsumed under that heading. There 
was almost no interest in occupational mobility per se: evidence about 
recruitment patterns relied for its significance on what it could tell sociology 
about class boundaries and the continuity of the class structure. Because 
mobility assumed only a secondary importance to sociologists more concerned 
with social class (such as the writers mentioned above) they were content to 
take Glass's evidence on trust. The prime focus of their work, social class, 
provided ample problems, so that there was little incentive to become deeply 
involved in the detailed technicalities of social mobility, which, after all, 
(1) Parts of this chapter discuss in very considerahle detail those ~a~ts of 
Social Mobility in Britain dealing explicitly with intergenerational social 
mobility: the reader may find it helpful to have a copy to hand. 
of Social Mobility in Britain made below refer not to all parts 
book, but to the specific sections on this type of mobility, e.g. 
Criticisms 
of that 
pp 179-215. 
comprised ~nly one element of the total picture. 
In the second place, Glass's study was highly plausible, ooth in 
its methodology and its findings. On the one hand, the study was an 
exceptionally sophisticated one, even by today's standards. It had a large 
I 
sample with national coverage (3497 male respondents in England and Wales, 
and 417 in Scotland- Glass, 1954, 180-3 and 213-215). Its statistical 
innovations not only took up several chapters but formed the basis of much 
( 2} later developments on mobility in~ices in Britain and abroad · _, On technical 
grounds, it was an uni.mpeachable source, particulary during a period 
of sociology's history in this country, when statistical expertise was not an 
. 1 f h . 1 . ' . ( 3) essent1a part o t e soc1o og1st s reperto1re . 
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On the other hand, its findings made sense. Almost without exception, 
sociological writers on social class in Britain have adopted a political stance 
on the Left. When Glass wrote th.at there was little upward social mobility, it 
reinforced everything else that they knew about the class system. There was no 
incentive, therefore, to challenge his results. What is more, Glass's 'hard' 
scientific evidence was a great support both in the debate with Conservative 
Party ideologues, and with liberal apologists for capitalism. Even American 
sociology welcomed Glass's findings as helping to show the difference between 
an open and achievement-dominated society like the United States, and closed 
class-ridden societies in Europe (e.g. Bendix and Lipset, 1959). 
( 2) See for example, Hauser's comment that even if doubts have been expressed 
about Social Mobility in Britain, the source is so well known that it is best 
to continue using it for statistical development (Hauser, 1978). 
( 3) In a slightly different context, Keith Hope has suggested that it was 
Glass's development of statistics based on a x2 zmodel that had great influence: 
even non-numerate sociologists could follow a X approach in a general sense. 
David Glass's numerical expertise as a demographer also probably helped to 
promote confidence in his mobility results. 
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There is, however, a third and more important reason why Social 
Mobility in Britain has been so influential, and that is the position of the 
sponsoring institution, LSE. To understand this it is necessary to look at 
the state of English early post-war sociology. The frequent comment that 
sociology is a relatively new discipline is more true than is normally 
recognised: in Britain the profession has existed for all intents and 
purposes for a bare thirty or forty years. The growth of sociology is quite 
remarkable. In the last full year before the outbreak of the Second World 
War there were only 35 professors in all of the social sciences in Britain, 
and 177 lecturing staff on other grades (Clapham, 1946.). The number of 
graduating students in sociology, anthropology and social administration 
combined was just 33 (Heyworth, 1965). By 1973, there were around 12,000 
sociology teachers in Higher Education, and another 900 sociologists in research 
work. Indeed a 1975 survey of only 19 Polytechnics found more sociologists 
than all social scientists in 1938/39 (Nicholas, 1978). By 1970, there were 
1,700 graduates a year in sociology and social anthropology, while 5 years 
later there were over 2,500 social science post-graduates (Smith, 1973; 
DES, 1975). 
Before this rapid grotvth, British sociology was synonomous with LSE, 
where the dominant mode until the late 1940s was more one of social philosophy 
and ethics. The central figuresamong the 'old guard' at LSE were Marshall, 
Ginsberg and Mannheim. These men represented continuity with the early years 
of British sociology, both in their experience and also in terms of what they 
were teaching. Mannheim taught a theory course, while Ginsberg was centrally 
concerned with Hobhouse's style of sociology. A student of that period has 
remarked that, in teaching theory and method together, Ginsberg was strong on 
methodology at the level of philosophy of science, but less so on techniques of 
( 4) data-collection . In most respects this was the final flowering of the old 
(4) Personal Communication with Margaret Stacey. 
sociology, for there was an abrupt change in the early 1950sJ shortly 
after the arrival of David Glass. Largely under the influence of Shils, 
American sociology was introduced to the School. Both Parsonian 
functionalism and a watered-down version of Lazarsfeldian empiricism 
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were suddenly challengers to social darwinism and civic sociology (Halsey, 1982). 
These new doctrines were taken up by a particularly good crop of graduates 
.and young staff in the early post war years: for example, Asher Tropp, 
Cyril Smith, Chelly Halsey, Joe and Olive Banks. Many of these were the 
'young turks' who were to determine the future direction of the new BSA 
towards a professional association (Banks, 1967). These sociologists 
made successful careers and were influential in setting up new departments 
in other universities. For a number of years, LSE could boast that 
half of British Sociology Chairs were filled by LSE graduates. 
During the explosion of sociology in the late 1960s, successive 
generations of LSE students, post-graduates, research assistants and 
junior lecturers became the staff of other newly developed departments. Not 
least amongst these were Glass's co-researchers who went on to become heads of 
department:· Kelsall, Martin, Floud, Halsey, Banks and Banks, and Bottomore. 
They took with them an interpretation of social mobility which was unusually 
coherent, and until the 1970s there was a general assumption that mobility 
'had been done' by Glass, and that there was little more to be said on the 
subject. 
These conventional interpretations of mobility contain several 
inter-related strands. Firstly, mobility is normally taken to mean exchange 
mobility rather than structural mobility: that is, mobility refers to 
those movements between occupation statuses over and above any 
movements'necessitated' by a change in the occupational structure between 
the father's and the son's generations. Secondly, while recognising that 
movements do frequently occur, it has been generally agreed that 
movements over the whole range of the occupational structure are very 
rare. The typical move is a 'short distance' one; the clerk's son 
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who becomes a departmental manager, or the miner's son who becomes a clerk. 
Thirdly, social mobility has been subsumed· under a wider concern with the 
contemporary class structure: in as far as it has been· of interest to British 
sociologists, it has been only as a contributory factor in the structured 
inequality of life chances, and in class formation. It has not been of much 
interest in its own right, or ~n a comparative context. In short, a dominant 
paradigm has existed for over twenty years in British sociology which drew 
heavily on Glass, but which, in its acceptance of Glass's findings, generated 
little significant new research or speculation about mobility patterns per se 
until the present round of studies. 
If there is any doubt about this, consider the way in which three 
recent and well-regarded writers on the sociology of stratification have 
dismissed mobility as a Gonstant and known process. Westergaard and Resler 
(1975) discuss Glass's results, concluding that there has been 
'no change of substance in the amount of movement up and down the 
social scale till about the time of World War II. And there seems 
now to have been little increase in social circulation after that 
either ••. Long distance movement especially- from bottom to top, 
as well as from top to bottom - is uncommon. Most individual 
mobility is far more modest; and much of it stays on one side or 
the other of theronventional dividing line between white- and 
blue-collar work.' (Westergaard and Resler, 315; 302). 
Secondly, Sease, in a review of Class in a Capitalist Society in 
Sociology approves of Westergaard and Resler's section on mobility as scotching 
the popular myth of a more open society, and thereby confirming 'what every 
sociologist knows'(Sic)(&ase,l977;515). Certainly, this is the view presented 
to many beginning students of sociology: the second edition of Horsley's 
Introducing Sociology which claims that its first edition 
'has been used in about half the universities in the UK, ~n many 
colleges of various kinds, and even - to our surprise - ~n schools' 
(Worsley et al, 1977; 15) 
asserts that 
'though there is a great deal of mobility, most of it is, in fact, 
very short range mobility. The myths of 'long distance' mobility-
'from log-cabin to President' -are, overw~mingly, myths as far as 
the life chances of the mass of the population are concerned. ' 
(Worsley et al, 1977; 432)· 
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The a.uthora continue by quoting verbatim Hestergaard and Resler's version of 
stable mobility rates referred to above. 
These three sources, with their dependence on Glass, lend support 
to the view that there has been an agreed and widely held notion of mobility 
among British sociologists. Indeed, the same statements about limited and 
short range mobility can be found with only very slight variation in the works 
of Bottomore (1965; 38); Miliband (1969; 34-44); Parkin (1971; 51-6); Miller 
(1960; 36-41); Raynor (1969; 33-5); Frankel (1969; 161); Goldthorpe (1974; 145-6) 
and Giddens (1973; 107, 181-2). We shall return to the detail of what these 
writers say about mobility below. 
It will be apparent from the foregoing pages that Social Mobility 
1n Britain is of such importance that it must be the starting point for any 
subsequent study of social mobility. If one is to propose findings that 
challenge those of Glass, one must be on the strongest of grounds, and gj.ven 
the security of his reputation, one is placed in the position of needing to 
marshal every possible argument to counter his case - and indeed the case of 
all those other subsequent sociologists who have based their ideas upon his 
evidence. It is a daunting task. 
There are at least four different critiques of Glass that could be 
adopted. The first, and simplest, is that if more recent studies disagree with 
Glass, then the explanation lies in changes in British society since 1949 when 
the fieldwork for the first study was done. If rates of mobility are found to 
be higher in the 1970s, than around 1950, both findings can be assumed to be 
accurate for their respective times. This is the view espoused by Goldthorpe 
and Llewellyn ( 1977) who argue that Glass's study came by misc.hance just at 
the end of an era of low mobility, whereas the Nuffield study in 1972 taps. 
the subsequent era of higher mobility. 
· An alternative view is the one which will take up much of the final 
section of this chapter. That is, that the Glass findings are in some way 
inaccurate. In this case, the more recent studies (of England and Wales, and 
of Scotland) represent the first accurate studies of their kind. 
In fact, the present author adopts a third position, namely one 
that draws on the previous two. If changes in mobility rates depend on 
real historical events like the availability of employment or the growth of 
white collar occupations, then inevitably Glass's findings would be specific 
to the time at which the LSE research was carried out. Equally, if there are 
reasons to doubt its accuracy, its results may be biased in some way. The two 
conditions are 1n no way mutually exclusive. 
There is an additional independent critique which applies only to 
Scotland. Even if the case for questioning Glass's account of English mobility 
is not proven - which of course is not the position taken in this chapter 
then the problems with Glass's treatment of his Scottish data remain. As 
this is an argument of lesser importance than the more fundamental question of 
accuracy, it is easier to deal with it before proceeding to the major 
criticism. 
Glass on Scotland 
In the first place, it must be recognised that Glass has very little 
to say about mobility in Scotland. To be precise, he devotes 3! pages of his 
book to the subject, large parts of which consist of tables and charts. In 
fairness, Kelsall's paper on recruitment to four professions does also cover 
Scotland, but there is a distinct lack of information reported for the 1949 
study. 
This is probably because the s1ze of the sample was so small. 
Unfortunately, in attempting to correct for this, Glass weakens his o~m case 
in two key ways. On the one hand, he becomes inconsistent about the 
significance of the Border, and on the other, he is reduced to much cruder 
occupational categories than he employs for England and Wales. 
Because he has only 417 male Scots in his Scottish sample, Glass 
adds in 54 other men born in Scotland, but resident in England. Thus only 89% 
of his 'Scottish' sample live in Scotland. The only rationale for this move 
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can be that mobility is determined by something in the origins of 
respondents, not in their destinations. One could attribute to Glass any 
number of explanations for the dominance of origin in mobility: mobility 
due to racial inheritance, or cultural heritage, or the Scottish educational 
system. While the latter seems plausible, Glass gives no clue to the basis 
of his decision. The concentration on national origins neglects the effect of 
destination on mobility rates: the opportunity structure of England (and 
particularly of London and the South East) is quite different from that of 
Clydeside or the Highlands. 
Furthermore, as we have observed, some sociologists argue that 
long distance migrants are not typical of the general population: they tend 
to be better educated, and employed in jobs of higher status (see Blau and 
Duncan, 1967, ch. 6 and 7; Friedlander and Roshier, 1966a and b; Uhlenberg, 
1973; Miller, 1975, etc). By additing more than 10% of these people to the 
sample, Glass is likely to have distorted the picture of Scottish ~obility. 
To this v1ew, it may be objected that what Glass has done is not 
to distort but to round out the picture. He is presenting an account of all 
mobility amo~g men born in Scotland, not mobility in Scotland. This will not 
do, however. Glass does not omit the English who have migrated north from 
his sample, nor does he add them on to his English sample. What is more, 
why should Glass stop at adding in England and Wales? What about America, 
Canada and Australia, and the other lesser geographical destinations worldwide 
. ( 5) 
which feature in the Caledonian D1aspora? 
The other criticism concerning the collapsing of the occupational 
is equally important. Glass reduces the 7-fold schema used for England to 
( 6) 
5 categories for Scotland 1n order to maintain cell totals with only 471 cases 
(5) Richmond (1969) has noted the success of English speaking migrants in Canada, 
and in all, there were something in excess of 1.5 million such Scots spread 
throughout ~he world during the twentieth century. 
(6) i.e. 417 'true' Scots plus 54 'Anglo Scots'. 
This 
'may help to overcome (while, unfortunately, suppressing) some 
of the more subtle differences between the countries. Whether 
major differences in the ranking ofoccupations are still left, 
however, cannot be ascertained' (Glass, 1954, 213). 
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Since his initial preference was for 7-fold classification, the one used on 
the Scottish data must be definition be less satisfactory. It consists of: 
Status Category 1 & 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 & 7 
All professional, high administrative, executive 
and managerial workers (incl. Farmers) 
Higher grade supervisory, inspection and non-
manual workers ('semi-professional') 
Lower grade supervisory, inspection and non-
manual workers (small proprietors, manual 
supervisors) 
Skilled manual and routine non-manual workers 
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
Not only 1s this categorisation clumsy, but it shares several peculiarities 
with the original 7-fold classification In the first place, the allocation 
of farmers to the top category (which consists otherwise of senior industrial, 
administrative and professional occupations) will have the effect of 
exaggerating the apparent level of self-recruitment in that category, since 
farming is one of the most heavily self-recruited occupations. In the 1975 
study, 55 out of 76 farmers employing labour were the sons offurmers. If the 
farmers are eliminated from the figures (as in Goldthorpe's 19.75 paper) or 
allocated to a lower category (as in the main analysis for the 1975 study), 
the effect is to reduce the apparent closure of the highest category (or 
rather its cksest equivalent). 
Secondly, Glass combines semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Th_is 
combination, akhough producing a somewhat crude category, has since been 
advocated by Goldthorpe because the delineation of the boundary between semi-
and unskilled labour is so difficult. The third feature of his classificatio-n 
is the combination of routine non-manual workers with skilled manual workers. 
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This has received little comment over the years, presumably due to Kelsall's 
reworking of the English data which were featured in Miller's seminal work 
(Miller, 1960). In the Scottish data, this correction was not made, and the 
result is an unhappy combination of two very different groups. We will see 
1n detail later on how the mobility behaviour of the two groups differ, but 
it is worth noting here two aspects of the problem. While a number of 
writers have disputed whethermutine non-manual workers are essentially middle 
class or working-class- for example Wedderburn and Craig, 1974; Parkin, 1971; 
Westergaard and Resler, 1975; Stewart et al, 1980; and Giddens 1973- no one has 
~rgued in favour of treating the two groups as synonymous. One key difference of 
particular relevance to mobility patterns is the way change in employment 
structure has affected the two. As chapter 5 (above)showed, skilled manual 
workers have suffered the most marked decline in numbers this century, whereas 
the routine non-manual sector has been one of the most rapid 1n its expansion. 
Thus both the employment situation and the destination 'end' of the mobility 
link have been quit.e dissimilar for the two categories which Glass combines. 
There is yet one more limitation to what Glass can tell us about 
mobility in Scotland. This final constraint on comparison between 1949 and 
1975 is the most severe: Glass does not report his cell value for his 
mobility tables. Instead, he presents only the computed Indices of 
Association for two cohorts, and summary Indices of Association (I.A.) and Dis-
association (I.D.) for their two mobility tables (Glass, 1954; 214-215). It is 
clear that from the start, any attempts to link studies 1n the way that 
Nuffield attempted to compare the 1972 and 1949 studies would have been 
unfruitful in the Scottish case. 
Nonetheless, we can abstract four ma1n conclusions about Scotland 
from Glass's work (Glass, 1954; 215-216), that is, excluding any questions 
about direct comparisons with England and Wales: 
i) all cells have·an Index of Association significantly 
different from 1.0 
ii) for each cohort (and their counterparts for England 
and Wales) the ranking of categories by their I.A. 
scores, 'is almost exactly the same' (Glass, 1954;215). 
iii) Scotland appears to have 'a more even social structure. 
Table 18 suggests, indeed, than.in Scotland there may be 
a two-fold rather than a three fold division in the 
degree of self-recruitment' (Glass, 1954; 216), with 
categories 3 to 7 forming a broad group with similar levels 
of self-recrUtment. 
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iv) Scotland may be undergoing 'some sharpening of the divisions' 
in self-recruitment, in as far as Category 1-and-2 is more 
clearly differentiated in the younger cohorts. 
In considering these conclusions, we have only the Index of Association as 
evidence: without the marginals, it is not possible to know the maximum 
value which the index could take for any cell in the Glass data, so that we 
cannot compare values for large and small cells in an informed manner (large 
categories of either origin or destination can have only small values, and 
vice versa: see Tyree, 1973, 580). We are restricted to comparisons which 
relate only to the Index of Association as far as the 1949 data are concerned, 
·and to two broad cohorts, pre-1900 and 1900-1919(7). 
Glass's first conclusion means that in each of the occupational 
categories more self-recruitment is reported than would be expected on the 
assumption that father's background had no influence on son's occupation, and 
that the difference 1s too large to be attributed to sampling variation. 
This finding has lost some of its 1954 impact as a "proof" of a commonsense 
assumption, !nd indeed, any other finding (e.g. a deficit of self-recruitment) 
would be the more surprising. The assumption of perfect mobility (that 
father's occupation does not influence the son's occupation) is of course a 
sociological absurdity: ownership and inheritance, differential socialisation, 
educational access and performance, etc., are all well-documented features 
which explain the influence. Perfect mobility is employed solely for its 
(7) One wonders what would have been the impact of Glass's study had this been 
the miserly leve 1 of reportage offered for England and \.Jales. 
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heuristic value, and so when Glass reports that the empirical world deviates 
from it, this is only confirmation ofwhat is sociologically obvious. However, 
as Goldthorpe (1975) has pointed out, the appearance of self-recruitment (as a 
strong diagonal ~ffect in a mobility.table) may be more clear-cut in tables with 
a small number of large categories, than in a table with a higher number of 
more specific occupational categories. 
Glass's emphasis on 'category self-recruitment' stems from his 
limited view of the openness of society, and it provides only a very partial 
perspective on the mobility process: for instance, it says nothing about the 
cells which lie off the diagonal, and so nothing about gross upward or down-
ward mobility rates in Scotland, or about the patterns of association between 
particular occupational categories. Glass's first conclusion is included here 
only for completeness: in fact it rells us very little. tfuat is far more important 
is that this approach (and more so its use on the English data) has influenced 
subsequent work on mobility and stratification in Britain into a concentration 
on self-recruitment, stability, and rigidity in the social structure, during 
a period of massive change in the occupational structure. 
The second conclusion drawn from Glass is one which even his own 
data do not uphold. Despite his optimistic statement that both Scottish 
cohorts (and their English counterparts) have 'almost exactly the same' ranking 
in their I.A. scores, the actual pattern is not quite so neat (see Table 6.1). 
While the two English cohorts are internally consistent, the two Scottish cohorts 
agree only on classes '1-and-2', 5 and '6-and-7'. The younger Scottish 
cohort additionally matches the English pattern on Class 3, but retains two 
disagreements, while the older Scottish cohort does not agree on three classes: 
3, 4 and '6-and-7'. These variations cannot be adequately characterised as 
almost exactly the same' pattern. 
Table 6.1 
Indices of Association; Cohorts and Countries 1949 
Source: Glass (1954, 214) 
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Glass's third suggestion about the Scottish social structure is 
that it is more 'even' than in England and Wales, with only two patterns of 
self-recruitment instead of three. The idea of an even social structure ~s 
that all categories have similar levels of self-recruitment: south of the 
border, there are 3 levels of self-recruitment, one high with a value of 5+ 
for category '1-and-2', one low with a value of 1.19 or less for category 5, 
and one for the remaining categories with values between 1.91 and 1.45. In 
comparing Scotland and England and Wales, Glass claims that the difference 
in the degrees of self-recruitment between categories '1-and-2' and the others, 
particularly categories 3 and 4, is less clear cut in the earlier cohort. 
An examination of Table 6.1 shows this to be simply inaccurate. Again, for 
category 5, which is distinctively low on self-recruitment as compared with 
class 6-and-7 in England and \Jales, the Scottish pattern is less sharply 
differentiated. The implication that Glass draws is that since the biggest 
difference lies between categories '1-and-2' and the rest (albeit according 
to him with not such a great difference as in the English case) there are 
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effectively two patterns of self-recruitment in Scotland, one for category 
'1-and-2' and the other for categories 3 to 7. However, the difference 
between classes 4 and 6 and 7 is· much greater in the Scottish data, so the 
two level argument cannot be sustained. The levels argument is associated 
with Glass's fourth suggestion that there is in process a sharpening 
of the divisions between '1-and-2' and the others, because these are more 
differentiated in his younger cohort. We will consider these views in the 
light of the 1975 data later in the study, but it should be clear by now 
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that we can place little confidence in them. Their base, in a dubious sample,. 
using a truncated classification, and with a severely limited account of 
the results, is a weak one. The technical and logical grounds for 
asserting 'evenness' of structures, or 'sharpening' of difference are poor. 
The questions lying behind Glass 1·s Scottish account are nonetheless interesting, 
despite the limitations of his answers. However, a much bigger set of 
problems has now to be considered, which lie in Glass's account of mobility 
in England and Wales. 
Glass on England and Wales: Occupational Transition 
It is often the case with seminal works that any technical 
defects or limitations are quickly over-looked and soon conveniently 
forgotten. Glass himself took great pains to point out a number of 
unusual features of his results, and later writers (mainly in the field 
of social mobility, rather than class theory per se) have echoed his 
observations. However, very little has been done to consider what 
significance such features might have. For example, it is almost a 
commonplace that the LSE mobility tables are unusually symetrical, 
or that class differentials in fertility rates produce a biased 
distribution of fathers' occupations -both points originally made by 
Glass. Other peculiarities have been reported by Ridge and Hope during 
the recent phase of national mobility studies. But as yet, these problems 
have not collectively received the attention which they merit; the 
intention of this chapter is to remedy this, and thereby to raise doubts 
about the uses to which the Glass data have been put by later writers, 
i.e. in conceptualising the British class structure. 
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The starting point of this re-appraisal is the core of mobility 
analysis, the mobility table. One of the general characteristics of mobility 
tables showing respondents' occupations tabulated by their fathers' 
occupations is that the distribution of occupations for the respondents is 
different from that of their fathers. The dominant pattern of such tables 
is that fewer of the fathers have middle class occupations than do the 
respondents (or sons), and conversely more fathers appear to be in working 
class occupations. This pattern is associated with greater overall upward 
occupational mobility than downward mobility despite varying levels of 
inherited advantage and self-recruitment, and is commonly found in national 
mobility tables for 20th Century industrial societies. 
There are two major reasons why the fathers/sons distributions 
differ in this respect; changes in occupational structure and differences in 
fertility. The thesis of occupation transit:ion (discussed above in Chapter 5 ) , 
that industrial societies manifest a trend towards increasing skill levels, with 
more professional, technical and white collar workers, and relatively fewer 
unskilled manual workers, implies a steady expansion of the more desirable 
middle class occupations. This necessitates a flow of workers into those new 
occupations which expand the middle class sector. In other words, the sons of 
working class families are less likely to inherit their fathers' jobs because 
relatively speaking, the working class sector is contracting while the 
middle class sector is expanding, thereby making it easier to enter. This 
process is reinforced by educational policies designed to produce a workforce 
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with the necessary skills for further vocational specialisation, The result 
is structural mobility, which mobility researchers since the mid-1970s 
have increasingly seen as the major component of mobility (e.g. Hauser et al, 
1975a, 1975b; Goldthorpe, 1980; Hope, 1980). 
In mainland Britain for example, professional, technical, 
supervisory and routine white-collar male workers increased from about 
3,900,000 in 1921 to over 6,900,000 1n 1971, and have become 45% of all jobs 
compared with 30%, as Table 6.2 shows. 
TABLE 6. 2. 
Occupational Transition in Scotland, England and Wales in 1921, 1951 and 1971: 
economically active males, aged 20 - 64* 
Source: adapted from Census Occupational Tables (for details see Chapter 5 ) 
~~;l,it~ c-:·1·1:-;-.~--~ Scorlar1d I 1921 i. r 195f--i. l 1971- % I ·-419,641 28.3 ; 480. 7~9 ]1. 2 560,890 39.1 
. ' I i ~5. 81 llkcupallull' i E 1 J 1 3,519,704 30.0 1,,/0h,004 35.1 6. 31lb. 250 .. , . . ,_ ,. , ·ttg an 1 i ~l-.C \-b.~, I- I" & Wales , ; ( I 11<: I . Fa nne r') ; I Total 1 3,939,345 29.8 I 5,ufn,713 14. 7 6,947,140 45.2 I I·~~~'" C,d-1.11" --rs::-1~ 1,063,192 71. 7 1,060,221 b8.8 872,040 611.9 
!lh:cup.iti<JU!:i · 1. 1 J : 8 ,225,290 70.0 8. 71 J' 16tl 64.9 7, 566, ~ItO 54.2 1 . • I ',IJg :til iSE~.,; ~';'J-ll;IJ j ~ ~.J~il!.!S 
I ~----- 9 ,288,482 70.2 9. 773.189 65.3 3,438,280 54.8 
I - --a~- 1,482,833 100 1,540,Y50 100 1,432. 930 100 1 T~1Ltl::; Scot l.1nJ 
(~x,·\udillg _ England 
11 
1,744,994 100 13,41'1,172 100 13. '152. 490 100 
l.-\r1:1o:,J hJrC~> & & \;ales 
SEt; I I 
' I 3,227,827 100 14,960,122 100 15.385 ,420· 100 I (nul knuwn) ) ! Tl1t J l 
' -·- ____ _] ___ 
* Throughout this section, data are presented in broad categories such as 
"White-collar" or "Manual" workers 1n o-rder to achieve comparability 
over the several studies 
Blue-collar workers, despite an absolute increase 1n numbers between 
1921 and 1951, have been in relative decline s1nce the First \.Jorld T..Jar, and 
absolute decline since 1951. Their proportion of the classified workforce has 
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fallen from 70% to under 55% (excluding armed forces), The process of 
occupational transition can be traced back into the nineteenth centlry, although 
the mechanics of this exercise are not easy. The technical aspects of usi.ng 
census data to construct a time series become more difficult, because job 
titles (and work tasks) become more different the further back one goes. It 
seems that the rate of change increases in this century, but there is no 
evidence of a reversal of the occupational transition process in the later 
part of the previous century. 
In samples of fathers and sons, we would therefore expect to find 
differences in occupational status. Men starting careers in 1920:. say, joined 
a labour market which had greater demand for manual labour than did the labour 
market of 1950. In other words, ~he father was more likely to start as a 
manual labourer in 1920 (and therefore to remain one or at least to have a 
harder task cf subsequently getting a non-manual career) while his ·son had a 
better chance of entering white collar work in 1950. This is reflected ~n 
mobility tables, but will be distorted by other factors (particularly 
differential fertility as we shall shortly see below). Table 6.3 gives three 
examples from more recent surveys. 
TABLE 6.3 
Occupational Distributions of Generations (%)* 
Generation I Non-Manual i Manual 
Scotland 1975 Fathers ! 34.5 ! 65.5 
.n = 4468 i 46.2 53.8 Sons I ' 
!England & 
I I 
; 
Wales 1972 Fathers 46.1 i 53.9 
In = 9423 Sons 55.3 i 44.7 i 
Fathers 29.5 I 70.5 1u.s.A. 1962 l.n = 27,592 i Sons 39.6 60.4 ! I 
Sources: Scotland: Scottish Mobility Study data 
England: Goldthorpe & Llewellyn (1977b, 273)(non-rnanual = I-V inc.) 
U.S.A.: Blau & Duncan (1967, 496)(excludes 'farmers'; non-manual 
= 1 - 7 inclusive) 
* Different classification schemes make the comparisons approximate only. 
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These three recent examples provide some indication that sons 
have a better chance of obtaining white collar jobs, but we need to look at 
this in more detail than just at the level of probabilities. Underpinning the 
effect are the actual social processes through which,individuals enter 
occupations. The allocation mechanism ensures that only individuals with 
certain attributes may enter given occupations: race, gender, and educational 
qualifications are obvious examples of entry attributes. Although people 
do change their occupations, these changes are not random: not only are some 
occupations barred because 'the basic entry attributes are different, but the 
individual's own work experience rapidly becomes a further occupational entry 
attribute. For example, the skilled manual worker in a factory may 
subsequently become a foreman and even a manager in that company or industry, 
but he does not suddenly become a brain surgeon. To do that he would have 
to retrain and start again at the bottom. His skills are not transferable. 
Nor can the highly-educated brain surgeon easily obtain a job on a building 
site should he wish it, even though the builder's labourer has few formal 
skills and the trade has a tradition of high labour turnover. Faced with 
two job applicants, a choice between an experienced builder's labourer and 
the unknown quantity, an ex-brain surgeon, the typical employer will opt for 
the devil he knows. 
In other words, occupations are organised into 'channels', with very 
limited inter connection between each channel, or to use Stewart et al's 
simile (1980) taking up an occupation is like starting on a train journey: 
once started, it is hard to reach any other destination, despite a number of 
pnctions in the rail system. Because men become caught up in the 
occupational system, it is not easy for the labour force as a whole to adapt 
quickly to new demands for a different kind of skill. Popular political and 
journalistic comment about the current need to retrain and change occupations 
~n mid-career fails to recognise the hu~an investment that goes into twenty 
years of working in one job, or rather in one "occupational channel". The 
very limited success of government re-training programmes in the last two 
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decades is another indication of the rigidity of these channels, even for 
workers whose skills and experience are now surplus to requirements, Both 
trade unions and employers play key roles in maintaining the boundaries of 
these channels. Rather than mature workers transferring from one old channel 
to a new one, it is easier to divert some of the newcomers to the labour 
market. This protects the incumbents of a declining channel, and reduces the 
intensity of the inevitable dislocation of redundancy. It is also easier to 
set up, as the educational system is geared to younger people and can be 
adapted to provide new training and careers counselling, Apart from a brief 
interim period before a new occupation is identified, employers in expanding 
job sectors turn to the new generation for its recruits, To take one example 
close to home; the occupation of "sociologist" rapidly passed through an era 
in which its recruits were converted from other disciplines such as history, 
philosophy, and even engineering, into the golden sixties when the majority 
of present members entered the profession directly through the newly created 
departments of sociology in the post-Robbins Universities and Polytechnics 
(Payne et al, 1981). 
In sum, the differences between fathers and sons does not lie only 
in a simple stochastic process, but also in the workings of the relevant 
institutions. As the occupational structure changes, its effects impinge most 
immediately on young workers, for whom new opportunities open up more readily 
than for older workers. As a result, there is a built-in potential for 
upward social mobility, as blue-collar trades contract, and new white collar 
trades expand. 
Differential Fertility 
However, the figures that we saw in Table 6,3 do not derive solely 
from this underlying process of occupatronal tmnsition. A second historically-
specific process which gives rise to differences between the fathers and sons' 
distributions as seen in mobility tables is differential fertility. Broadly 
speaking, working class fathers each have more children(and therefore of 
course more sons) than do middle class fathers. A sample of the sons would 
find more who said their fathers were working class, because there would be 
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a greater chance of working class sons being sampled. This would lead to 
an overestimate of the proportion of working class fathers (Glass, 1954; 191). 
Consider the following example: suppose there were only two 
classes, A and B, of equal size, and the population remained unchanged over 
two generations; but class A fathers had on average one child each (0.5 sons 
per father), while class B fathers each had on average three children (1.5 sons 
per father). We draw a sample of eight sons and ask them about their fathers. 
Regardless of the occupations of the sons, the distribution for eight fathers 
would be: 
Fathers A A A A B B B B 
+ + + .+ + + + + 
Birth Rate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
v v 
Sons a a b b b b b b 
6 out of 8 sons (the b's) would say that their fathers were class B, and only 
2 out of 8 (the a's) would declare-class A. Therefore our estimate of the 
fathers' occupational distribution on the basis of the sons' answers would not 
be 50:50 but 25:75 (for further discussion see Allan and Bytheway, 1973). 
In other words, we would expect a mobility table to exaggerate the 
proportion of fathers with manual jobs (because they have larger families), so 
I 
that even with no real occupational transition, there would be an appearance of 
difference between the fathers' and sons' occupational distributions, such that 
more Qf the sons seemed to be in non-manual employment. 
As a concrete illustration, the fertility for women married between 
1900 and 1909 was 2.64 for R-G Class I, ranging to 4.17 for R-G Class V. 
Marriages contracted between 1927 and 1931 (and enumerated 20-24 years later) 
produced from 1.88 to 3.18 children for the same classes (Carr-Saunders et al, 
1958; 25). To some extent these differences in crude averages are 'damped down' 
by infant mortality, so that 1.88 becomes 1.78 while 3.18 becomes 2.74 (H.o.H,l956; 
233) and the rate for sons becomes thereby approximately 0.89 (below full self-
replacement) and 1.37. The manual/non-manual 'differential' has been remarkably 
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constant, in relative terms, over the early part of this century' at 
around 1.9 and 2.7 live born children (Carr-Saunders et al, 19.58, 24). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to relate these changes in a direct 
way to the Glass mobility table for England and \vales. In practice, Glass's 
'generation' of sons was aged from 20 to 64 in 1949, that is, born between 
1929 md 1885. Thus the fertility rates cover a span of 44 years, during which 
time they were changing. As Glass himself has indicated elsewhere, the 
fertility differential between manual and non-manual classes was about 1.2:1 
for marriages in the 1870s and increased to about 1.4:1 around the time of 
the Great Depression (Glass 1969, 44; and private correspondence, 1976). The 
·published information on this is IDmewhat limited, and moreover, is presented 
in terms of several classifications, including the Registrar-General~s class 
h (.8) sc ema · . It is therefore not possible to specify the effect of differential 
fertility on the mobility table without a very considerable and intensive study, 
including the re-classification of original records, which lies outside of the 
focus of the present work, combined with a year by year matching of each annual 
component of the sample with its relevant class fertility rate. The situation 
on the occupational transition dimension is even poorer: there is no year-to-
year data, so that one is dependent on Census data available only at 10 year 
intervals. Inevitably we must be contented with an approximation. 
Glass's sons were born from the 1880's on, i.e. in the period when 
the class differential in fertility was in excess of 1.35:1.0 (Glass and Grebennick. 
1954). Furthermore, the bulk of the increase in the differential was achieved 
by the early years of this century (Carr-Saunders et al, 1958, quoted above). 
About two-thirds of Glass's sample was born after 1900, so that '.Je can set the 
approximate average . . . (1 X 1.35) + (2 X 1.42) d~fferent~al for the whole per~od as 3 
= 1. 39 7. This slightly underestimates the differential: therefore if we take the 
(8 ) It is remarkable how little this topic appears in otherwise lengthy 
discussio~s of fertility: see for example Ha,.Jthorne, 1970; Busfield and 
Paddon, 1977; Cotgrove, 1967, and other commentators on Bank's (1954) 
thesis on class differentials in fertility. 
figure of 1. 4:1 as applying throughout the period, we have an estimate 
which is still a cautious one, even allowing something for class differential 
1.n mortality (9 ) • 
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Thus we can argue that if we treat the reported number of non-manual 
fathers as a base figure for the real number in the fathers' generation, then 
the number of reported manual fathers overestimates the real number by a 
factor of 1.4. In other words, the 2199 'manual' fathers (i.e. using Miller's 
(1960) vers~on of Glass's data, as aga{nst Glass's categories 5, 6 and 7 which 
actually include routine white collar occupations) reported in the sample 
represents 1571 in the real distribution. This would give an occupational 
structure in which there were really 54.8% manual and 45.2% non-manual fathers, 
instead of the 62.9% and 37.1% in the reported case. The estimate of 8.1% 
difference in the proportions could of course have been derived from taking the 
reported number of manual fathers as the base and weighting up the non-manual 
reported figure instead(lO~ 
( 9) Obviously the average differential between the extremes, say R-G's Class I 
and Class V, could be calculated in basically the same fashion and would 
be much greater. 
(lO)The Pattern of Fertility since 1880 is as shown in Table 6.4 
TABLE 6.4: Differential Fertility* 
Date 
1880 - 1886 
1887 - 1889 
1890 - 1899 
1900 - 1909 
1910 - 1914 
1915 - 1919 
1920 - 1924 
* Sources: 
Live Births for Completed Families 
(a) Non-Manual** (b) Manual Ratio (b) to (a) 
4. 35 
3.50 
2.81 
2.36 
2.07 
1.90 
Glass and Grebennick, 1954: 
5.87 
4.83 
3.96 
3.36 
2.94 
2. 72 
1880 - 86: Table in footnote 2, p. 108 
1890- 99: Table 36, p. 107 
Remainder: Table 5, p. 4 
1. 35 
1. 38 
1.41 
1.42 
1.42 
1.43 
** Glass and Grebennick use a variety of classifications, most notably 'manual' 
and'non-manual'; and 'status group I' and'status group II', which seem to be 
the same. The three sources in Table 6.4 all use the manual/non-manual class-
ification. It should be remembered that the absolute levels of fertility are 
subject to effects such as differential age at marriage, and mortality. 
However, the authors argue that the ratio does not change very much if 
corrections are made: For example Table 35, p. 106, gives Status I: Status II 
ratios for the 1900s as 1.41; 1.41; 1.40; and 1.41. 
(footnote: continued on following page) 
While it is useful to obtain this estimate, the more significant 
point of this argument is the general one that the reported difference 
between fathers' and sons' occupational distributions under-estimates the 
number of middle-class fathers and over-estimates the number of working-
class fathers. It therefore creates a picture in which there appears to be 
even more inter-generational occupational transition than is in fact the 
case, which in turn generates more upward mobility. The occupational 
transition effect and the class differentials in fertility are complementary. 
Fathers' and Sons' Distribution in Glass's Data 
The effects of these processes should be evident in the following 
distributions of fathers and sons taken from the LSE study: the dotted line 
indicates the middle-class boundary. Table 65 is not a mobility table; it 
says nothing about how pairs of fathers and sons fit into particular classes, 
because the two columns are discrete. 
(10) - continued 
An alternative method of calculation is to take the number of men reporting 
fathers in each category, divide by the fertility rate, and then weight up 
the results by the necessary factor to reproduce the original total number of 
fathers. This can be done for each decade, drawing from Glass's (1954) tables 
1 and 6, and 6.2 E.g. for pre-1898 births: 
i) Listed non-manual fathers 250 Listed manual fathers 429 
ii)' Divided by non-manual Divided by manual 
fertility 2.13 fertility 2.94 
iii) Gives 117· Gives 145.9 
iv) Which weighted up by ~.Jh.i·ch weighted up by 
2.582 (i.e. 679 
(117 + 146) ) = 307. 
2.582 (i.e. 679 ) = (117 + 146) 377 
This system applied to each de~ade provides a weighted estimate of 39.7% non-
manual and 60.3% manual, as against the more straightforward estimate of 
40.4% and 59.6%, i.e. using Glass's categories 5, 6 and 7 because Miller does 
not provide sufficient detail to repeat our earlier calculations. The 
difference between the reported and 'real' figures is around 7 percentage 
points using Glass's ~ata~ or 8.1% usin~ the alternative method. 
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TABLE 6.5 Occupational Distributions of Fathers and Sons in 'social Hobility in 
Source: 
1.· 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Britain•. 
Glass, 1954; 180-3. 
Professionals 
Hanagerial/Executive 
Higher Non-Hanual/Supervisory 
Lower Non-Hanual/Supervisory 
Father's Occupation 
as reported by Son 
129 
150 
345 
518 
Routine non-Hanual/Skilled Hanual 1510 
Semi-Skilled Hanual 458 
Unskilled Hanual 387 
TOTALS 3497 
Son's Occupation 
as reported by Son 
103 
159 
330 
459 
1429 
593 
424 
3497 
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It will be immediately apparent that the two distributions do not differ greatly 
from one another, and that the difference between them in 5 out of 7 classes is 
not as expected. Classes 1, 3 and 4 of the middle class sector show more 
fathers than sons, while working classes 6 and 7 show fewer fathers than 
sons. If we split Class 5 into white collar and skilled manual (following Hiller, 
1960; 71), then routine white collar shows more sons than fathers, 244 to 156, 
and skilled manual shows fewer sons, 1185 to 1354, both differences being in the 
expected direction. However, on the basis of Hiller's conversion, fathers and 
sons are almost exactly equal: a difference of only three cases between number 
of non-manual fathers and non-manual sons. 
But it is known that all these figures distort the real distribution 
because of differential fertility, so that actual situation is one in which 
there are generally even more middle-class occupations in the father's 
generation than shown, and even fewer working-class· occupations. So the full 
extent of the difference is under-estimated. The Glass mobility table appears 
to refer to a society at a time when the middle class has contracted and 
the working class expanded, against the thesis of occupational transition. 
However, as we earlier showed from census data, for at least the 
last 30 years of the period covered by Glass (i.e. the period including for 
most of the sample the reported' father's job'), there was an expansion of 
the middle class. Thus it can be concluded that on the one hand there is 
census evidence of an expans~on of perhaps as much as 17%, controlling for 
population growth, while on the other hand the Glass data show a contraction 
of 18%(ll? Even if the exact magnitudes of these percentages are based on 
approximation, it still seems reasonable to raise questions about the 
validity of the sample data. 
To what extent can Glass's data be reconciled with these doubts? 
In the first place, we need to eliminate one tempting possibility: 
artefactual distortion due to definitions. Unlike his successors, Glass 
operationalises mobility by comparing the sons' occupations with the last 
known occupations of the fathers (Glass, 1954, 179). Later studies have 
used an earlier occupational status for the fathers,namely a job point during 
the sons' later schooldays, such as when the sons were aged 14 (or less 
commonly, 16). This has the advantage of connecting father and son 
sociologically, as the impact of family background is at its greatest when 
(ll ks Table 6.2 (above) showed, the male work force for England and Wales was 
11,744,994 in 1921. Had the non-manual class made up the same proportion 
_of that total as in 1951 -- 35.1% -- then there would have been 
4,122,493 non-manuals, an expansion of 602,789 on 3,519,704 (the number 
of non-manuals in 1921). That is, an expansion due to occupational 
transition, but controlling for the growth of the labour market, of 
17.1%. 
The contraction of 18% is given by taking the difference between the son's 
distribution as reported by Miller (1295 non-manual) and the estimated 
'real' father's distribution (i.e. allowing for differential fertility) 
of 45.2% of 3497, that is 1582 non-manual. The difference of 287 is 
expressed as a percentage of 1582 (18.1%). 
220 
221 
both father and son are members of one household, and the son is at a crucial 
stage of his education. It also allows for the use of path analysis, 
s1nce the logically prior father's occupation can be shown to be chronologically 
pr1or. It has the disadvantage, compared with Glass, that the father may yet 
experience more mobility between the time when his son is 14 and the end of 
his own career, so distorting the measurement of mobility. In fact, the 
average age of the father when his son was 14 would bein the late forties,so that 
a degree of stabilization would have already occurred. The weight of 
advantage seems to lie in the operationalisation of father's job at the time 
his son was about 14, which has almost universally been adopted. 
In the present context, it might be argued that by Glass's taking 
the fathers later in life, they would be more advanced 1n their careers and 
so more represented among the non-manual sector. This might account for the 
syrnmetryof the mobility table. There is no precise answer to this suggestion, 
although there is indirect evidence to the contrary. Firstly, we have just 
observed, the fathers' careers are on average well advanced by the time 
the{r sons reach 14 years old: Glass suggests 34 for the age of the father 
at the birth of his "mid-child", which means 48 years old by the time the 
mid-child is 14 (1954, 191). As we shall see for Scotland in the section on 
intra-generational mobility, most careers have run their course by this· stage. 
On the basis of Harris and Clausen's Labour Hobility in Great Britain (1966) 
Goldthorpe et al have recently argued that by the time men are aged 35 and 
over, they 
'will tend to have achieved a stage of relative 'occupational 
maturity', in the sense that from then onwards one may expect 
if not a cessation at all events a marked falling off 1n the 
probability of job changes which involve major shifts 1n 
occupational level'(l980, 51-52). 
We would therefore expect little difference to emerge from the use of 
different time points. 
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A second indirect source E the 1975 mobility data for Scotland. As 
Table 6.6 shows, the predicted pattern of differences in the two distributions 
is present when 'father's last job' is compared. \vith that of the son: 
TABLE 6~6 Occupational Distributions of Fathers ~nd Sons in SMS, 1975 
Occupational Class* Father's last Son's Current 
Occupation as Occupation as 
Reported by Son. Reported by Son 
1. Professional/Managerial 303 550 
2. Semi-professionals, Supervisory 585 689 
3. Foremen, s.e. artisans 585 645 
4. Routine White Collar 168 267 
Non-manual Subtotals 1641 (35. 3%) 2151 (46.3%) 
5. Skilled Manual 1088 940 
6. Semi-skilled Manual 872 897 
7. Unskilled Manual 1047 660 
Manual Subtotals 3007 (64.7%) 249.7 (53. 7%) 
TOTALS 4648 4648 
* Classes not those used by Glass 
There 1s one exception: Class 6, semi-skilled manual, where instead of there 
being fewer sons than fathers, there are 25 more. However, each of .. the 
other classes does fit, and the overall non-manual percentages are 35.3% for 
the fathers and 46.3% for the sons .Jf me had used the father's job when the son 
was 14, the comparable percentages vTOuld be 34. ~ and 46.3% and all seven of the 
classes follow the expected pattern .. Despite the common sense expectation 
that th~ greate~ differenc~ between the distribution, the greater 
the mobility, such are the detailed changes that there is 
marginally more mobility when one uses the father's last job as the 
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destination. On these several items of indirect evidence it is concluded 
that choice of job point for the father does not account for Glass's data 
being a 'deviant' case. 
Glass's Explanation of his Results 
It should be recognised that Glass himself was aware of the 
problems with his data and attempted to deal with them, although with only 
partial success. Indeed, his explanations may have unwittingly contributed 
to later mis-interpretations of his position, because he stressed the 
stability of the occupational structure and suggested that differential 
fertility was a phenomenon the impact of which is minimised by its occurring 
mainly ~n the recent past: 
I • • . • Mortal~ty ~s correlated negat~vely with social status, but so is 
fertility, so that the two factors will tend to counteract one 
another. It is unlikely, however, that they will completely cancel 
each other. Having regard for the historical development of social 
status differences in fertility, it is more probable that, relatively, 
the bias towards the representation of "manual" fathers will be 
greater on the more recent than the earlier cohorts '(Glass, 1954, 191). 
In v~ew of the little attention that it received from later commentators, 
Glass's discussion of this appears to have been taken as implying that the 
class fertility differential is not too important, because of the late 
appearance of the differential, and the countervailing affect of mortality. 
However, as we have shown above, the fertility differentials do effect the 
whole sample,and adjustment for mortality only very partially counteracts the 
differential (see Glass, 1969, 44, and Parker et al, 1972). It follows 
that the differences in fertility effect between the early and late cohorts 
covers more of the sample than some later commentators may have taken Glass to 
mean. 
Glass also recognises the occupational basis of the discrepant 
father/son pattern, but while accepting that it appears unusual, he goes on 
to argue that it represents a genuine change ~n the social structure of 
Britain. He writes that the data suggest 
'a slight decline in the opportun1 t1es for high s.tatus over 
time, a decline which appears in the data for the subjects' 
fathers as well as for the subjects themselves ... the most 
likely conclusion is that there was no important change between 
1911 and 1941 in the proportion of 'non -manual' employment for 
the (fathers) concerned ... the increase in the proportions of 
'manual 1 occupations- and therefore of occupations of 
relatively low rank in the prestige hierarchy - as the more 
recent decades of birth are approached, is genuine'(Glass, 
1954, 190, 192-4). 
Thus Glass accepts his data as being valid, even if 'somewhat unexpected' 
and requiring some justification. He argues that his finding of a 
contraction of middle class opportunity is not necessarily 
' in conflict with the known fact that certain specific types of 
white collar occupations have greatly expanded over the past 
fifty years. It would mean, however, that other occupations 
of comparable status have contracted to an even greater extent. 
And also that the expanded opportunities in certain white collar 
occupations have been taken over by women'(Glass, 1954, 190). 
But he does not elaborate on which specific occupations he has in mind, and 
he does not relate his findings to the thesis of occupational transition -
although of course the state of such theories 1n the 1950's was less 
advanced that the present day. Instead, he uses the 1951 census data as a 
comparison - or as Ridge has noted in the context of discussing 
peculiarities of brother/subject/ father differences, the origin.'1. 1 .. 
investigators 
'seem to have been somewhat surprised, and attempted by 
manipulations of census statistics to shmv that the same 
trend can be observed on a status scale other than that of 
Hall and Jones' (Ridge, 1974a, 91). 
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Glass and his colleagues present two tables of comparison with the 1951 census,one 
for the fathers and one for the subjects. Since the argument is essentially 
the same for both, we shall deal mainly with the latter, because the data on 
the fathers are a poor estimate of true occupational distribution due to the 
differential fertility factor. 
Glass claims that the occupational structure has led to an increase 
1n categories 4 to 7 inclusive ('manual ')(l 2)in his sample, from 78.7% for the 
(12) The form 'manual~ is adopted to emphasi1e that, strictly speaking, Glass is 
not talking about manual workers but a somewhat larger category including 
some lower white-collar workers. 
225 
oldest 10 year cohort, to 89% for the youngest co~ort, with a consistent 
trend for each cohort in-between. He compares this with 1951 data (i.e. 
fro~ a single census) showing that the R-G's social classes 3 to 5 
inclusive (again 'manual') has_ similar scores of 78.4% to 87.7% for 
i:::1e same cohorts. This is shown in Table 6.7: 
TABLE 6. 7 Proportions of 'Hanual ' Respondents J.n four cohorts as reported 
J.n Social Mobi 1i ty in Britain ( 
Source: adapted from Glass, 1954, Tables 1 and 12; 181 and 194_ 
Cohort Born J.n Glass Sample 1951 Census 
Total %-,Manual' (Cats.4-7) % '"Manual'(R-G,3-5) 
1890 - 1899 540 78.7 78.4 
1900 - 1909 751 79.7 79.2 
1910 - 1919 772 83.1 81.5 
1920 - 1929 755 89.0 87.7 
-
Overall 3497 83.0 81.3 
It is Glass's argument that the smaller representation of older men J.n the 
'manual' sector indicates a shift in the underlying occupational structure, 
towards the manual sector. In other words, the older men entered 
· occupations when there were more 'non-manual' ones available - so fewer are 
in 'manual' occupations now - whereas the younger men were competing for a 
contracted supply of 'non-manual' jobs, and so were forced to appear in 
greater numbers as 'manual' employees. 
A re-examination of the Census data, this time including the three 
Census points 1921, 1931 and.l95l.·and using approximately the same cate-
gorisation scheme shows the saae general level of the dichotomy but its 
pattern over time for economically active oales does not uphold Glass's position. 
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TABLE 6.8 Changes in Proporations of ·'Manual' and 'Non-Manual' Economically 
Active Men aged 20-64 in Scotland, England and ~.Jales, 1921, 1931 
and 1951. 
Source: Census Occupation Tables (See Chapter 5 ) 
'Manual 'Non-Manual·' Totals (excluding armed forc~s etc) (SEG's 6-12, 15) (SEG' s 1-5,13,14) 
! 
't:l 't:l 't:l 't:l i 't:l 't:l 
't:l en ~ Q) 't:l Cll ~ Q) 't:l Cll 
I ~ Q) 
(:: Q) til I= ~ Q) til ~ ~ Q) til ~ 
~r-l r-l •.-I COr-l r-l •.-l tllr-l r-l •.-l 
r-l co ~ ~ r-l til +.J ~ r-l til +.J ~ eo~ 0 M::;:: 0 bO::;:: 0 
(:: (.) 0 ~ (.) 0 (:: (.) 0 
~c<:l (/) (.) ~c<:l U) (.) ~c<:l U) (.) 
1921 86.8 86.2 86.7 13.2 13.8 13.3 11,744,964 1,480,834 13,255,798 
1931 88.1 87.7 88.1 11.9 ; 12.3 11.9 13,247,333 1,542,253 14,789,586 i 
! 
1951 84.8 85.1 84.8 15.2 i 14.9 15.2 13,419,178 1,540,784 14,959,962 
I 
These figures, taken direct from the censuses for 3 different time points, 
indicate that the 'manual' sector fell by 2% between 1921 and 1951, despite the 
important fluctuation in 1931 due to the Depression, whereas Glass's figures, 
based on the cohorts of a single census, give the impression of a monotonic 
9.3% increase overall and 8.5% for the 3 youngest cohorts. The use of the 
three census time points is nore reliable than an estinate based on cohorts at a 
single time point. The findings from the three censuses match those of Bain 
et al (1972) who, using a slightly different categorisation scheme on the 
occupational population of Britain,also report 1921 has a lower proportion of 
manual occupations than ~n 1931, but higher by around 2% than in 1951. In 
addition, 1911 shows an even lower figure than for 1921, albeit by less than 
1% (Bain et al, 1972, 113). Goldthorpe (1980, 60) reports a contraction of 
5%, slightly more than does Routh (1965, 4-5). Other writers on evidence of 
varying reliability have also supported the view that the long term trend ~n 
industrial societies has been for a contraction of the manual sector, not the 
expansion Glass has claimed (See Chapter 3 ). 
227 
This interpretation is supported by the distribution of a sampLe 
of Scots born between 1910 and 1929. These men are the contemporaries of · 
Glass's two youngest, 1910-1919, and 1920-1929 cohorts. While perfect 
correspondence is not to be expected (sampling error, national difference, 
coding compatibility), the direction of the difference between the two sets 
of figures, taken for caution's sake at a. crude level, suggests that very 
similar men may be proportionately less •·manual·' at a later stage in their 
careers. 16.0% of the Glass 1910 cohort were in' non-manual' jobs (categories 
1-3, Glass, 1954, 186): interviewed in 1975 the Scottish 1910 cohort reported 
23.6% currently in'non-manual'jobs. Glass's (younger) 1920 cohort were only 
11. O%'"non-manual"' in 1949: 27.5% of their Scottish contemporaries by 1975 
h ld • I I • (13} were o ~ng non-manual Jobs . If one accepts for a moment that both the 
Glass and the Scottish data on respondents themselves are reliable, then we 
are left with a career effect which helps to explain the difference between 
the reported levels of non-manual employment. 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that age and hence intra-
generational 'career' mobility takes sufficient men out of the manual sector 
through promotions to produce the cohort illusion which Glass takes for the 
real occupational structure. In other words, each successively younger 
cohort is more manual, but because the men are younger, and not because the 
occupational structure has changed. 
Indeed Glass himself presents conflicting evidence. In a footnote 
discussing.Bowley's work and updating it, he shows a small increase ~n 
'non-manual' male occupations which. he does not explain beyond reference to 
'important elements of non-comparability' (Glass, 1954, 193). And while Glass 
also claims to find an expansion of the 'manual'sector for three groups each 
aged 45-54 in the 1911 to 1931 Census (Glass, 1954, 191-2), this evidence is 
not only bedevilled by comparison problems, but confuses age equivalence with 
functional career equivalence. 
(l3)It should be noted that overall, England and Wales has more non-manual 
occupations than Scotland. Therefore to find that it was the Scots in 1975 
who were more non-manual than Glass's men suggest that ,. career' maturity may 
have a considerable effect. 
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That ~s to say, entry to an occupational sector (such as foreman, 
or manager) is not always at an identical age for all men at all historical 
periods, even if entry into the "non-manual" sector always on average 
increases with age for any one cohort over time. This is because of 
institutional changes, such as educational reforms and the growth of 
credentialism, and historical events such as wars which affect men of 
different ages in different ways (for some, career prospects may be 
improved by the death of rivals or seniors, but in turn that accelerated 
group constitute a greater block to promotion for the next youngest cohort). 
The occupational situation of any cohort is the product of 3 major factors: 
a) Its unique historic location, which no other cohort can 
ever share 
b) Its stage of career cycle, that is to say, its seniority, 
which other younger cohorts will in turn occupy; and 
c) The changing occupational structure (with its expansion of 
non-manual opportunities) which applies to all cohorts, 
albeit more to the youngest cohort in the process of 
training and recruitment as this group is the most 'flexible'. 
The inter-play of these factors is complex, but Glass has interpreted the data 
on the three 45-54 year old cohorts and the data in Table 6.6 above solely in 
terms of the last of these factors. He has mistaken what may be changes in 
access to certain jobs at different career stages for changes ~n the overall 
structure. By the same token, the evidence for the Scottish labour force 
quoted above must be regarded with caution because the increase in the 
non-manual proportion is not only due to seniority, as we implied, but is 
(14) 
also due in part to changes of occupational structure. 
(14)Although cohorts generally display little difference between their 
average status levels, this does not necessarily mean there is no career 
effect. It may be that older cohorts have benefitted from career 
mobility, but that younger cohorts have benefitted disproportionately 
more from the expansion of the non-manual sector, i.e. structural 
mobility. This kind of pattern therefore appears as the dominant one ~n 
current mobility studies which reflect the expansion of industrial 
society throughout this century, but see Hauser (1975b, 588-590) for a 
difference of emphasis. 
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Alternative Explanation of Glass~s Resul~~ 
Because of these observations about changes in the occupational 
structure, age-effects, and differential fertility, Glass's interpretation 
of the problems apparent in his data cannot be accepted as a solution. The 
problems persist. Because gross mobility rates are necessarily dependent 
on the marginal distributions,' Social Mobility in Britain' provides an 
unreliable estimate of intergenerational occupational mobility, which in 
turn will require the revision of those of our theories of class relations 
1n Britain which derive from the 1949 study. 
If this is accepted, it is still an open question as to what went 
wrong with the LSE inquiry. The sample design 1s not obviously faulty, the 
response rate of 9296 out of 12,924 (75.9%) is respectable and the age/marital 
status comparison with the Registrar-General's estimates suggest that the 
achieved interviews provided an adequate representation of the population. 
Glass says that while there is some small bias in the age and marriage 
composition, it 1s doubtful if this is serious enough to affect the analysis, 
in part because the use of cohorts eliminates the over-weighting of some 
age groups·. The other variables --
'fertility and attainment of secondary education- do not 
appear to have been affected to any considerable extent ... 
In sum, therefore, though the sample is by no means 
perfect, the bias involved is not likely to be crucial and 
is to a substantial extent counteracted by the method of 
analysis'(Glass, 1954, 92). 
Indeed, as indicated below, the occupational representativeness of the 
respondents is not what is in question, since again, though not perfect, the 
bias is not great and it does not provide an explanation for the deviant 
fathers' distribut-ion. By the same token, an over-representation of older age 
groups and married men does not explain the fathers' pattern. It would be 
an unfortunate chance if a sample which is unexceptional on five variables 
should be widely deviant on a sixth which in turn we might expect to be 
related to at least some of the five. 
A second possiblity is a class differential in attrition rates: if 
migration and war casualties selected disproportionately for the sons of 
k . 1 f . . 230 war Lng c ass athers, then the resLdual populatLon would appear to have an 
excess of middle class fathers, because only the sons of the middle class 
would remain to be sampled. If this were a major effect, it would impinge 
most on the young men who fought the 1914-18 war, and who later participated 
in the great emigration of the late 1920's; that is to say, men born between 
1890 and 1899. This cohort is only 75% of the size of the other complete 
cohorts (Glass, 1954, 90), and so if there are significant differential 
attrition rates, this cohort should demonstrate them, assuming that some 
general process of adjustment has not since intervened. 
In the first place, cohort 1890-99 does not show a marked excess 
of non-manual respondents, a necessary condition if its working class population 
has suffered differential attrition. Its proportion Ls 21.3%, only 0.9% more 
than the next youngest generation. Second~ al thou~jh the cohort. does have 
a higher proportion of non-manual fathers (20.6% in categories 1, 2 and 3, 
while the others score 16.3%, 17.4% and 14.6% in descending order of age) it 
is in line with the pre-1890 cohort which also has a high proportion, 21.6%, 
but which has not been reduced in size by the war. Furthermore the 1890-99 
reduced cohort's net contribution of fathers is small precisely because it 
is a smaller cohort. Third, the marginal totals for the study mean that·some 
downward mobility was almost inevitable - but within the differential attrition 
model, there is no immediate explanation of why the working class sons of middle 
class fathers were not equally at risk as working class sons of working class 
fathers - so sharply reducing the chances of the downwardly mobile of getting 
into Glass's sample. One is still left with the lack of fit between the fathers' 
and sons' distribution in a sample which adequately represents the population 
from which the respondents were drawn. Furthermore, another study only two years 
later (Benjamin, 1958, 266) reports 26.6% non-manual fathers and 34.3% non-manual 
sons (as against Glass's 37.1% and 37%). 
It is; .therefore, necessary to suggest that there is something seriously 
wrong with Glass's data, most probably 1n the father's occupations. The 
source of error may be something to do with the respondent's accuracy or 
veracity; it may lie in the interviewing technique; it may be a coding 
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problem, or a combination of any of these. (15) There is now no way to tell, 
although the discussion below reviews some further possibilities. But in 
the absence of some explanation which can also restore confidence in the 
data, it must be strongly urged that conclusions based on the mobility 
rates reported by Glass be held in abeyance. 
This sceptical approach to the Glass data is not the position 
adopted by others writing since the father/son peculiarity became known. 
Perhaps it is the very recognition of the fact that the fathers' distribution 
does not represent a population in the normal sense that has discouraged them 
giving the matter further consideration. The international comparative 
sociologists (Bendix and Lipset, 1959; Miller, 1960; Svalastoga, 1965; Fox 
and Miller, 1966; Cutright, 1968; etc.) have all accepted Glass without 
question - as one would expect, given their general orientation towards grand 
comparative exercises and their lack of interest ~n cultural and historical 
. . (l 6 ) B . bb k h . . 1 . f h . b var~at~ons. ~ y remar s on t e s~m~ ar~ty o t e two generat~ons, ut 
uses the data as the cornerstone for his discussion of mobility measures 
(Bibby, 1975, 125). Duncan-Jones notes that' it is well known that this table 
has rather a regular pattern' (Duncan-Jones, 1972, 195): again, he uses the 
data in his exposition (both Bibby and Duncan-Jones employ the Miller vers~on 
of the Table 2 data (Miller 1960)). It is slightly ironic that the 
development of the various coefficients and methods of analysis have used 
concrete examples drawn from a table that is so untypical of mobility tables 
generally. 
Noble ~s one of the few commentators who has criticised the LSE 
study; however despite doubts about the sawple, he does not argue for the 
rejection of Glass's findings (Noble, 1972, 1975a). He suggests that the 
1949 study 
'which B correctly indicating little change ~n occupational 
(l 5 ) The interview schedules were destroyed as part of standard Civil Service 
procedu~es, and so are not available for analysis. 
(16) For a comment on the difficulties inherent in comparative analysis, see 
Payne, 19733.. 
structure, but, simultaneously, over-representing non-manual 
workers among the respondents, may also seriously over-
estimate the non-manual element in the generation their 
fathers represent '(Noble, 1972, 428). 
In other words, he attributes the excess of non-manual fathers to an 
excess of non-manual sons in the sample. However, this involves a number 
of misinterpretations. Firstly, Noble's statement is predicated on the 
assumption that Glass correctly indicates little occupational change, 
whereas the actual change, as indicated above, is very different from the 
picture Glass presents. Secondly, to what extent does Glass over-
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represent the non-manual sons? Noble gives four different figures for the 
non-manual proportion in 1951: 26.4%, 38.4%, 32% and 37%. The first is for 
all males, the second is for household heads (both taken from the 1951 Census 
of Great Britain), the third is from Beniamin's study (Benjamin, 1958), and 
the fourth is Miller's classes 1 to 3a, taken from Miller's account (which 
despite Miller's claim, refers to England and Wales only). Noble uses the 
difference between the first and last of these figures as an indication 
that Glass's sample is unsatisfactory. 
However, the correct comparison with the 37% reported as non-
manual sons by Glass is the age-adjusted English and Welsh civilian 
population figure for R-G's 1951 classes 1, 2 and 3, less the skilled 
workers, SEG 10: this g1ves 35.5% as the census estimate, or an error of 
1.5% (Census 1951, Occupation Tables, 148-9, Nos. 17 and 18). The earlier 
discussion of 'non-manual' by Glass gave the sample sons as 17% 'non-manual' 
(Table~ above, categories 1, 2 and 3), as against the census estimate of 
18.1%. So that while the sample is not perfect, its small error lies mainly 
1n its shortage of upper middle class (categories 1, 2 and 3) and its excess 
of lower middle class representation (category 4 and the routine white-
collar part of category 5, which contribute to the 37% figure). But the 
extent of the over-representation is not as great as Noble implies, and the 
larger part of it appears Ln the classes which are most open to 
(17) 
imprecisions of coding. 
Even if there LS an over-representation of non-manual sons, 
along the general lines of Noble's argument, this only relates to an 
excess of non-manual fathers provided that one accepts that there are 
high self-recruitment rates. But belief about these rates Ls of course 
largely based on Glass's work, so that an element of tautology creeps in. 
If we accept the figure of 1.5% excess of non-manual sons, this appears 
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to be equivalent to saying that about 54 cases in the first five categories 
of Miller's data should really be manual workers. But none of these could 
be removed from the top three categories because these are already in 
deficit(by about 1.1% in the under 60's part of the sample) and indeed 
require an addition of, say, around 40 more non-manuals. The total effect 
is that the upper three non-manual categories (1 to 3) have 592 cases (17%) 
and should have 633 (18.1%), while the lower two non-manual categories 4 
and Sa, have 703 (37%- 17%) and should be 608 (35.5%- 18.1%), for an 
overall non-manual total of 1241 (35.5%).' But if we assume that adjustment 
to non-manual sons changes the number of non-manual fathers by one for every 
son (i.e. assuming perfect self-recruitment at this dichotomous level), then 
while categories 4 and Sa would contribute fewer middle class fathers, 
(17) The concentration of over-representation in categories 4 and Sa is 
important, because they have particular mobility characteristics which 
ramify throughout the mobility matrix. In general, lower grade supervisory 
staff (e.g. foremen) and routine grades of non-manual work (e.g. clerks 
and shop assistants) are among those categories more likely to be recruited 
from a wide range of backgrounds (Goldthorpe, 1975, 9-10). In the Scottish 
Mobility Study, the coding of supervisors and inspectors proved technically 
difficult and despite detailed checks and recodings, the eventual sample 
showed about 8% foremen, compared with the 1971 census figure of 5% 
(although these figures are not for strictly compatible populations and the 
census figure should be marginally lower). Presumably this is a self-
inflation effect, and it may be that part of the problem with the Glass 
data arises from a similar phenomenon. 
Among other very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter 
Trevor Noble has pointed out the difficulty of allocating SEG 8 (service 
workers) who should really be split between Hall-Jones categories Va and VI. 
If SEG 8 is reclassified as manual as Noble has done, then the Glass/Census 
comparison becomes 37%/31.3%, which is more in line with his criticism of 
the sample. 
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categories 1, 2 3 would contribute more; the 39 cases which are moved 
would 'take with them' their fathers, so that we would still have exactly 
the same excess of futhers, proportionate to the number of sons. If one 
assumes, more realistically, a more moderate degree of self-recruitment then 
the excess of non-manual fathers in class 1, 2 and 3 increases absolutely 
although not relatively, while the excess in 4 and Sa becomes relatively 
greater (since removing one son removes less than one father). Conversely 
the new replacement manual sons add less than their own number to the 
manual fathers, which worsens the shortage of manual fathers because the 
sons' total is increased more than the fathers'. This effect will be 
limited by the fact that there is less downward than upward mobility in 
industrial society, so that adding manual sons add mainly to the manual 
fathers whereas any adjustment to the non-manual sons has some effect on the 
manual fathers. Again, the impact of adjustment in one category depends on 
its s1ze and pattern of recruitment. We are therefore unable to accept 
Noble's explanation of the discrepancies in the fathers and sons distributions . 
. Noble's original comments about errors in the sample develop from 
his view of age and career effects. He argues that household-heads have a 
higher social class rating than 'all males' (26.4% and 38.4% non-manual 1n 
19Sl), and because men with sons are more likely to be household-heads, than 
'all sons', there should be more fathers in the non-manual category than 
sons (Noble, 1972, 427). It is for this reason that he 1s less worried by 
the over-representation of non-manual fathers. However, s1nce Glass is 
talking about men aged 20 or over, 1 all sons 1 are closer to marriage age and 
household-headship than 'all males' , the latter including males lS - 19. So 
if Noble is correct, 1 all sons 1 should occupy the middle ground between 
household-heads and 1 all males ·1 • It has already been shown that on the 
categories 1- Sa definition, 3S.S% of' sons' over 20 years old are non-
manual; this compares with 36.0% for all males and 37.0% for household-heads 
(Mar~h, 1965, 200). (37.0% is chosen in preference to Noble's 38.4% in 
order that all three sets of figures are calculated 1n an identical way). 
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Thus, firstly, the difference between household-heads and males is not as 
great as Noble suggests (1.5% or at most 2.9% on Noble's figure) and 
secondly, the 'all males' are more .. non-manual' than their older 'all sons', 
so suggesting that the age/household-head effect is more complicated than 
it initially appears. Furthermore, an age effect on this scale would show 
up if the occupational structure was nearly stable, which contrary to 
Noble's view, it was not. So although he is aware of the peculiarities of 
the 1949 data, his assumptions about structural continuity and career 
effects prevent him from recognising the importance of the fathers' over-
representation. 
Similarly, while in a 1972 paper Ridge and Macdonald have commented 
on the way that the. pre-dating fathers' distribution resembles the later 
sons' d1stribution (Ridge and Macdonald, 1972, 142), they continue to use 
the 1949 data in a search for mobility trends (and Ridge has carried out 
further analysis more recently; see below). As they say, their tables for 
1949, 1951 (Benjamin, 1958) 19.62 (Runciman, 1966) and 1963 (Butler and 
Stokes, 1969) show no clear patterns, and they hesitate to draw conclusions 
about trends from the evidence of those four tables. Having considered the 
·lack of comparability due to different time points for the fathers' jobs, due 
to non-response, and the option of' concocting a tale' to fit the discrepancies 
and finding 1n none of these solutions a satisfactory answer, they raise the 
possibility of eliminating one table. But because the criteria for selecting 
'a table to discard are unclear' (Ridge and Macdonal~, 1972, 142) they leave 
the question open. The implication of their elimination idea is that the 
Glass data is the odd-man-out: without it the sons' non-manual proportions 
would be 34.3%, 35.6% and 37.5% for 1951, 1962 and 1963 respectively. The 
fathers non-manual proportions would be 26.6%, 25.6% and 29.5% (although this 
latter comparison is only approximate - see Ridge and Macdonald, 1972, 142 and 
146-7). These figures are closer to a consistent pattern and the three 
'retained' time points all clearly show the excess of non-manual sons over 
non-manual fathers. Thus whereas Ridge and Macdonald hesitate to discard the 
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1949 table for want of criteria the present author would suggest that 
the evidence of this chapter provides sufficient grounds for the elimination 
of the LSE data to be made.· 
Graeme Ford has identified further parallel peculiarities 
encountered by both Keith Hope and John Ridge in their attempts to 
the Glass data. In his paper 'Trends in the openness of British Society 
in the Present Century' (1975) Hope explores changes in mobility by comparing 
the overlapping parts of the 1949 study and the 1972 Nuffield study. Even 
allowing for problems of replication, two results do not match. Firstly, the 
marginals are different, with the relevant part of the 1972 sample being much 
closer to the 1951 Census figures (Hope, 1975, Pt. II, Table 1). Secondly, 
the association between fathers and sons is weaker in the later survey: the 
product moment correlations being 0.47 in 1949 but 0.36 in the Oxford inquiry, 
a difference not explained just by the change in marginals. Hope 
concludes that to bring the two mobility tables into line would require a 
reduction in self-recruitment in all categories 1n the Glass Study .. 
Hope goes on to explore possible reasons for the lack of fit, 
perhaps reflecting what was argued at the start of this chapter, that 
nobody wishes to doubt the credibility of Glass's study. He therefore 
examines differential effects of mortality and migration, and with reference 
to the Oxford sample, inaccurate recall, incorrect Hall-Jones coding, and poor 
interviewing. However, none of these, even had they been found tn be appicable, explains 
why self-recruitment should be higher in 1949, or why the marginals should 
be different. Despite his apparent wish to retain the Glass evidence, Hope 
concludes that 
'the two studies remain stubbornly divergent ... it seems reasonable 
to place greater reliance on the results of the later enquiry (lB) 
rather than on those of the earlier study'(Hope, 1975, 38, 49) 
(l~A fuller account of Hope and Ridge's attempt to make sense of the 
discrepancies can be found in Payne and Ford (1977a). 
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The second source of discrepancies in the Glass data which 
Graeme Ford has identified is in the 'vork of John Ridge (1974a). Ridge 
re-exam~nes the correlations between the respondent, several brothers, and 
his father, and reports a number of unlikely outcomes. For example, 
instead of inter-sibling correlations being more or less equal, the'between 
brother' value is higher than between the respondent and his brothers, while 
the respondent/father correlation is substantially higher than that between 
brothers and father. 
Ridge explores various possible explanations such as sampling error, 
fallible memory, sample attenuation, and data processing error, "'ithout 
providing a satisfactory answer. He does however raise two speculations which 
deserve further consideration. The first is, quite simply, that respondents 
do not tell the truth. They downgrade their brothers out of ''sibling rivalry' 
and upgrade their fathers to their own achieved class position, as a result 
of neurotic status consciousness .. This so undermines the whole enterprise 
of social mobility research as to be almost unthinkable! Happily, there are 
stronger grounds for refusing to countenance this possibility. It it were 
true; the excess of non-manual fathers ~n Glass (due to 'upgrading') ,,rould 
also appear in other mobility studies: as we have seen, there ~s no sign of 
this. 
We could probably construct an explanation based on systematic 
distortion on the part of the respondents along the lines indicated above; 
the problem here is that is stands or falls on the imputation of complex 
motive and behaviour patterns which however superficially plausible, are 
unamenable to evidence. Furthermore, even if we are happy to take this course, 
we are left with one major question: exactly what was it about the Glass study 
that led to the respondents' falsifications, where other studies seem to 
show less evidence of such peculiarities? 
The second problem which Ridge highlights is the actual recording 
and coding of the occupational data. The occupational information on 
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brothers (and fathers) was collected in less detail than that for the 
respondent. In addition, as Macdonald (1974) and Hope and Goldthorpe (1974) 
have pointed out, the directions given to coders for applying the Hall-Jones 
scale were not comprehensive: 
'the instructions followed in coding occupations into the Hall-Jones 
scale on the first occasion of its use (Glass, 1954) have never 
been published ... Certainly it cannot be assumed, given the 
inadequate guidance under which coders must have worked, that 
highly comparable classifications of occupations have been produced. ' 
(Hope and Goldthorpe, 1974, 7-8). 
It is possible that the coding of the fathers' and brothers' occupations 
was less successful than for the respondent. This would not, however, 
explain why fathers were 'upgraded' and brothers 'down-graded', unless there 
was some additional factor which applied differentially to the fathers and 
brothers.(l 9 ) Coding error may lie at the back of the problem, but there 1s 
very little hard evidence to go on, and even so, there seems to be no 
parsimoneous explanation for all of the various discrepancies that have been 
encountered. 
(19) There is one speculation ar1s1ng from personal correspondence and informal 
conversations which might fit the bill - but it must be stressed that it 
is highly speculative. In the Glass questionnaire,it is said that the 
father's and son's main jobs were on the same page. If the father's job 
was insufficiently detailed, it is possible that the easy availability of 
the more detailed son's job might have influenced the coding decision on 
the father. A coder unconsciously believing that there was little social 
mobility might have been guided to allocate the father into the same 
category as the son. For example, if a father was an 'engineer", and the 
son a factory manager, the father might be located as a professional 
engineer rather that a skilled manual worker (as the discussion of mobility 
in the industrial sector below shows, this could be no small factor). The 
net effect would be to make fathers occupationally like their sons, increasing 
the former's proportions of non-manual posts, reducing apparent mobility 
and increasing self-recruitment - which fits neatly with the objections 
raised so far in this chapter, except for Ridge's finding that the brothers 
have been 'down-graded'. As the brothers' jobs were recorded on a separate 
page of the questionnaire, perhaps there was less contamination, although 
this seems a weak explanation. 
Concluding Remarks on Glass 
This chapter has not succeeded in locating a satisfactory 
answer of why the 1949 study produced dubious findings. However, it 
is the present author's contention that serious doubts have been 
raised about the results, most notably with respe~t to the fathers' 
occupational distribution and therefore by implication with respect 
to the flows of mobility reported( 20). This was the central purpose 
of the chapter. As indicated at the start of this chapter, and as 
we shall see below, many sociologists have fmil t models of the class 
structure on Glass's evidence, so that the critique of his work has 
far-reaching implications. 
It might be, nonetheless, that the reader rejects the doubts 
outlined 1n the previous pages. If so, there is still good reason to 
make one hesitate to draw too heavily ori Social Mobility in Britain in 
anything other than a historical capacity: the Glass data refer to a 
very much earlier period, compared with the American or latest 
British studies. 
Towards the upper limits, for the older respondents 1949, 
Glass was dealing with people whose birth year was in the early 1880s 
and whose fathers' birth year came in the.mid-1840s (taking Glass's 
estimate of father's mid-child birth at age 34 (Glass, 1954, 191). 
Such a father would reach the equivalent of retirement age 1n 1910, 
still in the era of horse-drawn transport and well before the start 
of the First World War. His son could easily have worked for over 
20 years before the First War, and wou~d be reaching retirement age 
during World War II. Of course, at the other end of the age scale, 
the 20 year-old born to a 34 year-old father had worked only since the 
(20) It should be emphasised that the criticisms are limited to the mobility 
findings per se, and not taken as applying generally through the book, 
a point made by Jean Floud. 
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end of that war, but his father 1 s work experience would nevertheless 
start before the previous war - 1909: with successively older respondents, 
the father's work experience (particularly his entry into the labour 
force) becomes increasingly characterised by the inter-~1ar years, 
and the 19th Century. It follows that the mobility Glass reports is 
strongly bound up in occupational and social processes that had 
little direct relevance in 19.49. Over two-thirds of Glass's sample 
have their mobility defined by the occupations of fathers who reached 
retirement age before the end of the Second ~.Jar. 
Thus the problem with Social Mobility in Britain can be seen 
as a much simpler and more obvious one. The research dates from 1949; 
we are now ~n the 1980s. Even in the peculiarly non-empirical 
traditions of British Sociology, normal practice would make 
sociologists hesitant ~n attributing to the social conditions of the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s the results of surveys carried out only 4 years 
after the end of the last war. But all mobility studies are by 
nature retrospective and historical, and the LSE study is now more 
historical than most. It follows that there can be very little 
justification in uncritically regarding the present mobility processes 
of Britain (or 'advanced industrial society') as being those reported 
by Glass, something which certainly was the practice until very recently. 
Nonetheless it would be ungenerous in the extreme to finish 
this chapter without paying tribute to David Glass. Despite all of 
the criticisms outlined above, his contribution to the field of social 
mobility as an original thinker and as a stimulus to other scholars 
was nothing short of monumental, And at a much lower and personal level, 
he was helpful and courteous in the extreme to the present author when 
' the early work for this chapter ,.;as being carried out. It ~s only 
possible to operate in the field of social mobility at its current 
level because of the groundwork which he did. 
In the remainder of this study, there is little direct 
building on Social Mobility in Britain. On the contrary, much of the 
inspiration comes from rejecting much of that work. Nonetheless, the 
workings of this dialectic should not obscure the seminal character and 
the high esteem in which David Glass's work is held by the author. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Mobility and Class among Scottish Males 
The reject1on of Glass's findings presents us with two problems. 
First, if what we thought to be true is in fact 1.n error, what are the present 
rates of mobility? To some extent, the answer to that question has already 
come from the Nuffield Study, but of course not for Scotland. The second 
problem, which Goldthorpe has also addressed, is one of reconceptualising 
some of the middle range theories of the British class structure. Again, 
the Nuffield study's answers to this problem are less than complete, both 
for technical reasons such as the class schema used - and for conceptual 
reasons - such as the heavy dependence on a three-class model of Goldthorpe's 
own. 
( 1) 
Although in principle it would be possible to take the Nuffield 
study as a model for the analysis of the Scottish data, this is not the 
approach which has been chosen, nor is the analysis primarily geared to a 
comparison with England and Wales. Par.t of the reasoning behind these decisions 
is methodological, not least a concern with the Hope-Goldthorpe scale in its 
collapsed form. The details of these doubts are presented in Appendix I 
(see below) but the heart of the issue lies in the construction of the 
original scale and in the way in which the structure of the 124 point scale 
can be retained in reducing these categories to 7 broad groupings. The 
(1) To be more precise, Goldthorpe (1980) is working with a model 
consisting of a service class, a manual working class, and a· 
residual set of strata which lies between the two. 
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groupings used to analyse the Scottish study are different from those used. 
by the Nuffield team: the advantages lie in a 'tidier' set of categories,-
more evenly-sized, with less over-lap of Hope-Goldthorpe scale values, 
and based on a much simpler set of assumptions about how the values were 
originally derived. However, the emphasis on the importance of 'employment 
status' -manager, foreman, employee, etc - in constructing a Scottish class 
schema is in effect both a technical and a theoret~cal concern. The occupational 
classes used are set squarely in Lockwood's conception of work and market situatior; 
even if for pragmatic reasons groups have to be aggregated with others 
having slightly different situations. 
This in turn is part of a wish to develop an independent approach 
to mobility, based on occupations. To have set out to compare England and 
Wales with Scotland would have entailed responding to a model that for 
theoretical reasons the author finds not entirely satisfactory. For example 
much of Goldthorpe's writing involves statements about mobility which exclude 
the intermediate strata (because he himself feels their position is ambiguous 
1n the way he has defined them (Goldthorpe, 1980, 41-2)), while his notion 
of a service class, whatever its merits, involves combining a very wide range 
of occupations, and scale values. (2) A comparative exercise is obviously 
worthwhile, but must take second place to the prime task of developing an 
explanation for mobility, and a clear picture of Scottish mobility in its own 
right. A comparison would call for using one model and one classification, 
and neither study has yet been analysed using the other study's class 
schema. An additional advantage of separate analysis is that both the 
general evidence about mobility and the critique of theories of the class 
(2) In any scale it is easy to discover anomalies, so that the value 
of documenting examples is limited. Suffice to say that combining 
professionals and senior management of, say ICI or Shell, with 
window dressers, police sergeants, T.V. actors and lab. technicians 
seems to the author to createaheterongeneousclass, particularly when 
the scale values ·derived from the views of a random sample of 
respondents range from 82.05 to 48.15 i.e. the one class covers 55% 
of the entire scale range, with considerable overlaps of values with 
other classes. Other criticisms of the class schema can be found 
in Penn (1981): see also Goldthorpe's reply (1981) 
structure are not th~n dependent on a single analytical framework. (3) 
However, although we are interested in developing an occupational 
perspective on mobility, the starting point is the same as for a more 
conventional social or class mobility approach, namely the mobility table and 
rates of flows. The major questions to be considered are how much mobility, 
between which origins and destinat{ons, in which directions, has the labour 
force experienced? What do these flows tell us about structured inequalities 
and about the membership of the occupational groups that are generally taken 
to be the building blocks of social class? And finally, what do these results 
mean for existing theories of class structure? 
Intergenerational Mobility Among Scottish Men 
The data discussed in the following sections follow the convention 
of dealing with male mobility .between the respondent's job at the time 
of interview, and his father's job when the respondent was 14 years old( 4). In 
cases of unemployment, or where the father had been called up into the wartime 
armed services,the last civilian job was taken instead. Respondents were 
asked 'What is your job now?' as one of a series of occupation questions, all 
of which required a job title, a job description, ('What exactly do you do as 
a ••••.••••••••••. ?') an industry, and an employment status. The question 
concerning the father, or Head of Household where there was no father living 
with family, was 'And what was your 'father's 1 job at that time? I mean 
what exactly did 'he' do?' (5) No distinction has been made between those 
giving a 'last civilian job' or having non-father heads of households 1.n 
preparing Table 7.1 (or the other tables which follow). 
(3) It will still be possible to make a few points of comparison. The reader 
may wish to consider whether, following the author's reasoning that 
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Scottish Mobility is the outcome of Scotland's economic history and position, 
English regions like the North East with similar histories would be more 
akin to Scotland than, say, London and the South-East. 
(4) Female mobility is considered in Payne et al (l983a). 
(5) See Q.28a and 12a, respectively, in the questionnaire reprinted in the 
appendices. Appendix II gives details of the methodology, sample size, 
response rates etc. 
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Table- 7.1: Intergenerational Male Mobility 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
vu. 
I 
T 
Respondent's 
I 
Professionals; 
Managers; 128 
Senior Adminis-
trators; 2.8 
Semi-Profession- 108 
als; White Collar 
Supervisors; 2.3 
Foremen; self- 76 
employed 
artisans 1.6 
Routine White 41 
Collar 
-
v.9 
Skilled Manual 91 
2.0 
Semi-Skilled 5i 
Manual 
1.1 
Unskilled 55 
Manual 
1.2 
TOTALS 550 
11.8 
I T 
a 
II 
71 
1.5 
193 
4.2 
95 
2.0 
35 
0.8 
128 
2.8 
92 
2.0 
75 
1.6 
689 
14.8 
a 
b 
c 
occupation at time 
III IV v 
18 29 14 
0.4 0.6 0.3 
62 45 54 
1.3 1.0 1.2 
121 26 91 
2.6 0.6 2.0 
16 15 21 
0.3 0.3 0.5 
172 63 400 
3.7 1.4 8.6 
131 47 193 
2.8 1.0 4.2 
124 42 166 
2.7 0.9 3.6 
644 267 939 
13.9 5.7 20.2 
up-v:ardly mob le 
immobile 
dowm.;ardly r..-·":oile 
of interview 
VI 
14 
0.3 
72 
1.5 
110 
2.4 
14 
0.3 
265 
5.7 
257 
5.5 
167 
3.6 
899 
19.3 
4:2.3~ 
- 2 7. 4:-:: 
30.3::: 
VII 
12 
0.3 
35 
0.8 
75 
1.6 
11 
0.2 
217 
4.7 
152 
3.3 
158 
3.4 
660 
14.2 
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Totals 
286 
6.2 
569 
12.2 . ! 
I 
594 
12.8 
153 
3.3 
1336 
28.7 
923 
19.9-
787 
16.9 
4648 
100 
I 
The first feature to observe about this table is the difference 
between the marginal distribution of the fathers (the row totals given on the 
right of the table) and those for the sons (the column totals forming the 
bottom line). As already argued in the previous chapter, these do not 
reflect occupational transition alone, but they do indicate considerable 
structural shift between the two 'generations'.· All three of the manual 
categories (V~VI and VII) have higher numbers for fathers: 1316 as against 
939; 923 as against 899; and 787 as against 660. Conversely, the 'non-manual' 
. (6) 11 1 . . h I • I 1 h h"f . categor~es are a arger ~n t e sons generat~on. n tota t e s ~ t ~s 
an expansion of the non-manual sector of 548 - or alternatively a contraction 
of 548 in the manual sector: about 12% of the total sample. The largest 
expans~on lies in category I, (264) the professional/managerial group; the 
largest contraction (397) is in category V the skilled manual class. This 
~s presented diagrammatically in Fig 7.1 
Fib 7.1: l!istribution of Origins and [).,stin<~cion to Scale 
I 
..... II 
"' 
"' 
" 
"' 8
I 
" III 0 z 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
Respondents Occupations 
Non-manual 
II III IV I v 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
Manual 
VI VII 
(6) The term 'non-manual' is used for convenience. Strictly speaking·, the 
category includes self-employed artisans and so~e technicians who by 
virtue of either not being employees or having very high levels of skill, 
plus having higher Hope-Goldthorpe scale scores, are not classified with 
the manual group. 
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If we total the cells below, on, and above the main diagonal 
from top let to bottom right, Table 7.1 shows that 42.3% of the sample 
were upwardly mobile by at least one category, 27.4% were immobile, and 
(7) 30.3% were downwardly mobile. In other words, on the basis of these 
gross mobility rates, about 3 in every 4 men experience some kind of 
disjunction between their family background and their own occupational 
identity (forgetting for the moment any additional respondents whose 
earlier career took them away from their origins before they returned to 
the same category at the time of interview). This we regard as a relatively 
fluid condition. 
Of course, had we used a smaller number of categories, such as 
'manual' and 'non-manual', the appearance of the results would be different. 
In this case, 23% of the sample were upwardly mobile, 65.7% were immobile 
and 11.3% were downwardly mobile. We might hesitate to call this 'fluid', 
but this still shows 1 in 3 men being mob1le. Conversely, if we were 
to operate exclusively with the 20 categories which was used for parts of 
the analysis, the upward mobility figure would be 51% and the downward 34%. 
Thus the selection of a seven-category model of the:occupational order 
directly influences both the detail of the findings and also the way the 
reader interprets the level of mobility. 
Part of this mobility can be attributed in a direct way to the 
changes in the occupational distributions between the two generations. While 
it is not possible to make a direct equivalence between the SEGs discussed 
Ln the previous chapter and the sample data, (8) it is possible to establish 
that the bulk of SEGs 1 to 4 lie in class I; SEGs 5, 13 and 14 in class II; 
(7) It might be more informative to split the 1 irnmobiles 1 into those who 
retained some kind of advantage by remaining immobile in the non-manual 
class, and those who retained some kind of disadvantage by remaining in 
the manual class. This yields the figures of 9.8% and 17.5% respectively. 
(8) For reasons of age and date of survey, as much as definitions. 
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SEGs 8 and 12 in Class III, SEG 6 in Class IV; SEG 9 in Class V; 7, 10 and 15 
in VI; and II in VII. On the basis of what one knows about changes in the size 
of the SEGs, one would therefore look for upward mobilty fuelled by expansion 
particularly in Classes I, II and IV (although less so here than if women were 
being considered), but little upward mobility in Class V which should reflect 
the decline in skilled manual work, or in the fluctuating classes VI and VII. 
To allow for the different sizes of these classes, the share of overall upward 
mobility to be found in each class is compared with its size in the sample. 
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In this way, the components of mobility can be allocated to the relevant class. 
This is shown in Table 7.2, which also includes immobility and downward mobility. 
Table 7.2: Proportions of Mobility Associated with Classes 
Expanding Occupations Contracting Occupations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totals 
% of all Upmobility 21.4 21.6 22.5 7.7 18.2 8.5 n.a 100(1968) 
% of all Immobility 10.1 15.7 9.5 1.2 31.5 20.2 12.4 100(1272) 
% of all Downmobility n.a. 5.0 5.7 7.1 12.8 33.7 35.7 100(1408) 
% of sample 11.8 14.8 13.9 5.7 20.2 19.3 14.2 100(4648) 
Two-thirds of the upward mobility is concentrated in the three upper classes 
whcih consist of just over one third of the sample. No other class has substant-
ially more mobility than its 'proportional share'; contracting classes have less 
u~ward mobility than their proportional share. None of the classes except V 
deviates much from its proportional 'share' when it comes to immobility. Classes 
II and III have a relatively low share of downward mobility, whereas classes IV, 
VI and particularly VII are sites for disproportionately high levels of downward 
mobility; some kind of 'ceiling' and 'floor' effect may be present in 
these numbers. Even so, in considering the mobility characteristics of the 
various occupational groups, Table 7.2 helps to identify that the profiles are 
quite distinct, and generally compatible with an explanation that draws on 
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occupational transition. (9). 
However, one would not expect these data to show exact correspondence 
between occupational size and mobility because the 'occupatonal' approach iS not one 
that d=als only :in changes in size It also includes ideas about other facets of ocCuJXltional 
change, such as changing standards of recruitment, or shortages of labour supply, 
or unemployment. The changing occupational distributions are the framework 
within which these 'rules' andothers less directly to do with labour, like 
access to schooling, operate. Occupational transition is neither a simple, 
nor a monocausal, explanation of mobility. 
Both Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present a picture of considerable readjustment 
of employment level over two generations, with a consequent mixing of people 
with different backgrounds, and a need for them to learn new mores (although 
this is not to say Scotland is an 'open' or egalitarian society). What it does 
show is that direct inheritance of occupation is relatively rare, even ·at this 
level of general categories. Exceptions do occur: for example farming and 
small businesses are heavily recruited from among the ranks of farmers and 
'small businessmen', presumably because they involve property inheritance. But 
the general rule is to the contrary, so that there must therefore be important 
mechanisms for allocating sons to their occupational destinations over and 
above parental intervention to maintain status stability. 
To some extent, in that it has become 'normal' not to follow in 
one's father's footsteps, occupational inheritance ceases to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, if sons are relatively free agents who can decide their own 
occupational destinies, the data still show that constraints operate on job 
choice, so that the net effect of these choices is to allocate more non-manual 
jobs to non-manual sons than to manual sons. 
(9) Log-linear analyses of the SMS data using various combinations of classes 
and cohorts by Anderson (1976) and Ulas (1984) show similar results to 
those of Hauser et al (1975a, 1975b), namely that once structural change 
has been accounted for, a satisfactory model can be fitted without requiring 
a term to allow for changes in mobility rates. 
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This can be seen by adapting Table 7.1 to show inflow mobility, 
that is to say, the proportions of each class recruited from various origins. 
Table 7. 3: Inflow Analysis of Intergenerational Hobility 
ResQondents' occuQation at time ot interview 
I II III IV v IV VII Totals 
I 23.3 10.3 2.8 10.9 .. 1.4 1.6 1.8 6.2 
1::: II 19.6 28.0 9.6 16.9 5.8 8.0 5.3 12.2 0 
·r-1 
.j..J 
Cil III 13.8 13.8 18.8 9.7 9.7 12.2 11.4 12.8 0.. 
;:l 
u 
u IV 7.5 5.1 2.5 5.6 2.2 1.6 1.7 3.3 0 
CIJ 
1-< v 16.5 18.6 26.7 23.6 42.6 29.5 32.9 28.7 
Q) 
..c: 
.j..J VI 9.3 13.4 20.3 17.6 20.6 28.6 23.0 19.9 Cil 
'""' 
VII 10.0 10.9 19.3 15.7 17.7 18.6 23.9 16.9 
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(550) (689) (644) (267) (939) (899) (660) (4648) 
Whereas the previous table gave the percentages of total mobility to be found 
in each category, Table 7.3 shows from where the present members 
of each class have come. Thus clearly Class I is not a closed category. 
Three out of every four of its members have come from other origins, one ~n 
three from manual backgrounds, and each of the manual categories contributes 
about 10% or more. It is true that its largest source of recruitment is from 
itself, followed by the adjacent Class II. But this is a totally different 
picture than one gets from Glass's work. There one finds that apparently only 
one in ten of the upper middle class have manual working class origins, and half 
are self-recruited (Glass, 1954, 183). This is one of the more significant 
findings, because it shows that 'long range' mobility, from low in the hierarchy 
of backgrounds to a much higher ranked occupation, is not only possible but 
does indeed happen. This is a point to be returned to in the later discussion 
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of existing assumptions about the British class structure. 
In contrast, while Class II (consisting mainly of semi-professionals 
and technical workers with high levels of skills, plus managers of small 
enterprises) also recruits from a wide range of origins, it shows the highest 
degree of self-recruitment of any non-manual class. This is due in part to 
the component categories (not shown in Table 7.3) which include farmers and 
small businessmen, the two occupational groups with ·exceptionally high self-
recruitment - presumably due to the key role of property inheritance. 
Among present-day farmers, 56 out of 84 (67%) were born the sons of 
farming fathers, while 41 ou·t of 146 (32%) small proprietors came from a small 
business background. Among the semi-professionals and technical workers who 
make up the rest of the class the self-recruitment figure is only 5.2%. A 
similar discontinuity occurs in the marginal distributions: the two property-
based occupational groups contain 480 niches for fathers and 230 for sons, 
whereas the semi-professionals increase from 189 to 459. This tends to 
confirm the two conclusions already drawn: first, expanding occupations not only 
provide routes for upward mobility, .but recruit from a wide range of origins, 
while conversely contracting occupations - and here those with a petty capital 
basis in particular - are more likely to be self-recruiting. It is as if on 
a contracting market, either a disproportionate number of sons of that class 
'apply' for the jobs, ·or they are in some way specially favoured. 
The four occupational groups which compr1se Class II may seem 
unlikely bed-fellows for a single occupational category. Nhat they share is 
their desirability scores on the Hope-Goldthorpe scale. It is important to 
emphasise this point from time to time, because classifications tend to take 
on a reality of their own after a while. The inclusion owners of petty capital 
in class II are one of two major exceptions to the basic application of work 
and market situation in the construction of the class schema. 
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In contrast, both classes III and IV are relatively homogeneous. 
The former consists of foremen and self-employed artisans, i.e., those work-
roles which represent 'realistic' career ambitions for at least some of those 
who start work as (chiefly skilled) manual workers. 'To be your own boss' will 
in practice mean being a one-man band for most such workers, while a shop-floor 
supervisory position is about as high in the ranks of management as most workers 
could expect to rise in their own life times. Not surprising therefore, class 
III in some ways resembles the skilled manual class (V) more than classes II 
or IV (semi- professionals and routine white collar). Two thirds of its 
number are from manual origins, its self-recruitment is low- presumably 
because the advantages that parental career achievements confer are not 
readily convertible into career advancement for the sons - and few class 1 sons 
arrive in this kind of work. This seems to be a good example of genuine 
occupational mobility, in which the mobility table reflects exactly what would 
be expected both from common sense observationand from a more developed 
argument about the occupational basis of social mobility. The finding in 
Table 7.3 of a high proportion of mobility focussed on this class can be 
explained, not by class expansion, but by structural connection of 
career significance to the manual worker, and of no little significance for 
the way capitalist production is able to mobilise parts of the labour force 
to bring its technical expertise into play on behalf of a less expert (in 
this context) management. In the same way, the system offers a space for the 
one-man operation in the intertices between large scale production, which can 
occasionally allow a individual to graduate from being a manual worker to 
being a proprietor of some significance. It seems likely, however, that such 
a development may be more important to capitalism as a pacifying and legitimizing 
myth for the working class than as a new source of entrepreneurial dynamism. 
Class IV, routine white collar work, is here the smallest (because many 
such workers are female) and has a recruitment pattern more in line with the 
non-manual sector than the manual. It recruits less than its 'share' from 
' ) 
253 
manual backgrounds, i.e. on the expectations of no association, and more 
from the non-manual. However, it has an unusually low rate of self-recruitment. 
This is only 5.6% (the next lowest is class III with 18.8%) and its recruitment 
from all classes is very close to the appropriate proportions. This ties in 
with Stewart et al's findings discussed above. 
In contrast to the routine white collar category, skilled manual 
workers are both the largest class and the most self-recruited. This is a 
contracting class, like farming and small businesses; 1336 sons came from 
skilled manual families, but there were only 939 niches for them. As we shall 
shortly see more clearly from Tab~e 7.4, the 'natural' connection with class III 
accounts for 172 of them, while 42.6% of the present skilled workers are self-
recruited. This may reflect an ability to pass on limited occupational 
a~vantage (vis a v~s the rest of the manual labourforce) to the next generation, 
by means of manipulating the apprenticeship scheme. It is not conventional 
to conceive of this kind of self-recruitment as self-interested closure 
in the way that elite recruitment is normally treated. Nonetheless the basic 
principle would seem to be operating at a secondary level lower down the scale. 
No evidence is presently available, however, to substantiate this. 
What is evident is that class V is substantially the largest ~n both 
generationsand other things being equal, would be expected to have prominent inter-
actions with all other classes as a source of their recruits. Interestingly 
the converse does not hold true. Table 7.3 shows that less than 2% of the 
skilled category come from class I (a pattern shared with the other two 
manual classes). In all, about four out of every five skilled workers comes 
from a manual background; again, a pattern common to all manual classes. 
The semi-skilled, and the unskilled, manual classes resemble each 
other, and indeed the decisions to call one job semi-skilled rather thanuD~ 
skilled was sometimes hard to justify. The main difference in inflow is that each 
recruits more heavily from among its own 8ons than from the other. Both are 
also contracting sectors, although the contraction of the semi-skilled 
category is somewhat less marked. Neither recruit as much as 2% from class 
I, and only around one in five of their numbers come from non-manual 
backgrounds. 
The central point about Tables 7.2 and 7.3 is that they show a high 
levelof movement, a much higher level than one would expect from most 
254 
sociological writing in Britain. Within the system of occupational stratification, 
there is considerable individual mobility. If we regard mobility as one 
index of the rigidity of that system, then it is necessary to modify our 
conception of class in Britain (or strictly speaking, Scotland). Even at the 
most modest level of the manual/non-manual transition, more than one in every 
three male adults personally experienced occupational mobility. That is to 
say, he has been a member of two different classes. If we conceive of the 
stratified order as consisting of smaller units such as the seven categories 
that we have used above, then nearly three in every four adult males has 
moved across group boundaries. It does not seem plausible to regard this as 
a rigid system, except in so far as one concentrates strictly on the 
perpetuation of a system. 
However, the dichotomy between the properties of a system, and the 
characteristics of the elements contained within that system is not so neat 
as is sometimes assumed. Of course it matters that social inequality exists, 
and continues to exist over success1ve generations. But it is at one level 
also a property of that system of inequality that individuals and families 
experience different parts of that system. Inequality is easier to bear 
when either one's own life, or one's children's (or parents') lives have involved 
other ·social circumstances. The reality of familial experience of occupational 
mobility goes some way to explain away the problematic of why social inequality 
continues to exist. And that familial experience is a property of the system, 
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as much as a characteristic of the actors caught up within it. On this 
evidence, the general rigidity of the British class system is not~. great as has 
been suggested: a later question for this research is to locate where rigidity 
is still established. 
The second general point to be made on the basis of tables 7.2 and 
7.3 concernsclass formation and the generation of class consciousness. 
Occupational mobility tends to result in people experiencing different life-styles: 
one in their families of origin and one - or more - in their own adult careers. 
Let us make the not unreasonable assumption that early experience does have an 
effect on later life, in the sense of contributing to ideas and values, providing 
a frame of reference for evaluating 'progiess' in one's own life, influencing 
social relationships (eg, with parents and others from neighbourhoods of origin 
and so on). In other words, childhood socialisation 'sticks', despite the over-
lay of more recent events such as re-socialisation into new occupations or grades 
as part of promotion within an organisation (Watson, 1964; Nichols, 1969; Offe, 197 
It may be that an intergenerational shift between two adjacent categories of the seven-
category scheme is unimportant in this context, but a move from one end of the 
scale to the other clearly is. What tables 7.2 and 7.3 (and to a lesser 
extent, table 7.4 below) show us is that the backgrounds in question are for 
the present middle class very variable, and therefore any notions of social 
homeogeneity and shared values which draw on what is brought to the current 
class situation from family of origin, might be suspect. It is not possible to 
entertain ideas of a non-manual class developing as a class 'for itself' when 
its collective experience is restricted to much less than a single life-time. 
With heavy recruitment from the manual sector, the non-manual class may wish 
to stress its difference from and superiority over manual workers - but that 
is a far more dynamic and at the same time constrained situation, than one ~n 
which successive generations of a class are overwhelmingly self-recruited. 
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However., this situation is less true for the working class. Although 
there is some downward mobility, the main pattern is that manual workers 
are the sons of the previous generation of manual workers. There is consider-
able interchange between the levels of manual work (skilled/semi-skilled/ 
unskilled) both between generations (and as we shall see, within careers) 
and this may provide some kind of heterogeneity of life experience in the 
way that we have seen for the middle class. It certainly is not provided 
by the inflow of sons from above, and manual workers have more basis for 
a ~ommon identity and consciousness than do non-manual workers. 
The continuity ~f working class membership is also well illustrated 
by the patterns of outflow from manual class origins. The discussion so far 
has concentrated on absolute and inflow measures of mobility, which reflects a 
concern with one strand of the problem namely what are the implications of 
mobility for the present structure of the classes. The emphasis on inflow 
shows up most clearly that heterogeneity of origins is far more prevalent 
than was expected, and that there is greater fluidity in the system. But while 
this is important - and perhaps one of the main contributions of ·the present 
study is to demonstrate these basic facts - it would not do to ignore that 
other strand of British mobility writing, the differential access to desirable 
jobs. To put it more strongly, a sense of moral outrage informs much of the 
writing on mobility and stratification, and while the inflows may show consider-
able movement, they show much less about those who are not so successful in 
the mobility competition. For this, we need to turn to the outflow table shown 
below as table 7.4. (Table 7.4 follows on next page~) _ 
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Table 7.4: Intergenerational Outflow Mobility 
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Outflow .analysis can be misleading because the flow percentages are 
more obviously constrained by the size of the destination categories. Thus 
for example, the small values in the class IV column say more about the fact that 
there are only 5.7% of all occupations in that category, rather than any process 
of connection between white collar work and other origins. It is not proposed 
to explore this table ~n the same detail as table 7.3 but certain features do 
stand out. 
Despite the earlier emphasis placed on movements between occupations 
the children of both the higher classes- and particularly class 1- have a much 
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better chance of good jobs than other children. Only about 14% of the sons 
of managers and professibnals and 28.4% of the sons of semi-professionals 
ended up in manual work. In contrast, roughly 65% of manual workers' sons 
became manual workers, i.e., in absolut~ terms they were four times more likely, 
and man for man twice as likely, to be manual workers than the sons of profess-
ionals. Nearly half of those born into dlass I held their position and another 
quarter ended up in the adjacent class~_II. Less than one in every fourteen sons 
of manual workers made it to the upper middle class. 
This comparison of chances shows the advantage which birth brings. The 
Fabian and radical themes discussed in earlier chapters pointed to the importance c 
any <Eviation from Equality of q:>portuni ty. However, the basic structure cf occupationa] 
opportunity must not be neglected: the immobility of many of the sons of manual 
workers can be seen as being that part of the outcome which would be expected 
if there was. no parental advantage involved. Thus if, say, skilled work is 
about 20% of employment then about 20% of the sons of each class would be 
in skilled manual work - including the sons of skilled manual workers. Infact, 
the latter's proportion is about 30%, an 'overload' of 10%. But the flow from 
both semi- and un-skilled manual origins into skilled work is 'about right', 
while those from the non-manual classes are low. Given the earlier observations 
about self-recruitment in contracting classes like skilled manual work, it is 
interesting to speculate whether these patterns represent some kind of excessive 
self-recruitment or the outcome of a blockage preventing a distinct proportion 
of able-skilled manual workers' sons from entering the non-manual class. 
This kind of analysis, which obviously draws on Glass's idea of perfect 
mobility and the index of association, tends to reduce much of the apparent 
disadvantage of lower class sons in the competitionfor better jobs. Nevertheless 
that disadvantage is real and enduring ih. the 19JDs. It is still true that even ~n 
its 'reduced form', there ~sa class differential. And whatever the shape 
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of the class structure, one must not lose sight of the fact that a chance 
of one in fourteen of getting a good job is singularly poor odds, when the rewards 
attaching to good jobs are so much better (to name but one example, the mean class 
I gross annual earnings 1n September 1975 were £4,236 compared to class 
VII's £2,529: something like£10,000 and £7,000 respectively at the levels of the 
early 1980's). 
This point is made here because the choice of measure employed does 
modify the picture presented. In this chapter, and particularly in the next 
section, the emphasis has been placed on inflow and absolute measures which 
reveal the fluidity of the occupational structure and are useful in understanding 
the present composition of classes and the question of class formation. An 
alternative can be found in Goldthorpe (1980) where greater weight is given to 
outflow analysis and relative measures, presumably because Goldthorpe retains 
a strong, traditional interest in the inherent inequality of life under 
. 1. (10) 
cap1ta 1sm • He makes great play of the point that while occupational 
transition helps to move more sons of manual workers into non-manual jobs, their 
chances of such moves compared with the chances of the sons of non-manual workers 
do not vary much oyer time. While this is an interesting paradox, there is 
something slightly perverse in Goldthorpe's making so much of it in his discussion 
of fluidity. Noble has recently arguedin this connection that people do not 
experience relative chances as measured by odds-ratios: on the contrary: 
'Individuals of course experience mobility or the lack 
of it .... the degree of inequality which persists could 
be more easily discerned in the growing homogeneity of 
recruitment to professional and managerial jobs which 
a simple inflow analysis .... would reveal' (Noble, 1981, 137-8). 
The calculation of odd-ratios only obscures the changes in absolute rates 
because, as Noble shows (ibid), theodds-ratio 1s a somewhat insensitive 
instrument. While odds-ratios have their uses as part of log-linear modelling 
(10) Goldthorpe also redefines upward mobility as moves into his classes I and 
II, which is a radical departure from normal measures: see Goldthorpe 
(1980, 42). 
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techniques, when it comes to the consequences of mobility, in Erikson's words 
the 
'heterogeneity of social classes, the number of 
people with experience of social mobility, the 
career expectations of youth, the degree of 
total mobility will be of greater importance 
than the rate of exchange mobility' (Erikson, 
1975, quoted in Noble, 1975, 19). 
We might equally say the same about ~he consequences of 
occupational mobility, and it is for that reason that no effort has been made 
to distinguish between 'structural' and 'exchange' mobilities in the present 
chapter. 
The evidence of absolute and inflow mobility rates, even when 
balanced againstthe outflow measures, suggest a basic pattern quite different 
from those normally attributed to Glass, namely that movements over long 
distances are rare, and that the level of movement is relatively limited. 
The rejection of these statements is important, because in addition to the 
general points about rigidity and class formation, there are a number of 
specific models of stratification based on these assumptions about occupational 
mobility. The three main models are triose of a mobility barrier, or threshold, 
between manual and non-manual occupations; that the intermediate range of 
occupations act as a 'buffer zone' between the middle class proper and the 
working class, which takes two generations to cross, and that the upper 
reaches of the occupational hierarchy are increasingly closed to entry from below, 
until the highest echelon is almost completely self-recruiting. Each of these 
models 1s considered in turn in the next section. 
Models of Mobility and the Class Structure 
The simplest of these models proposes the existence of 
a mobility 'threshold' at the manual/non-manual boundary. Westergaard and Resler-
who ironically have done much to restore social mobility to the centre of the 
stratification debate by the attention they give it in Class in a Capitalist 
Society - claim that there is a 
'persistence of some mobility threshold along the line 
dividing manual from non-manual labour, even if it is 
lower than before .... That line in fact has something 
of the character of a barrier against mobility' 
(Westergaard and Resler, 1975, 302, 301). 
In the first place, as· has already been shown, about one third of 
the sample moved across that line in one direction or the other. This does 
not seem like a serious mobility hurdle. Second 
' 
within each of the four 
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non-manual classes, there is considerable recruitment from the other side of the 
threshold: 35.8%, 42.9%, 66.3% and 56.9% respectively. The reverse is less 
clear-cut: the three manual classes recruit 19.27., 23.4% and 20.2% from the 
non-manual sector, about one in every five. 
Third, if the manual/non-manual line is to be regarded as a key 
hurdle, it should presumably be a more formidable obstacle than exists elsewhere 
in the occupational structure, i.e. the mobility flow across it should be lower 
than between any other two points in the mobility table. So for example, it 
should be harder to move.from manual to non-manual, than from 'semi- and un-
skilled' into 'skilled and non-manual' occupations. But \vhereas the former has 
a mobility flow of 34.3%, the latter is only 38.7% and again the flow between 
the sector comprising classes I, II and III, and that comprising IV, V, 
VI and VII, is 34.2%. In other words, moving the threshold up or down 
one category does not seriously change the mobility flow. 
The logical extension of this critique is to re-dichotomise the 
seven category classification at each of its six possible points. In such 
an exercise the closer one moves to the top or the bottom 
of the classification, the smaller becomes the number of cases which could ~n 
theory be·mobile: for instance the maximum mobility value for class I ~s 
achieved if all sons born in class 1 (286) enter other classes, while all the 
present class 1 occupations (550) are exclusively filled by sons from those 
other classes. The maximum value in each cell ~s of course dependent on the 
marginals. It follows from this consideration that at the supposed threshold 
between manual and non-manual sectors, those who are mobile make up a smaller 
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proportion of all those theoretically at risk of being ~obilepartly because 
the number of people theoretically at risk is higher in the middle of the table. 
We can extend this analysis by using the outflow rates in Table 7.4. 
Each of the three manual classes exports more than one-third of its sons 
into non-manual occupations, which is less than would be expected on a no-
association assumption (when one would look for nearer half of such sons to 
be in non-manual work), but still is a considerable flow. The counter flow 
is slightly smaller for classes II and IV, bigger for class III, and only 
about one in seven from class I. If the supposed threshold were drawn one 
class lower, the outflows from semi-and unskilled manual backgrounds would be 
substantially increased, so that nearly 60% of their sons crossed the barrier. 
If the threshold were drawn one class higher, the flows would be slightly 
reduced, by about 5% on each class; this would then be balanced by the added 
outflow from class IV which would also export about 60% of its sons to classes 
I, II and III. These rates of movement only seem limited against the absolute 
standard of perfect mobility. The ideal of the threshold does not receive 
sufficient support from these data to be accepted. Perhaps a semi-permeable 
membrane might be a better analogy. 
The second model which has been advanced as representing_ the main 
features of mobility is Parkin's 'Buffer Zone'. In this model 
'The children of manual workers who cross the class line 
tend to assume fairly modest white-collar pos~t~ons -
as clerks, salesmen, shop assistants, schoolteachers, 
and the like. Recruitment to the established middle 
class professions requiring long periods of training 
and education is far less common .... He could sum up 
these remarks by suggesting that there is what might 
be called a social and cultural 'buffer zone' between 
the middle class and working class proper. Most 
mobility, being of a fairly narrow social span, involves 
the movement into and out of this zone rather than 
movement between the class extremes' (Parkin, 1971, 51, 56)· 
The effect of this buffer zone ~s to insulate the 'middle class proper' from 
the culturally-disruptive incursions of large numbers of ex-working class 
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incomers, so securing the middle class's privilege and also maintaining 
class values and identity. In the seven-category classification, the buffer 
zone can be equated with classes III and IV, and the dominant pattern of 
movement should therefore be between these two and classes I and II, or classes 
V, VI and VII. However, if we examine inflows (table 7.3) to classes I and 
II, there is a larger flow direct from classes V, VI and VII than from classes 
III and IV, in fact, almost exactly double (39.7% of the total, .compared with 
19.9%). However the flow into the two intermediate classes from below is heavier 
than the flow from classes V, VI and VII into the upper two categories: 579 cases 
compared with 492. A strict test of the buffer zone model would have to be 
that not only was this latter condition fulfilled, but the interm~diate-to-
upper flow would also have to be greater· than the manual-to-upper flow, which it is not. 
Parkin does not say much about the function of the buffer zone in 
downward mobility. Here the picture is the reverse of the upward pattern, with 
a smaller direct flow from classes I and II to the manual classes than that 
from the intermediate classes, but with a larger direct flow than that into the 
buffer zone. Again, only one of the two required conditions is met. 
Even if one takes the outflow figures, the model cannot be clearly 
substantiated. The percentage flows direct into classes I and II from the 
manual classes are 3% greater than those into the buffer zone classes. The 
downwaFd flows from class I direct to manual occupations are slightly smaller 
than to the intermediate zone (14.0% as compared with 16.4%) but those from 
class II are much larger (28.4% and 18.8%). 
The heart of the problem for the buffer zone model is its more general 
assumption that all mobility is predominantly over a short range. If Parkin 
were correct, each class should have intakes which consist mainly of recruits 
from the immediately adjacentcategories. But if the immobile are discounted, 
then all but one of the categories draw only around one third of their remaining 
intake from the categories immediately shown above and below them: the notable 
exception is the semi-skilled group with double this level of 'local' 
recruitment, which may 1n part be due to technical problems of deciding the 
limits of semi-skilled occupations. (ll) Intergenerational mobility does 
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not predominantly consist of a series of .one-place, short range steps, from one 
category to the next: recruitment draws instead from a wide spectrum of 
origins - although as was noted above, manual occupations have higher leve.ls of 
mutual intake. 
This means that the heterogeneity of origins is not just the 
heterogeneity caused by drawing on the two adjacent classes which have 
relatively similar origins, but 1s more complex and extensive, particularly 
in the non-manual sector. The diversity of composition thus not only applies 
over the whole range of categories, but is in each case extensive, although 
again, the important caveat about the manual groups needs to be made. These 
are 40% of the total workforce who inter-recruit extensively, but who have 
added to their own numbers just over 10% of the total workforce drawn from 
different origins. In this half of the society, then, only one in five has 
been mobile over a 'long distance' which includes crossing the manual/non-
manual line. Conversely, the non-manual half consists of 25% of the total 
workforce which is inter-recruited, with an equal amount added from manual 
origins: one in two is a long distance mobile in this half, so that the 
heterogeneity of the non-manual sector is far greater than 1n the manual. 
Thus while Parkin may be correct in saying that not many semi-skilled 
or unskilled workers are recruited from the sons of professionals, managers and 
so on (but still nearly 1 in 10 in this case), 36% of the present category I, 
and 43% of category II come from the other side of the buffer zone. 
The thesis of a buffe! zone, in which cultural re-socialisation of 
the mobile is either unnecessary or can take a whole generation, and which protectf 
(11) This lack of a short-distance effect might be taken to mean that the 
conventional seven-category model is not a good representation of 
stratification effects: a less radical explanation .is that the 
hierarchy is generally adequate, but that mobility patterns do not 
conform to this order. In other words, when people are selected for 
occupations, they are chosen through some mechanism which does not 
closely limit their range of mobility. 
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the upper middle class from social dilution, is not supported by experience 
of present-day Scots. It may be that the mobility over two generations and 
the intermediate classes does serve the functions which Parkin proposes, but 
it is not the dominant pattern of mob1'l1'ty. S h · h b b uc a process m1g t e etter 
pictured as a kind of fairly effective safety net, or perhaps a non-return 
valve, against downward mobility rather than a filter against up-
ward mobility. This would be to change the significance which Parking attaches 
to the buffer zone analogy very substantially, and to stress protection for 
offspring rather than closure against incomers. 
The third model of mobility that was found in the writings of Miliband 
and Bottomore, for example, suggests that a kind of 'graduated closure' 
operates as one moves closer to the top of the stratified order until at the 
last, the narrow elite is almost totally self-recruiting. Any additional 
members are recruited only from those groups most like the.elite, which in turn 
are nearly as closed-off to others below, as the elite is from its neighbouring 
groups. This model needs to be considered 1n some more detail than the previous 
two, for several reasons. In the first place, it has its particular relevance 
to theories of industrial society and the expansion of the new middle class. 
Second, reports of higher general rates of mobility need to be carefully 
qualified when it comes to identifying elite recruitment. And third, Goldthorpe's 
promotion of the idea of a service class has drawn attention to this upper part 
of the class structure. 
Recruitment to the New Middle Class 
An important first step must be to clarify the relationship between 
the study of 'elites' and the study of mobility. In fact few mobility studies 
can say much about elites, because elites are by definition small and unlikely 
to show up in discernable numbers in a national sample. There is therefore a 
natural temptation for sociologists to redraw the boundary of the elite 'lower 
down' the class hierarchy, in order to have sufficient cases to analyse: this 
has led to some confusion over definitions. In the present case, this 
temptation has been resisted, not least because of the considerations discussed 
in Chapter 4, namely that Scotland is unlikely to contain many of the British 
elite, which is either metropolitan or internationally-based (see for 
~xample Giddens, 1974, 15). Careful scrutiny of our 4,887 questionnaires 
located 2, and possibly 3, individuals who could be safely said to belong to 
Giddens' elite, and perhaps up to 20 who might in an independent Scotland be 
recast in a more powerful mould. Power LS both vertically and geographically 
concentrated in Britain, and Scotland is as much a Depressed Area in power 
terms, as in other fields. 
But this is already to beg several questions about the nature of 
the powerful. In the first place it is assumed that there are relatively 
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few people who are 'really powerful', and that they should not be confused with 
the middle or upper middle classes. ( 12 ) Because we wish to include writers who 
operate with elite and ruling class models - and some writers who use the two 
together - we do not distinguish sharply between them, or insist on one at the 
expense of the other. The difference between the two is important, but the 
precedent of Giddens and Bottomore shows that at times there can be advantages 
in operating at a less precise level (Giddens, 1974, x-xi). Obviously, this 
leaves great areas of the power debate untouched, and opens the way for the 
usual criticisms of both elite and class approaches. 
(1L) As some working definition is required, if only to know who these 
middle classes are, briefly 'power' is taken as residing in control of or 
interest in large blocks of capital, or occupation of command positions: 
this is a point to be returned to below. Pahl and Winkler's critique 
of such positional approaches can be thought of as ext~nding to all 
mobility studies, because these operate with occupations as units of analysis. 
The 'upper middle class' is basically a category of occupational titles: 
mobility is only the exchange of one category (based on father) for 
another (based on self). It remains problematic how far an individual 
holding an occupation at any level actually exercises the power - of any 
type, basis or range to be posited - which is generally attributed to that 
position, or shares whatever ('class') characteristic that occupational 
grouping is meant to convey. But as mobility studies are essentially about 
occupations (and if they are to deal with the major dimensions of life 
chances, for the population as a whole, it cannot be otherwise) then they 
necessitate a positional style, Pahl and Winkler notwithstanding. Clearly, 
'mobility patterns' require supplementing with research into the carry-
over from background to present performance etc., to meet those authors' 
conditions of relevance (Pahl and Hinkler, 1974, 121; Giddens, 1974, xii). 
An example in mobility terms can be found in Lee's discussion ot what she 
calls 'business executives' in her book entitled 'Who Gets to the Top' 
(1981' 30-36). 
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The first step is to review several empirical accounts of elites, 
and the boundary with the upper middle class, in order to show where confusion 
has arisen over the size and function of elites, and therefore coloured 
debates about recruitment. Consider for example, the literature on inequal-
ities in wealth, income and inheritance. The contributors to Urry and 
Wakeford refer variously to over 1%, 2%, 5%, 7%, 10% and 12% of the population 
as being the high earners (Urry and Wakeiord, 1973, 18-60). It is true 
that such measures help to demonstrate the steepness of the income gradient 
'at the top', but is the reader to conclude that the elite or ruling class 
consists of one person in a hundred - or one person in ten? 
Westergaard and Resler (1975,156-9) suggest that the 1.5% ot all adults aged 25 
and more, with holdings in excess of £5,000 in 1970 (and more so the 0.6% 
holding £20,000 or more) are the only people who can actually exercise 
any influence on business policy - and that within an arena in which the 
largest blocks of share holdings are held by-companies and not by individuals. 
Do the interests of these powerful individual share-owners coincide with the 
larger group (about 7%) with smaller holdings? If we asstJire that this is typically.so, 
we effectively have an 'active' and a 'passive' division within the stock-
holding class: the former have a degree of power, while the latter can be 
thought of as a reserve group which provides some kind of ideological support 
and legitimation. 
The size of such a reserve group varies from writer to writer. 
Parkin is a case in point. His argument over several pages can be fairly 
indicated by three successive quotations. Firstly, on the basis of occupations 
and rewards, he identified two main classes: 
'to characterize the occupational order as the 
backbone of the reward structure is not to 
ignore the role of property but to acknowledge 
the interrelationship between one and the other 
the fact that we do speak of a class system 
suggests that we can distinguish some significant 
break in the reward hierarchy. In Western 
capitalist societies this line of cleavage falls 
be t\..reen the manual and non-manual occupational 
categories' (Parkin, 1972, 24-S). 
He then proceeds by characterizing the relationship between the classes, 268 
which includes the question of control over the state apparatus: 
'It is the highly patterned nature of the inequalities 
we have so far examined which enables us to portray 
the reward system in terms of a dichotomous or two 
class model ... within the context of a dichotomous 
class model, the dominant class seeks to preserve its 
awards and privileges vis-a-vis the subordinate class 
the ability of the dominant class to maintain a 
privileged position for themselves and their progency 
rests largely on the fact that representatives of this 
class have greater access to or control over the various 
(state) agencies which govern the allocation of rewards' 
(Parkin, 1972, 26-7). 
We must assume then, that since he does not mention any other class, the 
non-manual workers as a whole are Parkin's dominant class. Not only do 
the dominant class of all non-manual workers have better access to and 
more control over the state: 
'the very fact that the dominant class can 
successfully claim a disproportionate share 
of rewards vis-a-vis the subordinate class, 
is in a sense a measure of the former's power 
over the latter' (Parkin, 1972, 46). 
If one takes.Parkin at his word, then the dominant (i.e. powerful) class 
includes 36% of the G.B. male working population using the Registrar-General's 
classification (Census, 1971, Economically Active Table 29) or the 55% or 
44% as defined by Goldthorpe (1977) for England and Wales, or the 39% for 
Scotland using the Scottish Mobility Study classification. These figures 
contrast starkly with Westergaard's 0.6% of rich and power stockholders.(l 3) 
A third type of confusion can be found in the work on recruitment 
and access to positions of power. In his chapter on "Economic Elites and 
Dominant Class" Miliband rejects the notion of a separate managerial class, 
partly on the. grounds that their social origins are the same as those of the 
large-scale capitalist owners. His managerial element includes "all layers 
of management" and the origins cover both upper and 'upper middle class' 
families (Miliband, 1969, 36-38). 
(13) This is one point where the difference between elite and class models 
shows up. Parkin is talking (somewhat loosely) about the large 
number of beneficiaries in the system of rewards: Westergaard and 
Resler are intent on showing that if 7% (on their criteria) benefit. 
only 0.6% have the means of exerting any significant leverage. So 
that Parkin is talking about a reserve class, and the others about an 
active elite. The advantage of the latter approach is that is 
specifies the mechanisms involved more clearly. 
This seems to be a confusion of senior management with management 
in general. As other writers, such as Nichols (1969, 61-2) and Westergaard 
(1975, 161-S) have pointed out, it is one thing to argue that a group of 
senior ~anagers have day-to-day charge of capital, if this refers to that 
small category of Directors who make up the Boards of large companies. But 
that is not the same thing as saying that such men are a separate class, nor 
is it to say that all levels of management are included in this (still less 
is it to include all 'technical, planning, and other specialised staffs' as 
having managerial power, as advocated by pluralists such as Galbraith (1967, 
69), Lenski (1966, 364-5), Burnham (1945) or Crosland (19S6)). Equally, the 
debate in recent marxism on the professional/managreial class raises similar 
problems (eg, Poulantzas, 1973; Hunt, 1977, and the discussion in Chapter 2). 
Miliband writes of advanced capitalist societies that 
'elite recruitment in these societies has a 
distinctly hereditary character. Access from 
the working class into the middle and upper 
class is generally low' (Miliband, 1969, 39) 
However, elite recruitment is not the same thing as access to the 
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middle class. Elite recruitment must, if it is to have any analytical utility, 
mean recruitment into the 'upper class'. Given the general acceptance 
over the last decade that occupational mobility is infrequent and occurs only 
over short-ranges of the occupational structure, most sociologists would 
expect to find mobility from manual workers' families into the routine 
clerical sector of the middle class. But they would not expect to find such 
a pattern of recruitment from manual workers into the upper- or even upper-
middle-class. 
It has already been observed above that this version of mobility is 
attributable to Glass, but to a degree it is Miller's re-presentation of those 
data that has been influential. Miller links the Glass findings to other 
studies of elites, suggesting that a general feature of all socie~ies is 
that there is little movement from the manual strata into elites of various 
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sizes, both in Britain, and ~n other national and local studies: his data are 
given in Table 7.5 
Table 7.5: Working-Class/Manual Movement into Elite I and II for 
Selected sizes of elites 
Size of elite 
A. Under 4. 6% 
Belgium I (St-Martens-Latem)(Elite I & II 
Denmark (Eilte I and II) 
France (Elite I) 
Great Britain (Elite I) 
India (Poena) (Elite I) 
India (Poena) (Elite I and II) 
Italy (Elite I) 
Netherlands (Elite I) 
Puerto Rico (Elite I) 
Sweden (Elite I) 
West Germany (Elite I and II) 
B. 6%- 8.5% 
Brazil (San Paulo) (Elite I) 
France I (Elite I and II) 
France II (Elite I and II) 
Great Britain (Elite I and II) 
Italy (Elite I and II) 
Japan (Elite I) 
Sweden (Elite I and II) 
USA I (Elite I) 
c. 10% - 15% 
Japan (Elite I and II) 
Netherlands (Elite I and II) 
Puerto Rico (Elite I and II) 
D. Over 15% 
Brazil (San Paulo) (Elite I and II) 
USA I (Elite I and II) 
USSR (emigres) (Elite I and II) 
* Unavailable 
Source: Miller, (1960, 38). 
Working 
classes into 
elite 
% 
o.o 
* 1.9 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 2.6 
2.3 
1.6 
* 4.2 
2.0 
* 
* 
* 4.4 
* 
* 
* 11.4 
* 
* 14.5 
Manual 
into elite 
% 
o.o 
1.1 
1.4 
0.6 
0.7 
1.4 
0.0 
1.2 
1.5 
1.8 
1.5 
1.0 
3.5 
1.6 
2.2 
1.5 
3.9 
3.5 
3.4 
7.0 
6.6 
8.6 
5.3 
7.8 
* 
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This .table together with Miller's commentary (Miller, 1960, 36-41) would 
lead the reader to accept that elites are relatively closed. 
The first objection to this conclusion is that the percentages are 
misleading. Taking the original data for Britain, the '0.6%' flow from 
manual into fElite I' consists of 12 men now in Glass's Category I, out of 
all 2,200 men born to manual backgrounds (Categories 3b-5) who were 'at 
risk' of being,able to move from 'manual' to 'Category I'. But since Elite 
I has only 103 members, the maximum flow co11ld only be 103/2200 = 4.7%. 
Again, Miller's 'Elite II' is shown as taking 2.2% of the manual class (49/2200): 
by the same logic, its maximum flow is 262/2200 or 11.9%. These percentages 
depend on the size of the class of origin, in this case the manual class, in 
relation to the size of the elite:· the larger the manual class for the same 
size of elite, the smaller will seem the flow. In presenting the data as 
percentages without immediate comment on the range of possible values, it ~eems 
that Miller may have contributed to a misreading of elite recruitment. 
By extension, what if Miller had expressed recruitment as a 
percentage of inflow, rather than outflow? The two figures for the elites would 
have been 12/103 and 49/262: 11.7% and 18.7% of the current elites were 
recruited from the ~orking class. The theoretical upper limit of this measure 
would be 100%. It may well be that 11.7% and 18.7% would still not be 
regarded as large flows: after all, how 'big' is 'big'? But a commonsense 
view of perception would suggest that 11.7% is likely to seem a lot more than 
0.6%; and 18.7% to seem more than 2.2%. (14) 
(14) A similar argument applies to Miller's statement that there is more 
downward than upward mobility ·in industrial society: it all depends 
on what bases are used for calculating the percentages being compared 
(see Miller, 1960, 34). It must of course be remembered that all 
these figures for Britain come originally from Glass, so that they are 
unreliable as estimates of 'true' mobility. 
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Thirdly, there is the question of Miller's use of the term 'elite'. 
In Table 7.5 above, the term 'elite' has been employed to refer to groups of 
very different sizes, because the original studies have been so varied in 
their approaches. Thus 11 studies are taken as operating with an elite of 
under 4.6%, 8 with elites between 6% and 8.5%, 3 with over 10% and 3 over 15%. 
The inclusion of such different categories, all under the term 'elite ' , is 
not only an inconsistent useage of the term, but is a potential source of 
considerable confusion. It is one thing to discuss mobility into the top-
decile of occupations: it is another to talk about recruitment or access to 
elite positions. The high reputation of Miller's work may well have produced 
the unintended consequence that subsequent writers on elites failed to 
differentiate between occupation-based general categories such as the 'upper 
middle class', and their own more rigorously defined conception of elites. 
Goldthorpe has addressed this problem by means of Renner's concept 
of the 'service class' -or more exactly, by means of Dahrendorf's version 
of Renner's work. Although Goldthorpe clearly recognises the elite boundary 
problem (1980, 45) he is surprisingly brief in his theoretical statement of 
the service class model. On page 40, the reader is told that Goldthorpe's 
Class I (of seven classes) can be 
'taken as very largely corresponding to the higher 
and intermediate levels of what Dahrendorf, following 
Karl Renner, has termed the 'service class' (Dienstklasse) 
of modern capitalist society - the class of those 
exercising power and expertise on behalf of corporate 
bodies - plus such elements of the classic bourgeoisie/ 
independent businessmen and 'free' professionals as are 
not yet assimilated into this new formation. (op cit, 40). 
Goldthorpe's Class II, he goes on to say are the subaltern or cadet levels 
of the service class, while Class iii is not part of it (40-41). Upward 
mobility will be defined· as only those movements into classes I and II, and 
while there is some initial discussion of each of these classes separately, 
this is soon superceded by a style of analysis. which treats them together as 
one service class. This 1s justified on the pragmatic grounds of needing 
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to simplify the analysis (ibid, 51). The collapsed 3 'class' model dominates 
the remainder of the book.. Although the reader will pick up several comments 
on the mobility and employment characteristics of the service class, there is 
almost no further explication of the basic category being used, although Goldthorpe 
has since added to this as noted above in Chapter 3 (see Goldthorpe (1982)). 
Although Goldthorpe is therefore careful to distinguish between 
the elite and the service class, his solution raises as many problems as 
it solves. First, we now have a major boundary drawn below Class II, so that 
the service class is a large one, including a number of relatively less 
influential managerial and technical occupations, all of which are said to 
exercise 'power and expertise on behalf bf corporate bodies'. This must run 
the risk of confusing the extensive control and very considerable expertise 
of the Class I managers and professionals with the lesser powers and skills 
of Class II. Second although Goldthorpe thereafter talks about the service 
class, his Classes I and II include 'elements of the classic bourgeoisie' which 
are not in Dahrendorf's original formulation (Dahrendorf, 1964, 244-252). 
Third, the entire emphasis of mobility analysis is shifted because of his 
particular re-definition of what he will accept as mobility, ie moves into and 
out of Classes I and II. 
A more conventional approach is adopted here, which concentrates more 
narrowly on the upper echelons of the managerial and professional class, i.e. 
Class I, the 'upper middle class'. This term, together with the distinctive 
label 'lieutenant class' to identify the specific operationalisation used in 
analysing the Scottish data, specifies that part of the middle class which 
typically does not own or exercise strategic control over large blocks of 
capital, and does not occupy key command positions in the state apparatus: 
when we say 'managers', we do not mean senior management in the major companies 
in the economy. Nor, at the other end, are routine clerical workers, foremen, 
'one-man businesses', or even semi-professionals (teachers, social workers, etc) 
managers of small firms, or farmers included: all routine and intermediate 
skill levels (and reward levels) are excluded. This leaves professionals 
(both self-employed and employees); managers and administrators of large 
organisations (both commerical and governmental); and senior supervisory 
staff - in all, about 12% of the male workforce. 
By defining the upper middle class in this way, the-re is no danger 
of mistaking it for the elite theorist's idea of 'really powerful' groups ~n 
society and it can be analysed, if not in isolation from the upper class, at_ 
leas·t independently. It will rapidly become apparent that the generally 
acceptable sociological wisdom about where, and how much, mobility takes 
place in Britain is seriously open to question. This applies particularly 
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to the position adopted by Bottomore and Miliband, who regard the occupational 
hierarchy as increasingly closed in its upper reaches. The former has written 
that movement into the class which includes company directors, landowners, 
professionals, higher civil servants and others of similar social position 
(i.e. our category 'I'), is 'very limited in any society and notably so in 
Britain' (Bottomore, 1965, 38), while Miliband- who, it should be said, is 
more concerned with elite recruitment and political power - agrees that the 
'upper and middle class in these (capitalist) societies is still largely 
self-recruiting and therefore to a marked degree socially cohesive' 
(Miliband, 1969, 44). 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, there are two standard 
ways of examining the openness (or otherwise) of the upper-middle class ('UMC'): 
inflow analysis, which deals with the recruitment of the present class 
from various social origins, and outflow analysis, which deals with the present 
destinations of all those whose family of origin was ~n that class. These 
complimentary perspectives onthe patterns of mobility are shown in Table 7.6 
which for reasons of conven~ence abstracts the most relevant features from 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 
Table 7.6: Recruitment 1.n the Upper Middle Class (or 'Lieutenant Class') 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
Professionals and 
Managers (UMC) 
Semi-Professionals, 
'Small' Managers 
a 
Origins of Present UMC 
(Inflow) 
23.3 
19.6 
Foreman, Self-Employed 
Artisans 13.8 
Routine-White 
Collar 7.5 
Skilled Manual Workers 
16.5 
Semi-skilled Manual 
Workers 9.3 
Unskilled Manual 
Workers ·1o.o 
---
Totals 550 
b 
Destinations of 
UMC sons (Outflow) 
44.8 
24.8 
6.3 
10.1 
4.9 
4.9 
4.2 
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It will be immediately clear from col. (a) that less than one quarter of 
the present UMC has been recruited from its own ranks and more than one 
third come from manual working class origins. While there is a degree of 
concentration at the top (classes I and II are the biggest contributors), 
the composition suggests considerable openness, and mobility for one in 
three is of a 'long-range' character across most of the occupational 
structure. As far as origins are concerned, the UMC cannot be said to be 
either closed or homogeneous. 
In terms of outflow (col. (b) ), less than half the sons of the 
UMC retained their occupational advantage. Most of the less-successful sons 
did manage to preserve a non-manual position, but again, this is not the 
picture of overwhelming self-recruitment and inheritance of advantage that· 
earlier writers have assumed. It is all the more striking, in that the data 
cover a period of rapid expansion of UMC occupations so that the conditions 
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for ~ maintenance of occupational privilege should have been relatively 
favourable. 
This occupational privilege is considerable, and consists of 
sevP.ral elements. By definition, the UMC is popularly seen ·as having the 
most desirable occupations, with greater security, autonomy, satisfactions 
and rewards. Incomes from employment are higher, there is more chance of 
ownership of shares and property, and personal possession of housing, 
consumer durables, and privileged education are more common. Some further 
details of these features are given below in the discussion that concludes 
this chapter, and they provide the empirical grounds for regarding the UMC 
as 'privileged'. They may not occupy positions of power in the sense of an 
elite or ruling class, but they are undoubtedly important material beneficiaries 
of the current forms of state and industrial organisation. ( 15 ) 
However, not all families in the lieutenant class are equally 
successful in maintaining their position. The 'track records' of the four 
constituent occupational categories of the UMC in placing their sons are 
somewhat varied. 46% of the sons of professional employees have made it into 
the ~1C, as did 44% of managers' and proprietors': however, the sons of the 
self-employed professionals did much better, with 61%, and the sons of other 
senior staff did rather worse, with only 35%. On this outflow evidence, 
the self-employed are the most secure in their privilege, while the 
bureaucratic technical experts are less so, particularly those senior staff 
who are only marginally of managerial or professional status. 
(15) In one sense, the self-recruiters in the UMC can be seen as being 
more 'elite-like' than the newcomers. They hold a sort of half-way 
house position between elite and nouveau-UMC: their family status 
has survived two generations, their recruitment is narrow from near 
the top, they resemble the traditional model of an elite found in 
Miliband, etc. Additionally their financial rewards are greater 
than their first-generation counterparts, and their education has also 
been more privileged, as will be shown below. 
One thing that is striking about these various rates of self-
placement is that they bear almost no relation to strict self-recruitment. 
Professionals have placed 29% of their sons in the professions, and 17% 
in other UMC occupations. Both self-employed professionals and managers 
and proprietors have about 18% of their sons in their own sector, but 
whereas the former have a further 43% in the UMC, the latter have only 
26%; so that while the sons of managers and proprietors maintain their 
privilege to the same extent as professionals, they do so more by transfer 
to other sectors, most notably to that of professionals, than by narrow 
self-recruitment. 
Thus inheritance is not 'direct', even for those categories- the 
self-employed, and managers and proprietors - where the question of property 
inheritance might be involved. The occupational advantage of the father 
is converted into a general currency of advantage which does not rely 
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narrowly on personal influence or ownership for occupational entry (cf Boudon, 
1973, Bourdieu, (1973). The family's privilege is maintained by the son!s entry 
into an occupation of comparable status (or more accurately, general desirability). 
This is perhaps most surprising for the self-employed professionals, dominated by 
the old professions, where less than one in five sons followed their fathers, 
choosing instead to follow mainly salaried professions. 
We know from sources such as Kelly (1976), and Cruickshank and McManus 
(1976) that the mechanisms of recruitment still strongly favour father/son 
succession among some of these self-employed occupations, and the operation of 
'practices' provides a propqrty resource (of apparatus, clients, etc) for 
the marketing of professional skills, which the sons can either take over, 
or use as capital for entry into another professional business. But most 
of the sons of self-employed professionals have not taken this option, and 
among the UMC respondents as a whole, we appear to be talking about only 6% 
who could possibly have made direct use of property inheritance for job entry. 
There may of course be some delay in taking over from the father, which would 
depress this last percentage. 
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A second aspect of these flows between sectors relates to the 
managerial revolution thesis that a new class has emerged. At this 'below 
senior management level', there is no evidence to suggest that managers per 
se presently constitute a new closed group with inherited privilege. 
Less than 1 in 5 managers' sons have become second generation managers; nearly 
half the sons of managers are downwardly mobile; the rest have converted 
their privilege into wider professional (and mainly bureaucratic) employment. 
Even if the writers on industrial and post-industrial society, discussed in 
chapter 3, were correct about the significance of technical expertise and 
the division of ownership and control, these UMC managers have yet to show 
any signs of consolidating their new economic power into dynastic security of 
the kind presumably enjoyed by the owners, and without this achievement (on 
lines pointed out by Mills, 1963) their participation in a 'revolution' is 
incomplete. ( 16 ) 
Furthermor~, these same patterns of inter-sector recruitment do not 
support what Westergaard and Resler have characterised as 'the thesis of 
benevolent managerialism' (Westergaard and Resler, 1975, 170), namely that 
the new managers bring with them a social ethic of responsibility to temper 
the owners' need for profit maximisation. This reorientation of policy criteria 
depends on 
'an increasing recruitment even of top level 
management from among professionals and 
technical specialists. For they par 
excellence can be expected to be job-, product-, 
and growth-orientated rather than dedicated to 
profit maximisation' (Westergaard and Resler, 
1975, 155) 
(16) This statement refers to management in the UMC, and not to its 
highest echelons where other processes of recruitment and privilege 
maintenance are assumed to operate: see Nichols (1969). Consolidation 
is of course only one dimension among several of both class 
formation and power-holding. 
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But as we have seen above, despite the growth in the managerial sector (one 
new recruit needed for every 3 managerial origins) there is little sign of 
a significant flow from professional and technical specialist backgrounds 
(i.e. those who would be expected to have an ingrained family culture of 
professionalism) into management. The flow has been less than 9% of the 
absolute potential, and such ex-professional incomers are only 6% of all 
managers. Conversely, a quarter of managers' sons have joined the 
professionals, and they make up nearly twice as big a proportion of current 
professionals as the ex-professionals do of current managers. If anything, 
the professionals are being infiltrated by the managers, not the reverse, 
so that wherever the social ethic in managerialism is ·supposed to come from, 
it is not from inter-generational inter-sector recruitment. 
A further difference between the two groups is the outflow of 
sons who are downw~rdly mobile. More than half of both the professional 
groups' downwardly mobile sons found jobs in Class II (semi-professionals 
small proprietors and managers), compared with less than 40% of the sons ot 
managers and senior staff. A quarter of the senior staff's downwardly mobile 
sons and third of managers' downwardly mobile sons are in manual work, a fate 
that befell only one tenth of self--EIDployed professionals', and only slightly more of 
salaried professionals' sons. The latter two categories also exported a 
smaller proportionto the 'supervisory and self-employed artisan' Class III, 
which may be the result of a lack of a connection between the worlds of 
professionals and industry. Putting it somewhat over-simply, the less-
successful sons of the professionals go ~n for semi-professional and white-
collar jobs; while the less-successful sons of senior staff and, even more 
markedly, of managers, are just as likely to end up in lower-g~ade industrial 
occupations. 
But ~n contrast to this picture of openness in downward mobility, 
there are signs of growing maintenance of privilege in recent years, as the 
trend analysis in Table 7.7 shows for men aged 30 or over. ( 17 ) 
Table 7.7: Trends in UMC origins and destinations for four cohorts of men 
now aged 30 or olde~~ 
a) Outflow 
Year of Birth 
1909-1918 
1919-1928 
1929-1938 
1939:-1944 
b} Inflow 
Year of Birth 
1909-1918 
1919-1928 
1929-1938 
1939-1944 
I 
42.9 
21 
56.8 
25 
56.0 
28 
70.6 
24 
I 
24.7 
21 
19.2 
25 
20.9 
28 
36.4 
24 
II 
18.4 
9 
25.0 
11 
18.0 
9 
23.5 
8 
II 
22.35 
19 
20.0 
26 
14.9 
20 
27.3 
18 
Ill 
6.1 
3 
6.8 
3 
4.0 
8 
III 
14.1 
12 
16.2 
21 
14.9 
20 
7.8 
5 
IV 
14.3 
7 
4.5 
2 
2.0 
1 
5.9 
2 
IV 
5.9 
5 
4.6 
6 
9.7 
13 
6.1 
4 
v 
4.1 
2 
2.0 
1 
v 
15.3 
13 
20.0 
26 
17.2 
23 
7.6 
5 
VI 
6.1 
3 
2.3 
1 
2.0 
1 
VI 
10.6 
9 
8.5 
11 
12.7 
17 
7.6 
5 
VII 
8.2 
4 
4.5 
2 
4.0 
2 
VII 
7.1 
6 
11.5 
15 
8.2 
11 
7.6 
5 
* Younger men excluded as lacking time to develop a full career 
49 
44 
50 
34 
n=l77 
Total 
85 
130 
134 
66 
n=415 
(17) This trend analysis is carried out using fairly crude methods.· A 
fuller and more sophisticated account is given in chapterS. 
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Whereas at the start of the period, only 42.9% maintained their station in 
the UMC, by the end 70.6% were achieving this. And of those who did not, 
most were in Class II (semi-professionals) and none had become manual workers 
(Classes V - VII). In the oldest cohort, the sons had a 60/40 risk of downward 
mobility; the middle cohorts improved to 45/55, and the youngest cohort (albeit 
on the basis of small numbers) had made it to 30/70. So that while not dominating 
the UMC in the sense of making it their exclusive preserve, the upper middle 
class appear to have become increasingly successful in maintaining their inter-
generational privilege. 
However, as Table 7.7 also shows, the trend of inflows of new recruits 
to the UMC is less marked. The main feature is that throughout the period, 
self-recuits have never been more than 36.4% of the total and they were 
generally less, at around 20 to 25%. There is no sign of a consistent trend 
for the incbmers' share of UMC occupations to increase or decrease; although 
the total size of the UMC has tended to expand. The larger totals for 
successively younger cohorts (1939-1944 is a 'half cohort') is despite a 
career effect which works in the opposite direction: the UMC's proportion 
of the whole sample is 10.5%, 12.3%, 13.6% and 13.1% for the four cohorts 
respectively. The first conclusion from this is that, since World War I, 
the lieutenant class has always been predominantly drawn from 'other ranks': 
we are not dealing with a new phenomenon, but merely one that has previously 
been under-estimated. Secondly, as the size of the class has expanded, the 
expansion has worked to enable more of the lieutenant class to remain in the 
class of their birth. 
The picture of privilege maintenance that these various figures 
present is not one which can support a simple model of the closure of the 
UMC. Firstly, these UMC sons who 'make it' into the UMC are not following 
in their fathers' footsteps: whatever cultural or other capital they 
have is a general currency. Secondly, while there is inheritance of advantage, 
in that a greater proportion of UMC sons 'made it' than the children from any 
other background, the majority of UMC sons have been downwardly mobile, 
albeit by a small majority. Thirdly, there is some signs of privilege 
maintenance becoming more common, but this ~s at the same time associated with 
inward recruitment from the lower classes. Thus the extent. to which it can 
be said that a specific inherited culture is shared by all UMC sons is 
severely limited, since this culture is being exported into other occupational 
groups, and also attenuated by heavy in-recruitment from other classes. The 
new recruits to the UMC outnumber the 'immobile', or 'self-recruiters' by 
3 to 1. This is the reverse of the pattern which Miliband has described 
in reference to elite recruitment, which is one where 
'the upper and middle class in these (capitalist) 
societies is still largely self-recruiting and 
therefore to a marked degree socially cohesive' 
(Miliband, 1969, 44). 
Nor does the current evidence accord with Bottomore's v~ew that access to 
a rather broadly defined upper class is 'very limited in any society and 
notably so in Britain' (Bottomore, 1965, 38). Even allowing that a different 
definition of the 'upper class' ~s being employed in this second case, it is 
clear that recruitment patterns are very different from what both Miliband 
and Bottomore have assumed. 
Is this difference crucial? In the first place there is the plain 
matter of empirical evidence and specific statements: recruitment does not 
operate ~n the lieutenant class mthe way which, say for example Miliband, 
has said that it did. Secondly, there is the question of how such specific 
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assumptions under-pin general models of a ruling class or elite. In the 
work of Bottomore, Miliband and others like them, there is sense of graduated 
insulation about the rulers. Recruitment is either from their own ranks, or 
from the group closest to them, which is almost as closed as the elite itself. 
The tumult of the multitude has to pass through many baffles before it can 
disturb the peace of the inner:corridors of power. Against this, the new data on 
mobilityrates seem to suggest that the lieutenant class is already open to 
the other classes: it is filled with men from humbler backgrounds. So the 
Masses are· at the Gates, and their clamour fills the Palace. With these 
alternative impressions guiding them sociologists would expect to find 
differences in the ways which the power-holders protected their continuity 
and exercised their power - if indeed they could continue to do so. 
However, the Masses (and not even all of them) are only at the 
Gates: they are not yet inside. There is a striking dissimilarity in accounts 
of closed access and self-recruitment among those supposed to be the holders 
of large blocks of capital and the ·occupants of key command positions on 
the one hand, and the new indications of openness in the lieutenant class 
on the other. A quick review of the readings in Stanworth and Giddens shows 
the following patterns: 
(Table 7.8 follows on the next page.) 
able 7.8: Elite Recruitment ~n Various Studies * 
Year 
1970 
1970 
1955-
70 
1900-
72 
1960-
69 
1966-
67 
1967 
1960-
date 
Category 
Labour M.P. ' s 
Tory M.P.'s 
Labour 
Cabinets 
Tory 
Cabinets 
Company 
Chairman 
Millionaires 
(deceased) 
Half 
millionaires 
Open 
Competition 
Entrants to 
Administrative 
Upper Grade 
Civil Service 
in Post 
Bishops 
% Recruitment trom Origin 
27% ex-working class (i.e. by 
own earlier career) 
0.9% by same definition 
35% ex-working class 
62% middle class 
3% aristocracy 
0.0% ex-working class 
79% middle class 
1.3% ex-working class 
13% middle class 
85.7% upper class 
little change by cohort: 
Working class 7. is 'negligible' 
at all periods; but the 
proportion from middle class 
origins seems to have declined 
slightly. 
18.9% 'manual or low clerical' 
66% 'established upper class' 
6.9% 'manual or low clerical' 
79% 'established upper class' 
19.4% routine white collar 
or skilled manual 
4.6% sem~ or unskilled 
skilled manual 
24.9% routine white collar 
or skilled manual 
6.1% semi or unskilled 
'guess' that future higher 
Civil Service 'will be 
significantly more 
homogeneous in social 
background' 
28t not professional or 
landed 
Reference 
(Guttsman) 
p.23 
p.34 
p.36 
p.36 
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Comment 
Class of 
recruitment 
is based on 
own earlier 
career, not 
on father's 
occupation 
(Stanworth For those 
& Giddens) with known 
origins 
p._83 
p.89 
(Rubenstein) 
p.l62 
p.l63 
(Kelsall) 
p.l73 
p.l73 
p.l84 
(Thomson) 
p. 201 
For those 
with 
known 
origins 
Evidence 
from 
Committee 
on the 
Civil 
Service 
(1979) 
* The references are all to Stanworth and Giddens (eds), 1974. The reader is 
cautioned that each study has its own definitions of 'working class', 'clerical', 
. - .___ --.! - ..... 1 -- - __ ........ _ .... - ... 1-.. 1 r\ 
There is clearly a considerable difference between the lieutenant 
class, recruited 25% or at very most 45%, from the upper parts of the 
middle classes, and the elites recruiting at 85%, 80%, 66%, 75% or 72% from 
the higher echelons. How can this be explained? It may be methodological 
artefact: the mobility data refer to origins since 1909, and destinations 
~n 1975: respondents are aged 20 to 64 years, and so are at all stages 
of their careers. The elite data, on the other hand, were collected mainly 
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~n the late sixties or 1970, and presumably deals with mature men at or near 
the peaks of their careers. So the differences in recruitment could be due to 
the time of the research, or to some career factor. The first explanation 
we reject as implausible; we know of no supporting evidence that the 
last ten years have seen the sort of dramatic democratisation required to 
bring the two patterns into agreement. The second explanation would require 
that many young middle class sons start work at lower levels, and then later 
in their careers recover their upper middle class status in such numbers as to 
balance out (presumably not displace) the incomers. 
As Goldthorpe has shown for England and Wales, there is a degree of 
this later counter-mobility (Goldthorpe, 1977). However, unless one assumes 
actual displacement, the return flow could not be large enough to produce 
sufficient adjustment to bring the two patterns into lineand as Chapter 
9 shows this does not happen. So while the mobility survey may underestimate 
self-recruitment because of the career effect, the difference between elite 
and lieutenant class recruitment patterns would still be between 15%, 20% 
or 25% when the most generous (or implausible) allowances are made. It seems 
reasonable to infer that the elites, narrowly-defined, are much less accessible 
than the lieutenant class, that their backgroundsand recruitment systems 
are very different, and that the elites are not 'like' other occupational 
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groupings because of this ( 1 ~) 
Now it is important to remember that what one has here is a 
discontinuity between evidence about family backgrounds 1n some positional 
elites on the one hand, and a set of occupations on the other. This 1s not 
in itself direct evidence for the existence of an elite, or that the positions 
discussed by the contributors to Stanworth and Giddens have 1n some way 
been shown to be powerful because sel~recruitment 1s high. At best, these 
recruitment data are compatible with such an interpretation, but mobility 
studies are about jobs, careers and backgrounds, and it is dangerous to over-
extend their findings. 
The importance of the discrepancy in the recruitment patterns is 
two-fold. It would seem that this kind of formulation of the problem - 1.e. 
contrasting the 'really powerful' with the 'not quite so powerful' -might be 
a fruitful line to follow, provided an adequate conception of power could be 
made. In other words, as Giddens has implied (Giddens, 1974, xii), the study 
of careers and avenues of connection may sustain positional analysis. Secondly, 
if the 'top people' and the lieutenant class are rather different, their 
inter-relationship - dependent, supportive, legitimative, recruitment pool 
etc., - therefore now seems more problematic,. and is in need of further 
empirical research. It is a problem which cannot be solved at a purely theoretical 
leYel, despite the efforts of the writers discussed in chapter 2 and 3. 
(18) It is interesting that Pahl and Winkler (1974, 241) have speculated 
that mobility research may have over-estimated upward mobility into 
the elite by over-estimating the size of the elite. One must have some 
sympathy with this opinion, but it does suggest that the UMC/elite 
differences could be even greater than the ones that we discuss. 
That being so, the reader may care to consider whether other arguments 
could explain away some of this difference: for instance, is the 
Scottish UMC more open than the English UMC, so that the latter is 
closer to the English elite? In fact, while we do not present data 
on this, Goldthorpe (1980) suggests little variation, and that if 
anything, this would be in the reverse direction. 
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Some concluding remarks 
This account of mobility has not revealed a neat or simple 
pattern. On the one hand there are elements of fluidity, while on the other· 
hand,. we find sharp class differentials in access. These are not purely 
artefactual, despite ·the earlier observations about the way certain techniques 
tend to emphasise one view or another: not for the first· time, the real world 
has proved to be complex. 
The three models of the class structure that have been re-examined 
~n the light of the Scottish data have all been found to be inadequate. There 
~s almost no evidence of a threshold effect, only a little more for a buffer-zone, 
and the thesis of progressive closure seems to survive only as an observation 
about elites narrowly-defined. Underlying all three of these models is the 
basic misconception, drawn from Glass, that almost all mobility is short 
range. Once it has been demonstrated that short-range mobility is not the 
dominant feature, these theoretical constructions require rebuilding. A 
similar view of short-range mobility (which dates from Sorokin) also appears in 
the ~ritings of:others like Parkin and Giddens, but in a more diffuse form; 
some implications of this will be drawn in _the final chapter 
Although one or two images - safety-net, semi-permeable membrane -
have been suggested, the complexity of the actual processes does not easily 
lend itself to handy metaphor. The basic pattern is a product of several 
tendencies: 
a) Nearer the 'top', there is high self-recruitment and low 
export of sons to the lower levels. 
b) Nearer the bottom, there is fairly high self-recruitment 
and fairly high export of sons to the upper levels. 
c) At all levels, a majority of sons enter other classes, 
and in all classes, the in-comers heavily out-number 
those whose fathers were in the same class. 
In discussing these results (indeed in conceptualising them ~n this way) 
the chapter has followed the ma~n tradition of mobility research, namely 
the identification of class boundaries, in equality of access to non-manual 
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classes, and the components of class formation, that is to say the investigation 
of upward mobility and the lack of it, particularly in reference to the 
higher groups. 
The latter part of the chapter has attempted to develop aspects 
of the sociology of the new managerial and professional class. Their 
backgrounds are fairly diverse, and their capacity to pass on occupational 
advantage, although relatively high, is still limited. It follows that 
their ability to generate a cohesive identity or class position seems very 
restricted as far as mobility is a factor, so that there is a disjuction 
between functional necessity under a technological system, and capacity 
to act as social class. Of course, the processes of selection and re-social-
ization work to counteract this, but such processes clearly must be accorded 
much more emphasis than hitherto, because the mobility rates are now seen 
to be so high. 
The present chapter has attempted to answer what can be seen as 
the most fundamental question about mobility, namely how much movement is 
there between origins and current status? In examining some of the implications 
of that answer, the dimension of occupational change has not always been 
paramount, because the initial question is framed in static, if historical, 
terms. Occupational transition has been included either by reference to the 
I 
father's distribution (a less than perfect representation, as the earlier 
critique of Glass explained) or by implication rather than explicitly: 
mobility rates are the results of a background process previously described. 
Now that the basic pattern is clear, we can deal with the second of the 
main mobility questions, is society becoming more or less open? This is 
a dynamic question, and one that lends itself to a more explicit answer 
in terms of the dynamics of economic change, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. 
289 
Appendix to Chapter 1 : The Service Class and the Lieutenant Class 
The service class and the lieutenant class concepts are essentially 
similar, but differ both in their conception and definition, the service 
class being large and operationalised as classes I and II of Goldthorpe's 
collapsed seven category schema, and the lieutenant class somewhat smaller, 
comprising class I of the SMS schema. Details of the occupational composition 
can be found in the Appendix I. This appendix presents some empirical 
data on the difference between SMS class I and class II, to amplify the 
conceptual aspects dealt with earlier in the chapter, and to show why class 
I can be sufficiently distinguished from what Goldthorpe regards as the cadet 
level of the service class as to be treated separately. 
As already noted, Goldthorpe's service class covers a wide range 
of Hope-Goldthorpe Occupational Grading scale points (82.05 to 45.15) 
The lieutenant class on the other hand, covers a smaller range, from 82.05 
to 60.12, with consequently less overlap of scores. These higher scores 
mean that the general public see these occupations as being, an average, 
marked by higher pay, more security of employment, pleasanter work conditions, 
and greater autonomy than other occupations (Hope and Goldthorpe, 1974, 
13). It follows that although this is not evidence that the UMC, as a 
privilidged ~ per se, is part of some general class-image, there are 
nonetheless empirical grounds that most people do identify the component 
occupations of the UMC as ones being sociall advantaged vis-a-vis those 
of class II, as well as all other classes. 
In the Scottish data, this can be demonstrated at least in terms 
of material advantage. As Fig 7.A. shows, people in the UMC have larger 
ma~n incomes than other classes, and second-generation members of the UMC 
have even higher incomes than first. generation new recruits to the class. 
These data, which have been indexed to September 1975, show that half of the 
UMC earned over £4,000, a quarter earned more than £5,000, and 10% earned 
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Fig.7A Gross Income p.a. from main oc-cupation: cumr.ulative% cf Classes land II 
indexed to S::pt. 1-975. 
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over £6,500. The comparable figures for class II are £3,300, £4,200, and 
£5,500. To put this another way the approximate proportions earning certain 
levels were: 
£4,000 + 5% class I 28% class II 
£5~000 + 25% class I 14% class II 
£6,500 + 10% class I 3% class I'I 
Of course income from main employment is only one index of material privilege. 
Income from other sources such as shares and property, plus job fringe 
benefits are also important, since only certain sectors of the population 
receive them. Our survey data on parts of these other sources of income are 
almost certainly underestimates of the true proportions, but nevertheless 
the UMC/class II differential is clear even in the reduced evidence. Over 
20% of the UMC have income from shares and property, compared with 11.3% of 
class II, and 14% of them admit to fringe benefits, compared with 5.6% of the 
other class. The classii pattern is closer to that for class III and IV 
than class I. 
This superiority of income has been translated into superior 
amenities for day-to-day living for both classes: the upper middle class 
are better housed and own more consumer durables than the rest of the sample. 
However, although there are differences between class I and II ~n life style 
(for example, 64% of class I are owner-occupiers, and 90% have telephones, 
as against 52% class II owners, and 82% with phones) the differences between 
these classes and classes III and IV are about the same. Both classes I and 
II stand out sharply against national figures at 29.4% and 56% respectively 
(Census Scotland 1971 Housing, p. llO and personal communication with the 
Post Office). The general low level of house-ownership is a result of 
Scottish housing traditions: nationally 64.7% of Registrar General's SEG's 
1-4 and 13 are home owners, compared with 64.1% of our (slightly-different) 
class I. 
A third area of comparison, education, is also based in part on 
material advantage. Nearly one in three UMC sons attended· fee-paying schools, 
the proportion for the other class was one in ten. About one in three 
UMC sons were educated at selective secondary schools: that is, the education 
system operated to select one third of those from that origins for academic 
education at 12 years of age, but it selected only a quarter of class II 
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sons for that privilege. The educational pattern reinforces the material 
advantage and desirability figures to convey an image of considerable occupation-
based privilege. 
One final area of comparison could be rates and patterns of 
mobility. The data for these can be inspected in Tables 7.1, 7.3 and 7.3. 
However, s~nce it is mobility that is the focus of the present study, it 
would be a rather circular argument to employ mobility as the one of basic 
identifiers of group membership, and then to use the class schema so defined 
as a means of analysing mobility rates. 
On the whole, the weight of the evidence suggests a genu~ne 
difference between the two classes, although the order of difference on some 
of the variables is not great. Obviously, if we had to combine class I with 
292 
another class, it would be with class II. In some cases this may be necessary 
_ for technical reasons, or for simplification, but these do not constitute 
a reason for adopting such a collapse as a normal feature of the research. 
The discussion in this appendix has been in terms of the Scottish classes 
I and II, not those used by Goldthorpe, and their boundaries do differ: 
however, the same logic could be applied to the English data to examine 
how homogeneous the service class really is. 
